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Human Nature and the Joint Social Project: Towards a Coherent Notion of Alienation

GABY BECKLEY

Introduction

In the 1844 Manuscripts Marx flips Feuerbach's criticism that religion alienates us, and instead claims that the economic system alienates us first, and religion is the response to this as ideology distracts us from our miserable alienated existence.¹ Thus this new view that capitalism causes humans to suffer some kind of severe estrangement forms a significant reason to criticise capitalism, which remains a useful tool to criticise capitalism today.² However, 'alienation' can be used in a variety of ways to describe the ills of society, to refer to any sort of isolation, detachment or estrangement, e.g. the alienation of the British public from the democratic system; class A alienates class B because they always talk about their rich lifestyles which B cannot relate to. But what was the core of the concept as Marx *specifically* understood it? Part of the issue is that there is no consensus on what he meant, and how alienation operates. In fact, some thinkers, such as Allen Wood, have said that Marx used the term in such a variety of ways that there can be no proper theory of alienation – it is perhaps just an emotive word that applies to a lot of situations, not a meaningful theory of a distinct class of problems. I plan to argue against this sceptical view of alienation and defend an interpretation of alienation posited by Gregory Mason which helps us understand exactly what conditions something must satisfy to count as being alienating.³

Reasons to be Sceptical

I will begin by outlining the reasons why people have doubted there can be a coherent theory of alienation. Allen Wood is doubtful about the chances of expounding a coherent theory of alienation from Marx because he thinks the

¹ K. Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* (Gregor Benton Trans., 1974); K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction* (Paris, 1844), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm> (Accessed 26/6/17).

² F. Pappenheim, 'The Alienation of Modern Man', <https://www.marxists.org/subject/alienation/pappenheim.htm>, (Accessed 09/06/2017).

³ G. Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*, (Nottingham, Unpublished, 2016).

phenomena which Marx describes as alienated are too varied.⁴ Marx talks about workers being alienated from their products, from their labour, from the state, and from the environment in which they work.⁵ He also speaks of the economic system of capitalism being alienating as a whole, by splitting people up into classes, and engaging people in activities which alienates them from each other and themselves.⁶ According to Marx, the economic and social structure alienates people from each other even further by setting them up in competition with each other, with their interests in direct opposition to those of others, so that they become concerned only with their own needs and not those of other people.⁷ According to Wood, Marx also views Christianity as an alienating illusion because it extracts all the best qualities from humanity and nature, and re-conceives of them as properties of something outside of nature, a being which cannot be shown to exist.⁸

Wood thinks that the only obvious link between all these cases of alienation is that they involve some sort of 'unnatural separation or hostile relationship'.⁹ Wood claims that this is not sufficient to formulate a full theory, because this vague commonality alone is not enough to think there is a true connection or a common cause between all these different phenomena. Wood doubts that the defects of human and social existence which count as alienated could be classified as a distinctive class in contrast to other types of dysfunction.¹⁰ For example, in contrast, substances which are gold seem to form a distinct and non-arbitrary category compared to other materials. There is a specific and naturally occurring feature which makes something gold – namely, the number of protons. So if we are given a substance we can work out if it is gold or some other material by looking at the number of protons. In contrast, the various phenomena Marx points out as alienated do not seem to have some clear feature in common which determines them as alienated in the same way. It seems there is not some fundamental property that all and only alienated dysfunctions have, in the same way that substances which are gold form a clear class because they have the common feature of having a particular number of

⁴ A. Wood, *Karl Marx* (Abingdon, 2nd Ed., 2004), p. 3.

⁵ Wood, *Karl Marx*, pp. 3-4.

⁶ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 3.

⁷ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 3.

⁸ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 4.

⁹ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 4.

¹⁰ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 4.

protons. Consider two different examples of alienated dysfunctions given by Marx for example: the process of human labour, and religion. They do not count as alienated in the same way; the explanation given for why labour is alienating is different from the explanation for that of religion.

An alternative way to understand alienation is that alienated objects are human creations which dominate or enslave their creators. Marx mentions this feature several times in the 1844 Manuscripts, for example saying that ‘the relationship of the worker to the product of labour [is as to] an alien object that has power over him’ and ‘the worker becomes a slave of his object’.¹¹ This is more specific, but Wood still rejects it, on similar grounds.¹² Again he says that because of the varied phenomena Marx picks out, we would have to apply this idea of alienated created objects to a range of human creations too broad and varied, including material objects such as cars, social institutions such as the state, and even ideas such as religious illusions.¹³ These are human creations in very different senses of the word, and as a result the way people are dominated by these is very diverse. So again, he thinks that this notion of an object which dominates its human creator is not the kind of description which picks out a distinct class, therefore does not count as a sufficiently unifying factor.¹⁴

Wood is certainly right to criticize those who claim that Marx presents a rigorous theory of alienation.¹⁵ Marx does mention varied phenomena, and moreover certain readings of Marx do suggest it will be hard to find a common element in the various phenomena of alienation, or to establish that alienation is a naturally and specifically definable class of dysfunction. For example, because Marx says that people are alienated from their labour, the product of their labour, each other, and themselves, it initially seems that that Marx presents four different types of alienation. But this understanding will not be very useful for a theory of alienation as it does not define the element common to each. This approach is also inconsistent with Marx’s claim

¹¹Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*.

¹² Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 5.

¹³ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 5.

¹⁴ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 5.

¹⁵ Wood, *Karl Marx*, pp. 4-5.

that proletarian and capitalist are alienated in the same way.¹⁶ On a simple reading it seems that capitalists might experience alienation from other people and themselves, but they are not engaged in labouring activities in the same way as proletarian workers are, who will experience alienation from their labour and the products of their labour. If we want to make sense of Marx's claim that capitalists and proletarians are alienated in the same way, we need to find a single, coherent concept of alienation, with these four descriptions being different aspects of one complex condition. What this core concept might be is not forthcoming in Marx's writings, as Wood notes. Hence it appears that assuming four separate types of alienation does not meet Wood's challenge. To vindicate the claim that there is a coherent theory of alienation underlying Marx's works we must find a common feature or cause which explains how each instance of alienation counts as such.

Problems with Wood's Scepticism

Explicating a theory of alienation based on Marx's writings is challenging and the way forward is not immediately obvious. However, I will argue that Wood is unjustified in claiming it to be impossible, that his scepticism is too hastily arrived at, and that there are other ways to provide a coherent theory of alienation. In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx clearly means to say something important about the world using his theory of alienation. As Wood concedes, 'Marx's early writings are...rich in both social and philosophical insights'.¹⁷ Certainly, alienation has historically appealed to and inspired ideas and understandings of the world.¹⁸ It may be that contemporary scholars have missed Marx's insights about alienation, and will continue to do so if they remain too sceptical about the possibility of explicating a theory of alienation consistent with his writings.

Wood's scepticism about explicating a full theory of alienation in terms of human creations dominating their creator leads him to re-define alienation in terms of

¹⁶ K. Marx & F. Engels, *The Holy Family* (Richard Dixon Trans., Moscow, 1956). Also see Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*.

¹⁷ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 5.

¹⁸ E.g. See the focus on alienation and the ideology which serves to distract us from alienated existence among many Neo-Marxists – Samuel Freeman, 'The Headquarters of Neo-Marxism', <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/03/23/frankfurt-school-headquarters-neo-marxism/>, (Accessed 15/03/2017).

psychological wellbeing. Wood thinks the most effective use of alienation is to describe it as experiencing a lack of self-worth or meaning in our lives, or needing illusions to experience meaning and self-worth.¹⁹ However, as Wood is aware, this is not what Marx intended as it puts the emphasis on psychological feelings at the expense of material reality, and Marx criticized Hegel and Feuerbach for characterising alienation as essentially about consciousness. Marx believed that life determines consciousness, not the other way around.²⁰ If Wood's conception of alienation, which is not the one Marx had in mind, is the only coherent notion of alienation we can extract from Marx's works, then we have probably missed something valuable and insightful about Marx's understanding and meaning of alienation. Wood thinks this is our only option as Marx's use of the term is too varied and vague, but, as I shall show, there are other options open for formulating a coherent theory of alienation based on Marx's ideas.

Distinguishing Causes, Alienation Itself, and Symptoms

Wood also fails to distinguish between the causes, constitution and symptoms of alienation, both in his reformulation of a concept of alienation and elsewhere in his argument.²¹ One of the main reasons Wood thinks a coherent theory of alienation is impossible is because of the varied phenomena that Marx counts as alienated. Yet some of the things Wood names here would probably more accurately and coherently be described as *manifestations* of alienation, rather than defining alienation itself, analogous to the symptoms of a disease. The fact that a disease has an array of different symptoms does not render impossible a coherent theory about what actually constitutes the disease (alienation), and how this leads to a variety of symptoms.

For instance, it seems likely, especially given what I have already said about Marx's disagreement with those who prioritize consciousness over material reality, that Marx would consider a loss of sense of self-worth or meaning in life to be a symptom of alienation, rather than constituting alienation itself. Similarly, the illusions Wood talks of such as religion are actually a reaction to unpleasant psychological states, and are

¹⁹ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 8.

²⁰ K. Marx, *The German Ideology* (London, 1932).

²¹ Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*.

not part of what constitutes alienation.²² As Marx expressed when he famously wrote that religion is the 'opium of the people', we create these illusions to distract ourselves from the alienated reality of our existence:

Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature... It is the opium of the people... The demand to give up the illusions about its conditions is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of the vale of woe, the halo of which is religion.²³

Marx makes very clear his belief here, that religion is a response to alienation. Hence, Wood does him a disservice to consider it part of what constitutes alienation. Marx also says elsewhere 'the gods were originally not the cause but the effect of the confusion in men's minds'.²⁴ Illusions may be a symptom or signifier of living in an alienating world, but are not (at least initially) objects which themselves alienate and dominate us, so are not part of what constitutes alienation.²⁵ Marx goes on to say that the relationship later becomes reciprocal, but this need not undermine the fact that initially religion is an *effect* of alienation, rather than *constituting* alienation. It is reciprocal in the sense that religion helps people accept the alienated state as normal by making the conditions more tolerable, so that they continue to live with it – this is Marx's meaning of religion as 'the opium of the people'. For this and other reasons, the disease analogy is not perfect as a parallel to alienation, but it sheds light on the kind of mistake Wood is making. Wood mischaracterises Marx when he considers religious consciousness as constituting alienation, rather than being an effect (and/or cause) of it. The complex idea of feedback effects that Marx seems to work with at various points in many of his writings should not lead us astray here.²⁶

Moreover, Wood's reasoning from a core idea he recognizes in Marx's use of alienation, to his idea of alienation consisting in psychological states may be

²² Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*.

²³ Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique*.

²⁴ Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*.

²⁵ Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*.

²⁶ G A Cohen has addressed the importance of feedback effects in Marx, and has theorised it using the device of functional explanation. Religion then, might also require a functional explanation.

misguided. Wood says 'a central application of [Marx's] image of 'unnatural separation' is that alienated individuals are in some sense separated from, at odds with, or hostile to themselves'.²⁷ He then moves directly to, in the next sentence:

These considerations motivate a provisional suggestion that alienation might be seen as the condition of a person who experiences life as empty, meaningless and absurd, or who fails to sustain a sense of self-worth'²⁸

Wood then reformulates alienation in terms of this concept, since he thinks that explicating a theory of alienation based on Marx's own views is a lost cause. Wood moves from recognizing alienation as involving separation from the self, to focusing on psychological states which, I argue, is an unjustified leap. While I grant that we might reasonably expect these psychological effects to often or always accompany being separated from or hostile to ones-self, clearly this would be a further effect of the condition of alienation, and not what constitutes alienation itself. It seems to me that a simpler approach will address how alienated individuals might be separated from themselves in some way, instead of focusing on the psychological effects that may or may not accompany this. I will now outline a theory which, I contend, is a more promising line of argument, and one which is directly applicable to contemporary social phenomena.

A More Promising Theory

Unlike Wood, Mason argues that a theory in terms of dominating objects may be possible, and might pick out some property or essence in the activity of labour which would explain what Marx considers consequences of alienation. Mason focuses on a wider reading of products dominating their creators.²⁹ We can say that we are all engaged in a type of labour, namely the joint human venture of shaping our world, and the world we create is at odds with what is needed for human flourishing.³⁰ This form of labour is alienating because we are involved in shaping a world where our human needs cannot be met, and the labour causes the multitude of varied effects

²⁷ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 8.

²⁸ Wood, *Karl Marx*, p. 8.

²⁹ Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*.

³⁰ Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*.

Marx mentions because the societies we form and sustain are at variance with the conditions required for human flourishing.

Marx is relying on implicit norms about requirements for human flourishing for his theory of alienation, as the key idea is that in alienated existence these requirements are not fulfilled.³¹ Marx is noticeably relying on such norms when he says of the alienated capitalist class that they experience ‘the semblance of a human existence’ whereas the proletariat experiences ‘the reality of an inhuman existence’.³² The use of these terms ‘human’ and ‘inhuman’ has normative implications, as Marx surely does not mean that alienated people are not living in a *biologically* human way.³³ He seems instead to be referencing some implicit norms about what counts as a *properly* human existence. For example, in the 1844 Manuscripts Marx hints at one of the specific norms for human flourishing, since he criticizes alienated labour for the fact that the worker ‘does not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind’.³⁴ This implies that work should develop the body and mind of the worker, which would seem to be one of the norms that Marx holds constitutes a properly human existence. Marx’s conditions for human flourishing seem also to involve things like living a creative life, and honouring our nature as social beings, thus being involved in joint ventures that will benefit humans as a whole.

The 1844 Manuscripts contain a recurring focus on human nature and the creation of the world, and how these relate in man’s labour. For instance, the following section communicates that in producing something not focused on or fitted to our human nature, we tear ourselves away from our human nature, and experience alienation. It is, therefore, in his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself to be a species-being. Such production is his active species-life. Through it, nature appears as *his* work and his reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of the species-life of man: for man produces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but actively and actually, and he can therefore contemplate himself in a world he himself has created. *In tearing away the object of his production from*

³¹ Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*.

³² Marx & Engels, *The Holy Family*, p. 51.

³³ Mason, *The Concept of Alienation*.

³⁴ Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, pp. 326-7.

*man, estranged labour therefore tears away from him his species-life, his true species-objectivity, and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him.*³⁵(My emphasis)

This quote and others suggest that it is the production of something at odds with human nature which is central to Marx's concept of alienation. This quote also refers to man's role in creating the world he lives in – not just consciously but in the actual, physical world. So the world can be seen as the product of man's labour. Therefore alienation may well have a common core, namely being involved in the production of something at variance with our human needs which comes to dominate existence (and so engenders an 'inhuman' existence) – i.e. the joint venture of shaping the social world. It may now be possible to arrive at necessary and sufficient conditions for alienation: i.e. people are alienated if and only if they are involved in the creation or maintenance of a society which is at odds with human nature and hence inimical to human flourishing. Note that it is joint activities which are important here, so someone in a capitalist society who works for their own human flourishing, according to Marx's norms, is still alienated because their involvement in the world (their creative and productive powers) serves to sustain a world at odds with human flourishing. Everyone in a capitalist society is involved in sustaining such a world, because the system itself ensures that they cannot escape doing so when they engage with the world. Jonathan Wolff notes that it is an 'unintended consequence' of the system we have created that capitalist and proletariat alike have no choice but to engage in this system; the capitalist cannot just stop competing with others and the proletariat cannot refuse to work. In such a system, oppressive structures are reinforced and act as barriers to human flourishing.³⁶ Thus society is constantly in the process of alienating labour because a) a system which is at odds with the conditions for human flourishing is constantly reinforced and b) this labour is alienating because human flourishing requires involvement in joint ventures which *benefit* rather than *harm* the human species as a whole.

This theory therefore also makes sense of the fact that capitalists are alienated in the *same way*. Both classes have a role in the joint creation of the human world, so

³⁵ Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 61. (See rest of 'estranged labour' section for more supporting quotes).

³⁶ J. Wolff, 'Karl Marx', <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/marx/>, (Accessed 08/12/2016).

both are alienated through this joint venture. To illustrate further, one implicit norm for human flourishing that might be teased out from Marx's work requires that people should live as social beings enjoying what Marx calls community. Capitalists, instead of being able to live flourishing lives as social beings, must engage in competition with other capitalists and with their workers. The capitalist must directly compete for a source of income in profits with other capitalists, by trying to get maximum business for herself. Also, according to Marx's theory of exploitation, the capitalist makes a profit by extracting surplus labour from the proletariat, who has little choice but to take the exploitative employment since capitalists own the means of production and thus exercise greater power. Hence capitalists sustain a world which makes them unable to live a flourishing life according to Marx's implicit norms, since they sustain a world where they are unable to fulfil the norm of cooperating to help others flourish, because they sustain a world that involves competition with others, and the exploitation of the proletariat. Just like the proletariat they are part of a society which cannot encourage true human flourishing and they have taken part in the creation and maintenance of a world which is at odds with human nature.³⁷ So in sustaining the system of capitalism, capitalists and proletarians alike are involved in sustaining a system where the proletariat class is exploited for the gain of the capitalist class, and so they sustain a world directly at odds with certain conditions necessary for human flourishing such as living as a social animal.

This approach represents a true attempt to understand Marx's intentions as it does not interpret psychological conditions as constituting alienation, although this aspect can still be seen as an effect of alienation. Mason's theory, in contrast to Wood's, need not rely on psychological states to explain that alienation involves separation from the self in some way. This approach understands the 'self' we are separated from in alienation as not constituted by the vision of myself I personally hold, but rather by a kind of 'core self' that I am, in virtue of being human, no matter what I think of myself. Since Marx implies that there are norms for living a proper human existence, this core self may constitute the natural class of 'being human' which involves core values that are necessary for flourishing human existence. If a society

³⁷ For her part, the proletarian must compete with others for employment in order to feed herself, due to her lack of bargaining power. This example serves to show *how* both classes can be said to be alienated in the same way, since often there is confusion over how capitalists can be alienated in the *same way* as the proletariat, if they are accepted as alienated at all.

cannot fulfil those norms, for example if it does not facilitate engagement in social relations, then human nature is denied, and the process of making such a society is alienating. Thus alienation involves separation from the self, by being separated from living a properly human existence appropriate to the core self or natural kind as a human. Such a theory does not require psychological states as the only way to recognize and define a separation from the self.

Mason's theory is also more explanatory than many of the other options Wood dismisses. In particular, the alienating feature of this joint labour can explain why it produces an alienated product, as the 1844 Manuscripts suggests a theory should.³⁸ Namely, society is engaged in the alienating process of creating and reinforcing a world which itself is unfit for human flourishing and is thus alienating from human nature. This represents a common theory of alienation which explains all the phenomena Marx refers to as alienated. The product of joint human labour (societies etc.) is alienating because it does not fulfil human nature e.g. it pits people against each other so is at variance with human nature as social beings. The labour involved is alienating because it is an activity not aimed towards right human fulfilment, and takes place in a society already at odds with the requirements for human flourishing. People are alienated from each other and themselves because they are not working to attain human flourishing for themselves and others, because they are sustaining a system where they are not able to fulfil their complex creative and social needs. Thus, under this theory, alienation from product, from process of production, from species being, and from other people are all different aspects of a core concept of alienation, rather than different types of alienation. This reading of Marx fits well with his texts and also grants more interpretative charity than that of Wood.

I argue that Wood is unnecessarily sceptical about the chances of explicating a theory of alienation based on what Marx says. There are other possibilities for providing a theory which preserve Marx's insights and explain why a whole range of phenomena are cases or manifestations of alienation. Mason's theory is promising in this respect, and fits in with the varied nature of Marx's comments about alienation. Mason argues that the core concept of alienation involves being dominated by the

³⁸ Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 326-7.

product of joint human venture, where this product is a world at odds with the requirements of human flourishing. This offers a coherent concept of alienation which explains what distinguishes it from other types of dysfunction.

I will now consider applications of the term 'alienation', as explicated by Mason, to modern phenomena.

Contemporary Application

As discussed, Mason concludes that people are alienated if and only if they are involved in the creation or maintenance of a society which is at odds with human nature and hence inimical to human flourishing. This offers a clear concept of what Marx means by alienation, which allows us to apply it in a meaningful way to modern phenomena.

Social Media

I argue that, for example, social media may be considered as alienating, if it contributes to society being at odds with human nature.³⁹ For instance, dating apps like Tinder seem likely to increase or promote superficiality. If this is something considered at odds with human nature and flourishing, then both the effects of and engagement in modern social media could be deemed alienating. Our improved understanding of alienation means that if social media has these effects, which contribute to society being at odds with flourishing, then the experience of engaging in social media is itself alienating. Swiping left or right based on superficial consideration of an individual's appearance may be considered alienating, because it promotes in society a tendency towards superficiality obsession with appearance. One of the benefits of Mason's explication of alienation is that something is alienating if it contributes to a world at odds with human nature. If you think superficiality is inimical to human nature, you can use the core definition of Marxist alienation as explicated here in your own way, because what constitutes human nature for you is a separate matter and may go beyond what Marx says or implies

³⁹ Note that I am not saying any of the problems listed below are new ills – the argument stands so far as social media increases or even sustains existing features of society which are at odds with human nature.

about human nature. Using Marx's term in this way becomes a specific and powerful criticism based on one's own view of human nature and the effects of social media.

Another sense in which social media might be alienating is that it further undermines the privacy of individuals. The amount of personal information we make available online, both knowingly and unknowingly, makes private details vulnerable to businesses, governments and hackers. Employers can view aspects of one's 'private life' which were not intended to be made available beyond selected and trusted friends; businesses can purchase personal information to target individuals with specific advertising according to profile (e.g. age, gender) and interests; governments can potentially gain access to even private conversations between friends or family. Such aspects of social media seem inimical to human flourishing. Again, if the consequence is a society more at odds with human nature, then the experience of aiding in this process is itself alienating. The whole experience of supporting and giving more information to websites, which then profit from private information and interactions, becomes an alienating experience. This would mean making available such information online in the first place, both intentionally and not, through the act of engagement, is an alienating experience because it contributes to an alienated culture.

The controllers of businesses, governments, or social media websites who engage in these practices experience alienation in their work life, because they create a society at odds with human flourishing. Such relationships to other humans is at odds with their human nature too, so in promoting a lack of privacy they are engaged in the alienating process of creating a world at odds with our human nature. Thus, using Mason's definition, we can see how these negative effects of social media mean that in engaging with social media in the first place, we are alienated because we contribute to the creation of a world at odds with human flourishing.

Scepticism: The New 'Opium of the People'?

Marx famously said that religion was the 'opium of the people'.⁴⁰ By this he meant that it distracts people from their alienation and oppression, by feeding them a

⁴⁰ Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique*.

beautiful lie. Marx claimed that people use religion and the false consciousness it offers as a drug to escape their miserable reality, by believing in myths such as 'we are all equal in God's eyes' or 'I will get my reward in heaven'. As noted earlier, religion seems to be an example of a 'feedback loop' in Marx's work. It is initially an effect of alienation, but then it contributes to alienation by keeping people unaware of their alienation and making their life more tolerable so that they do not seek to change things.

The idea here is one of false ideologies arising from and then contributing to alienation. This function is not limited to religion, and may be fulfilled by political beliefs, for example a secular belief that we are all equal as often espoused by liberalism may distract its believers from the reality that people are not equal in the real world – people face varying degrees of challenge with varying degrees of resources, and moreover capitalism is necessarily a system of inequality.

I briefly want to suggest that an increasing scepticism about truth might function as a modern opium of the people. A degree of scepticism is certainly not novel among philosophers, where many doubt that there are objective moral facts, or think there are or might be moral facts but that can never be known. In any case, whether moral facts are unknowable or morality is simply subjective, it seems a natural conclusion to think there is little profit in pontificating about 'the truth'.

In the recent political climate, it has become increasingly hard to know which, if any, news-sources to trust. There is also an increasing acknowledgement that even supposedly reliable or fact-focused news sources like the BBC are not without bias – even news sources which make a conscious effort not to favour a particular political or moral view inevitably are biased in the way they report the news and the words they use. In part, increased acknowledgement of racial and religious prejudice in news reporting has brought to attention how the pictures chosen and the words used ('student' vs. 'thug', 'terrorist' vs. 'lone wolf') frame otherwise identical stories and facts in different ways.

In addition, Harry Frankfurt raises a concern that certain politicians, using Donald Trump as an example, seem to not to be liars, but 'bullshitters'.⁴¹ Liars are people

⁴¹ Frankfurt, H., 'Donald Trump Is BS, Says Expert in BS', <http://time.com/4321036/donald-trump-bs/>, (Accessed 27/04/2017). For more, see H. Frankfurt, *On Bullshit* (London, 2005).

who purposefully say something they believe is untrue, but remain aware of and concerned with the actual truth of the matter. In contrast, bullshitters are unconcerned with whether what they say is true or not. They are wholly focused on shaping the beliefs of their audience, e.g. rousing support. For example, politicians and others may make dramatic and often unverifiable statements, designed to illicit a specifically desired reaction. In those instances, such individuals appear to be unconcerned as to whether their statements are true or not – such issues become a matter of no concern, as conveying truth or otherwise is beside the point.⁴²

Increasing awareness of untrustworthy and biased reporting; lies, and, even worse, 'bullshit' from politicians, might all make us increasingly sceptical about truth. As people acknowledge how hard, or even impossible it is to determine the truth of social and political matters, and grow accustomed to politicians not only distorting the truth but deciding it is beyond their concern, it is increasingly tempting to give up on the idea of any knowable truth. Arguably, while certainly people should not readily believe everything they hear, not least because they may fall prey to ideologies which serve as 'opium' in Marx's sense, ceasing to believe in the possibility of 'truth' at all also serves to distract people from their alienation. If all is 'meaningless', if there is doubt as to the ability to categorize actions, events, and ideas as morally wrong, then the existence and prevalence of the lived condition of human alienation may appear not to matter. People may give up on seeking truth in any form, or trying to affect change, because all appears meaningless, impossible and therefore pointless. Certain forms of extreme scepticism might therefore serve as 'opium', as an effective tool to silence potential rebellion.

Conclusion

In introducing Greg Mason's alternative theory of alienation, I have shown that Wood's scepticism need not be accepted and scholars need not give up on explicating a coherent concept of alienation from Marx's work. Instead alienation can be understood as arising from the joint social process of creating a world at odds with our human nature. I hope to have shown how alienation may be specifically

⁴² Frankfurt, 'Donald Trump Is BS'

defined, and how it might then serve as a powerful and distinct tool to critique capitalism. For instance, one can use the term 'alienation' to signify a particular and distinct harm related to one's own view of human nature. Criticisms on the grounds of alienation can remain powerful, even for those who do not share Marx's view that all people are social beings, or those who hold a theory of human nature with extra conditions that Marx never implies. In those cases, phenomena which people consider as alienating, or the reasons why they consider them to be so, may differ from Marx's interpretation. Using alienation in this way may offer a powerful critical tool to consider modern phenomena, such as social media and extreme scepticism.

***Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* and Hollywood's Misrepresentation of the Politics of Interracial Relationships in 1960s America**

SARAH DUNNE

Guess Who's Coming to Dinner (1967) is a Hollywood film, starring Sidney Poitier as an African-American man who is engaged to Joanna Drayton, a white woman with liberal parents. The film, directed by Stanley Kramer, depicts the reactions of the couple's parents to their prospective union, ultimately emphasising an acceptance of interracial marriage and limited African-American integration into white society. The film was released when the 'subject of interracial marriage excited a great deal of public discussion' due to the historic *Loving v. Virginia* verdict.¹ *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* provides a cinematic depiction of an interracial relationship only twelve years after the murder of Emmett Till, a fourteen year old black boy who was killed in Mississippi 'for whistling at a white woman.'² This incident demonstrates 'the severity of the taboo' historically surrounding interracial relationships in American society.³ Interracial relationships can be defined more broadly than the romantic, as the film focuses much of its attention on John Prentice's interactions with Matt Drayton, Joanna's father. However, as this essay will argue, several elements of *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, such as the unrealistic characterisation of John Prentice, its liberal ideologies and affluent setting, and its failure to acknowledge social movements such as Black Power, prevent the film from fully depicting the struggles many African-Americans and prospective interracial marriages encountered in the late 1960s.

Interracial marriage was still a politically and socially contentious subject when *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* was released in 1967. This was illustrated by the impact of the verdict in *Loving v. Virginia* (1967), a case which involved 'a black woman and a white man who had been sweethearts since childhood.'⁴ The verdict

¹ G. A. Harris & R.B Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations Regarding Stanley Kramer's Film on the Subject of Interracial Marriage', *The Journal of Popular Culture*, 40/4 (2007), p. 708.

² K. Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society: Interracial Marriage and Stanley Kramer's *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* in Late 1960s America', *Studies By Undergraduate Researchers at Guelph*, 4/1 (2010), p. 25.

³ Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society', p. 25.

⁴ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 708.

removed laws banning interracial marriages in the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment 'only 6 months before the release' of *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*.⁵ Prior to this judgement, anti-miscegenation laws still existed in sixteen states, mostly in the South. Justice Earl Warren's judgement ended laws 'which prohibit[ed] and punish[ed] marriages on the basis of racial classifications.'⁶ However, a legal ruling does not instantly catalyse a change in public opinion. In 1968, one year after the *Loving v. Virginia* verdict, and the release of *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, only '20% of Americans approved of marriage between blacks and whites.'⁷ As Anne Perrin notes, it is 'not merely an irony that miscegenation laws were struck down after the rest of Jim Crow.'⁸ This was due to the fact that 'the idea of intermixing was a major fear of the white power structure' in American society.⁹ The social importance of interracial marriage as a topic in 1967 is also demonstrated by the public reaction to the marriage of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's daughter, Peggy, to African-American Guy Smith. 'The newlywed couple even appeared on the cover of Time magazine in September of 1967', which demonstrates that a high profile interracial marriage was considered newsworthy in this period.¹⁰ The Time article reported that 'Democrat Washington insiders were apprehensive about the nuptials, but 'the marriage did not unleash the kind of storm that it would have stirred only a few years ago.'¹¹ This indicates that although opinions were moving towards favouring interracial marriage, progress was slow. Like the characters of Joanna Drayton and John Prentice in *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, Peggy Rusk and Guy Smith's union involved a white woman and a black man. This racial combination was a more taboo pairing than the couple involved in *Loving v. Virginia*, as Southern ideology regarded the 'preservation of white womanhood [as] fundamental' and that it would be damaged by interracial marriage.¹² However, despite raising the important issue of acceptance of interracial marriage during a period of tumultuous social change in American society, *Guess*

⁵ A. G. Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class, and Gender Constructions in late 1960s America', *The Journal of Popular Culture*, 45/4 (2012), p. 847.

⁶ E. Warren, 'Opinion: *Loving v. Virginia*', 388 U.S. 1, June 12, 1967, *Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School*, <www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/388/1#writing-USSC_CR_0388_0001_ZO> (Accessed: 26/02/15).

⁷ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 712.

⁸ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 847.

⁹ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 847.

¹⁰ Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society', p. 26.

¹¹ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 848.

¹² Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 855.

Who's Coming to Dinner missed an opportunity to make a true impact on conservative viewers relating to interracial relationship; probably because the film is a light-hearted comedy, fuelled by the liberal ideology of director Stanley Kramer and writer William Rose, which does not fully explore the impact of racism on American politics and society in this period.

The message of *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* is firmly entrenched in liberal ideology. The film adopts Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s spirit of interracial co-operation and integration as the means by which racial difficulties can best be solved. The film's 'unambiguous morality [...] reflects the idealism of the 1960s movements' led by Dr. King while also depicting the 'problem of racial integration and equality as a moral issue.'¹³ However, in adopting this approach, the film becomes mainly focused on the interaction between the white and black men. This is best represented by 'the conflict between John Prentice and Matt Drayton [which] is a sort of personification of the integrationist Martin Luther King, Jr. faction of the Civil Rights Movement.'¹⁴ This is a similar approach to movies such as *In the Heat of the Night* (1967), also starring Sidney Poitier as Detective Virgil Tibbs, an experienced Philadelphia police officer, who helps the white Police Chief Bill Gillespie solve a murder in the racist town of Sparta, Mississippi. Tibbs and Gillespie's interactions in this film showed 'nostalgia for the interracial cooperation of the early Civil Rights movement' namely between black and white men.¹⁵ By 1967, the message of racial dialogue between white and black men had become an outdated method for gaining racial progress and equality. Previously, the Civil Rights Movement, which had promoted interracial organising through groups like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), had lobbied in the South, resulting in legislative progress such as The Civil Rights Act (1964) and The Voting Rights Act (1965). However, by the time *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* was released, the political emphasis had changed significantly. In 1966, SNCC ordered an 'expulsion of whites' from its membership, and Black Power had replaced the language of interracial cooperation as a means to achieving interracial progress.¹⁶ Even Martin Luther King

¹³ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 847.

¹⁴ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 849.

¹⁵ A. Levine, 'Sidney Poitier's Civil Rights: Rewriting the Mystique of White Womanhood in *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* and *In the Heat of the Night*', *American Literature*, 73/2 (2001), p. 377.

¹⁶ W. Breines, *The Trouble Between Us: An Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist Movement* (Oxford, 2007), p. 25.

Jr. acknowledged that 'social racism remained' and went north to fight against housing segregation and white flight in his Chicago Movement.¹⁷ In 1967, the Black Panther Party, led by Stokely Carmichael of the SNCC, had located its headquarters in Oakland, California, in close proximity to where *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* is set, in San Francisco. However, by failing to have the film's characters recognise, or even reference, the 'prevailing radicalism of black America at the time, including the radicalism of blacks close to San Francisco', *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* does not acknowledge the validity of Black Power as a means of dismantling racism in American society.¹⁸ Tillie, the Drayton's maid, is the only character who mentions Black Power in the film, when she tells John that he is 'just out for all you can get, with your Black Power and all that other trouble-making nonsense.'¹⁹ In accusing John of representing the Black Power movement she misappropriates its meaning completely, leaving the contemporary white viewer in ignorance of Black Power's goals and political significance in the African-American struggle for racial equality.

By the mid-1960s, 'the emergence of the Black Power movement, and the uprisings in the cities all across America' such as in Watts in 1965, 'had challenged the viability of integration as a political solution to segregation and racism.'²⁰ Yet, the main African-American character in *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, John Prentice, fails to represent this ideological shift. Black Power advocates 'believed inclusion into the white middle-class institutions was impossible' and leaders such as Stokely Carmichael encouraged 'the formation of separate, black establishments.'²¹ An affluent and successful doctor, John graduated '*magna cum laude* from John's Hopkins, taught at Yale, and the London School of Tropical Medicine' and therefore integrated himself into elite white educational institutions, which acted in direct contrast to the ideals of Black Power.²² His feat is considered so unusual, presumably to white moviegoers, for an African-American man, that Matt Drayton states that if John listed his accomplishments, that 'no one would believe him.'²³ John Prentice, while not representing Black Power, also does not resemble

¹⁷ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 851.

¹⁸ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 704.

¹⁹ *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* (Dir: Stanley Kramer, 1967).

²⁰ T. Wartenberg, *Unlikely Couples: Movie Romance as Social Criticism* (Colorado, 1999), p. 114.

²¹ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 850.

²² Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 853.

²³ *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* (Dir: Stanley Kramer, 1967).

the typical African-American male of the 1960s. 'Few African Americans were privileged enough to have climbed the ladder of economic and professional success by 1967', as John Prentice has done, his affluence indicated by his generous tip to the taxi driver at the start of the film.²⁴ In 1965, the controversial document, *The Negro Family: The Case For National Action*, known as the Moynihan Report, outlined the extent to which many African-American families lived in a 'cycle of poverty and deprivation' and suffered from broken family structures.²⁵ John Prentice does not represent or acknowledge this scenario. His parents remain married, despite the fact that African-Americans had a 'higher frequency of broken homes' than any other race.²⁶ John and his father are both employed, contrary to the high unemployment rate of the African-American male, which reached 29.2 percent in the 'prosperous year' of 1963.²⁷ African-Americans were grossly underpaid in relation to their white counterparts and often denied welfare benefits, yet in the world of *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, money is no object. Joanna orders extra steaks and requests they be delivered in a taxi, while Mr and Mrs Prentice buy expensive plane tickets to visit San Francisco for one evening.

The characters in *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* are distinctly upper-class, alienating many African-American audience members, who 'were interested in developing race consciousness, expressing group pride, and pushing for community control', yet were faced with a successful film that did not share, or even acknowledge, their values.²⁸ Instead, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* ultimately argues that integration was the best means to achieve racial equality, but only 'if white people integrate with upper-class black people.'²⁹ This sentiment, which ignored Black Power and the political climate of the late 1960s, coupled with the highly idealised nature of Sidney Poitier's character, prevented the film from delivering a realistic and relatable representation of interracial relationships in this period.

²⁴ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 703.

²⁵ D.P. Moynihan, 'The Negro Family: The Case for National Action' (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 30.

²⁶ Moynihan, 'The Negro Family: The Case for National Action', p. 36.

²⁷ Moynihan, 'The Negro Family: The Case for National Action', p. 21.

²⁸ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 704.

²⁹ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 851.

John Prentice was viewed as an inauthentic member of African-American society in the 1960s. As previously discussed, Dr. Prentice's class status and profession meant that he did not represent 'the diverse economic, social, and cultural attributes of American blacks in the sixties.'³⁰ This is not to say that it was impossible for an African-American man to reach a position of financial and career success similar to that of John Prentice in 1960s America. Rather, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner's* characterisation of John Prentice is troubling to its audience in that it suggests that acquiring wealth and status is the best way to gain acceptance in white society and become 'worthy', in the eyes of white patriarchal figures like Matt Drayton, of interracial marriage. *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner's* white audience gained little understanding of the majority of African-American experiences from watching this film. Black audiences would, once again, not see themselves truly represented in another Hollywood film. Minor African-American characters, such as Dorothy and Mr. and Mrs. Prentice are given minimal development, while Tillie and John are depictions of African-American stock characters. Tillie represents the 'wise black mammy' figure that African-American women were often confined to playing on the silver screen.³¹ John is reminiscent of an Uncle Tom, being perfectly compliant with white society. Critics have noted that 'John Prentice demonstrates the opposite values of Black Pride because he defers to Matt Drayton's judgment and disregards his father's opinion' on his impending nuptials.³² John tells his father that 'you don't own me', yet voluntarily places total control of his relationship with Joanna in the hands of her white father.³³ John is seen as a wholly virtuous character, not responding to everyday racism from the taxi driver and Hilary, while also maintaining composure when Tillie repeatedly questions his motives, and accuses him of being 'above himself.'³⁴ John possesses so many virtuous characteristics that he is effectively a perfect 'white man in black skin'.³⁵

Kramer made John Prentice a 'paragon of virtue' in order to remove 'potential objections to marriage on economic, social, and cultural bases' and to 'require

³⁰ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 709.

³¹ S.M. Lyman, 'Race, Sex, and Servitude: Images of Blacks in American Cinema', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 4/1 (1990), p. 54.

³² Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 859

³³ *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* (Dir: Stanley Kramer, 1967).

³⁴ *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* (Dir: Stanley Kramer, 1967).

³⁵ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 709

audiences to face the issue of colour prejudice directly.³⁶ However, this artistic decision, which made the film 'more palatable [to] hesitant white audiences', deprived it of the opportunity to authentically represent the racism and ostracism that 'lower class, interracial couples' faced from both black and white society in 1960s America.³⁷ In 2016, Hollywood made an attempt to rectify this class disparity, with the historical drama, *Loving*. This film focused on the true story of Mildred and Richard Loving, a black woman and a white man who were ordered to vacate Virginia for twenty-five years as a result of their marriage violating the state's anti-miscegenation law. Ultimately, the Supreme Court case based on their plight, *Loving v. Virginia*, ended anti-miscegenation laws in a number of states in 1967. Unlike *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, *Loving* quietly assumes that its modern audience already agrees that Richard and Mildred's marriage is valid, and knows that justice will prevail. As a result, while artistically beautiful, the film is heavily visual and understated, muting the violence of the Civil Rights era South. Similarly, the frequent narrative focus on lawyers Bernard Cohen and Phil Hirschkop deprives Mildred and Richard of agency in verbalising their experiences and emotions. Despite this, the critically acclaimed *Loving* shows a distinct effort to tell the story of the couple authentically, providing a sense of hope that future cinema, unlike *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, will endeavour to represent the reality of historical and political climates for mainstream audiences.

Guess Who's Coming to Dinner was enormously popular with white audiences, receiving ten Academy Award nominations. This was partially due to Sidney Poitier, who in 1967 was 'the year's biggest box office star', playing notable roles in *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* and *In the Heat of the Night*.³⁸ Poitier's stardom is widely attributed by critics 'to the consistent nobility, altruism, and pacifism of the characters he played.'³⁹ Both John Prentice and Virgil Tibbs were virtuous heroes who, according to contemporary journalist Clifford Mason, only existed in the 'white world...helping the white man solve the white man's problem.'⁴⁰ These characters failed to authentically represent African-American culture and the growing Black

³⁶ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 703, 709.

³⁷ Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society', p. 26; Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 850.

³⁸ Levine, 'Sidney Poitier's Civil Rights', p. 381.

³⁹ Levine, 'Sidney Poitier's Civil Rights', p. 381.

⁴⁰ Levine, 'Sidney Poitier's Civil Rights', p. 382.

Power movement, leading to an 'inundation of negative comments' regarding Poitier's depictions of Prentice and Tibbs.⁴¹ These criticisms demonstrated 'how out of step [Poitier's] movies were with the needs and frustrations of his own people.'⁴² Some critics rejected the notion that Poitier needed to 'employ language of the inner city, reveal talent in basketball, or express distrust of whites in order to present a more authentic characterization of African Americans' in cinema, but despite their claims having some merit, they were in the minority.⁴³ The majority of African-Americans did not feel Poitier represented their community, and would have to wait until the rise of Blaxploitation films such as *Shaft* (1971) and *Sweet Sweetback's Baadasssss Song* (1971) to see more authentic African-American characters in popular cinema.

One of the reasons Sidney Poitier was so popular with white audiences stemmed from the non-threatening nature of the roles he played. John Prentice is 'virtuously sexless.'⁴⁴ He and Joanna only kiss once in the entire film, the first major interracial kiss in Hollywood. The kiss is reflected through the taxi cab's window and accompanied by the driver's disapproving glare, emphasising the film's promotion of 'vague interracial tolerance.'⁴⁵ John's brief interest in Dorothy when she first appears is only included to prove that he is not solely interested in white women. Kramer and Rose were making a decided effort to distance Poitier's character from the black rapist archetype that had been popularised by *Birth of a Nation* in 1915. They did not want 1967 audiences to 'identify John Prentice with the demonic sexuality of Griffith's blackface villains.'⁴⁶ The fear that Poitier's character should be associated with this stereotype led the filmmakers to create a 'distinguished, race-neutral black man' who was 'greatly distanced from the social realities of the times.'⁴⁷ Many Americans were ready to discuss African-American sexuality in 1967. This was demonstrated by the popularity of Black Panther Elridge Cleaver's memoir *Soul on Ice* (1968). It was a work that openly discussed black male sexuality and interracial relationships. It sold one million copies initially, and 'The New York Times

⁴¹ Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 858.

⁴² Perrin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: The Web of Racial, Class and Gender Constructions', p. 858.

⁴³ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 710.

⁴⁴ Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society', p. 28.

⁴⁵ Levine, 'Sidney Poitier's Civil Rights', p. 371.

⁴⁶ Wartenberg, *Unlikely Couples*, p. 126.

⁴⁷ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', pp. 702-703.

labelled *Soul on Ice* as 'Book of the Year' in 1968.⁴⁸ Although the work must be condemned for its unapologetic descriptions of the rape of both black and white women, its popularity proved that black male sexuality and interracial relationships were a point of interest for many unenlightened Americans in this period.

Therefore, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* missed an opportunity to present a positive, but more importantly realistic, depiction of black male sexuality onscreen.

John's poignant discussion with his father towards the end of *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* is particularly notable for his accusation that 'you think of yourself as a coloured man. I think of myself as a man.'⁴⁹ The ideal John is describing here is akin to a colour-blind society. Such a society contradicted Black Power's ideal of celebrating black identities, but would have seemed impossible to many African-Americans who encountered institutional racism on a daily basis. Yet, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* depicts racism as individual prejudice that is linked to generational difference. The prominence of a 'colour-blind youth culture' in *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, allows the audience to interpret 'racism as a generational phenomenon, doomed to pass away as naturally' as the next generation assumes political control.⁵⁰ Joanna is 'the embodiment of the colour-blind ideal with which the Draytons had raised her' as she does not attribute significance to the colour of her fiancé's skin.⁵¹ The carefree dancing of Dorothy and the white delivery boy to rock and roll music is meant to symbolise the next generation's approach to interracial interaction. In this way, John Prentice's ideal of a colour-blind society is presented as inevitability, rather than a dream. *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* is set in 1967, which is when the 'Summer of Love' occurred in the Haight-Ashbury neighbourhood of San Francisco. The image of Dorothy and the delivery boy dancing, as well as the image of groups of teenagers enjoying ice cream and one another's company at the drive-through, is an idealised representation of the youth culture of the 1960s, glossing over the 'celebration of sex, drugs, and rock'n roll' as well as the homelessness that was rampant during this period.⁵² Also, by situating the film in San Francisco, John and Joanna's interracial relationship is established in 'the most

⁴⁸ Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society', p. 26.

⁴⁹ *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* (Dir: Stanley Kramer, 1967).

⁵⁰ Wartenberg, *Unlikely Couples*, pp. 123-124.

⁵¹ Wartenberg, *Unlikely Couples*, p. 117.

⁵² Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society', p. 27.

liberal metropolitan area' in the United States.⁵³ Similarly, the couple's planned move to Geneva for their nuptials ensures that their relationship won't be tested in the more racially hostile climate of the United States. As Glen Harris noted in his critique of the film: 'if Hollywood's story had shown Prentice and Joanna falling in love in Baltimore and planning to move to Georgia, it would have dealt more honestly and truthfully with the power of social resistance to mixed-colour marriages in 1960s America.'⁵⁴ Therefore, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner's* liberal setting creates an idealised image of serious social issues and fails to truly acknowledge the problems created for personal relationships by racism in American society.

By depicting the main African-American character as an affluent doctor, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* fails to address racism as an institutional problem. It does not emphasise the extent to which racism prevented African-Americans from advancing in society. Tillie is a domestic, a job that is a 'racially determined effect of the structure of American society' which deprived African-American women of educational and wider employment opportunities, based on race and gender discrimination.⁵⁵ Dorothy's part time job in the kitchen implies that the same fate is likely to befall her. Although the Black Power Movement, and even the Moynihan Report, advocated for more 'educational and employment opportunities' for African-Americans, these resources were mostly directed towards men.⁵⁶ Women in the Black Power movement were forced into traditional gender roles, and depicted as 'as the source of black men's troubles.'⁵⁷ Therefore, African-American women were forced to endure institutional racism, but also sexism within their own movements, a conundrum that Frances Beal referred to as 'Double Jeopardy.'⁵⁸ *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* does a better job of acknowledging everyday racism, but it is not heavily punished in this film. Although Christina fires Hilary for her attitude towards John, she grants her a \$5,000 dollar severance payment, which is worth roughly \$36,660 in 2017 when adjusted for inflation.⁵⁹ The taxi driver receives a generous tip,

⁵³ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 704.

⁵⁴ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 705.

⁵⁵ Wartenberg, *Unlikely Couples*, p. 122.

⁵⁶ M. Wallace, *Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman* (London, 1979), p. 114.

⁵⁷ Breines, *The Trouble Between Us*, pp. 58-59.

⁵⁸ F. Beal, 'Double Jeopardy: To be Black and Female', in T.C. Bambara (Ed.), *The Black Woman: An Anthology*, (New York, 1970), pp. 90-99.

⁵⁹ U.S. Inflation Calculator, <<http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/>>, (Accessed 06/06/2017)

despite his overt racism. Racist attitudes are not truly punished in this film, much like they were not punished in 1960s American society.

Overall, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* is undoubtedly a significant film, as it depicted an onscreen interracial relationship in a period when 'important social changes' were occurring regarding race in American society.⁶⁰ However, the film's impact is limited by its outdated ideology of 'an interracial liberalism [which was] increasingly irrelevant' in a political climate dominated by Black Power.⁶¹ Although Sidney Poitier was a respected actor, the film must be criticised for John Prentice's overly virtuous characterisation and its unrealistic representation of the wider African-American community. By setting the film in an affluent area of the liberal city of San Francisco, and having the majority of characters eventually approve the marriage, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* 'manages to greatly subdue the harsh language of racism and avoids the oppressive history of African-American exploitation and white privilege.'⁶² The conclusion of the film, which gives Matt Drayton 'the final and decisive word' on the marriage, and sees lower class African-Americans like Tillie remain in subservient domestic roles, does little to alter the balance of power in interracial dialogue.⁶³ The film 'presents the white elite as the ones with the power to resolve racial injustice' and does little to catalyse social change in this period. By presenting racism as a personal problem, bound to die out as a result of generational succession, the film 'encourages its audience to passively await the arrival of integration rather than actively work for its realization.'⁶⁴ Overall, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* does not accurately represent the obstacles and racism that interracial relationships encountered in 1960s America.

⁶⁰ Harris & Toplin, 'Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?: A Clash of Interpretations', p. 711

⁶¹ Levine, 'Sidney Poitier's Civil Rights', p. 371.

⁶² Anderson, 'Film as a Reflection of Society', p. 25.

⁶³ Levine, 'Sidney Poitier's Civil Rights', p. 375.

⁶⁴ Wartenberg, *Unlikely Couples*, p. 123.

Ants and Cicadas: South American Football and National Identity

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Argentina play football with a lot of imagination and elegance but technical superiority cannot compensate for the abandonment of tactics. Between the two *rioplatense* national teams, the ants are the Uruguayans, the cicadas are the Argentinians. [Italian journalist, Gianni Brera.]¹

Introduction

Despite having spent centuries together as part of the Spanish colonial Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, the independence wars of the nineteenth century and their aftermath saw Argentina and Uruguay separate, with the creation of the latter as an independent buffer state guaranteed by the UK in 1827 to ward off Brazilian territorial pretensions (Brazil having occupied the country from 1817).² With no discernible Uruguayan national feeling, there was little or nothing to differentiate it from its larger neighbour. Certainly, they shared the same dialect of the Spanish language as well as culinary tastes for beef, mate and *dulce de leche*, and culturally they would share the later development of the tango and reverence for the myth of the *gaucho*. Indeed, Campomar argues that Argentina considers Uruguay, 'as a proto-province rather than a separate nation-state.'³ The largescale immigration that came later in the century did much to produce a subtle variation between the two nations. In Argentina, large numbers of Italians immigrants brought their own cultural norms to the societal mix, whilst in Uruguay, Spanish immigrants were more prevalent.⁴

One key cultural signifier in which Uruguay could express both its existence internationally and difference from Argentina has been through the playing of football. Indeed, from the Argentine perspective, Levinsky has argued that, 'football constitutes a cultural space of the utmost importance, if not the most significant in its

¹ E. Archetti, 'In Search of National Identity: Argentinian Football and Europe' in J. A. Mangan (Ed.), *Tribal Identities, Nationalism, Europe, Sport* (London, 1996).

² R. Harvey, *Liberators* (London, 2000), p. 493.

³ A. Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, (London, 2014), pp. 100-1.

⁴ C. Taylor, *The Beautiful Game* (London, 1998), p. 31.

different dimensions. Constructor of individual, neighbourhood, regional and national identities, football is a totally social thing.⁵ This difference would be diffused and explained to the wider population through the pages of the mass print media on both sides of the Río de Plata. In analysing these newspapers and magazines, this paper will seek to go beyond existing academic literature in the field which has focused on the development of football as a signifier of national identity in Argentina and Uruguay individually, particularly that by Archetti and Alabarces in the case of Argentina, and Giulianotti and Osaba in Uruguay, by looking at how the juxtaposition of the footballing rivalry between them has contributed to notions of exceptionalism between the two republics.⁶

Shared Origins

The Río de la Plata estuary which separates the Argentine and Uruguayan capitals of Buenos Aires and Montevideo was the cradle of football in Latin America. The introduction and diffusion of football followed similar patterns in both countries, from within the small but economically important British communities. The British settled in the River Plate region in support of British capital invested in the nascent countries' new infrastructure, most notably its railway network. The British also founded their own schools and colleges and social clubs.⁷ Cricket clubs were at the vanguard of the game's development, with Thomas Hogg of Buenos Aires Cricket Club organising the first football match in South America, which took place in 1867, whilst on the other side of the Río de la Plata, Albion Cricket Club established a football section in 1893.⁸ In the respective English High Schools of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, two Scottish teachers, Alexander Watson Hutton and William Leslie Poole acted as catalysts for the propagating the game. Hutton and Poole employed specialist physical education teachers who taught football to the sons of the British community and the local *criollo* elites, thus beginning a process of diffusion amongst the native population.⁹ This process was further consolidated by the formation of

⁵ S. Levinsky, *AFA* (Buenos Aires, 2016), p. 15.

⁶ For Argentina, see E. Archetti, *Masculinities, Football, Polo and the Tango in Argentina*, (Oxford, 1999); For Uruguay, R. Giulianotti, 'Built by the two Varelas: The rise and fall of football culture and national identity in Uruguay', *Sport in Society*, pp. 134-154; J. Osaba, 'Mas allá de la garra. El estilo del fútbol uruguayo a través de *El Gráfico* y Nilo J Suburú' in P. Arrighi et al (Eds.), *Cuaderno de Historia 8, A romper la red. Aboradajes en torno al fútbol uruguayo* (Montevideo, 2012), pp. 57-69.

⁷ D. Goldblatt, *The Ball is Round* (London, 2007), p. 128.

⁸ Goldblatt, *Round*, p. 128.

⁹ Goldblatt, *Round*, p. 128.

works teams by employees of those companies constructing the infrastructure, particularly the railways. The newly-introduced game drew in popular sectors of *criollo* society and those from other immigrant communities, principally Italian and Spanish who were working alongside the British.¹⁰

In Argentina, a league competition operated in 1891 but lasted just one season. A second attempt in 1893 led by Alexander Watson Hutton proved more durable and survives to this day having gone through a series of splits and mergers. In Uruguay, a league was inaugurated in 1901, which included the two teams which continue to dominate Uruguayan football, Nacional and Central Uruguayan Railways Cricket Club (CURCC). Nacional, formed by nationalist *criollo* students of the University of Montevideo in 1899, were seen as elitist and nativist, founded in counterpoint to the perceived neo-colonial influence of Britain. Nacional adopted the colours of Uruguay's independence hero, José Gervasio Artigas. CURCC, who took the name Peñarol in 1913, from the Montevidean district in which they were located, attracted a support-base among working-class and immigrant sectors of society.¹¹ It was through this popular diffusion amongst the *criollo* and immigrant populations that different styles of play came to be perceived (if not located in the popular narrative until much later as we shall see), particularly in Argentina.

International Confrontation

The British community was also at the vanguard of cross-border competition with games between Buenos Aires and Montevideo XIs held on annual basis from August 1889 until 1894.¹² As with the England and Scotland football teams, their close physical proximity facilitated their accelerated development in comparison with other South American countries. The Uruguayan club side Albion travelled to Buenos Aires in August 1896, beating Retiro Athletic and Belgrano Athletic. Two years later Lobos Athletic became the first Argentine club to visit Montevideo, playing Albion and CURCC. Within four years these football clubs were being considered as national representatives, and their games viewed as full-blown international matches.¹³ From

¹⁰ Goldblatt, *Round*, p. 128. Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 44-6.

¹¹ Goldblatt, *Round*, p. 128.

¹² L. Prats, *La Crónica Celeste. Historia de la Selección Uruguaya de Fútbol: triunfos, derrotas, mitos y polémicas* (Montevideo, 2014), pp. 18-20.

¹³ J. C. Luzuriaga, *Albion Football Club. Profetas y maestros* (Montevideo, 2012), p. 44-8.

the Uruguayan point of view these were an important representation of the nation in a climate of civil war, in which its society was struggling to agree over its own self-representation. Selection for the Uruguay team was deemed a sacred honour, particularly amongst the gentleman amateurs of the Nacional club who formed the great part of the 'national' side. On the eve of the 1903 encounter in which the Uruguayans recorded their first ever victory over their neighbours, the father of the famous Céspedes brothers; Amílcar, Bolívar and Carlos, who formed the backbone of the team, claimed, 'we know that we cannot win; we come as brothers to do our duty.'¹⁴ In terms of the racial make-up of the respective teams, from the outset Uruguay embraced the black players who took to the game with greater enthusiasm than Argentina, fielding Isabelino Gradín and Juan Delgado at the 1916 South American Championship. By contrast, Argentina's national team has remained almost exclusively white throughout its history.¹⁵ This is despite there being very little difference in the racial make-up of the two countries. Recent estimates for Uruguay's racial profile suggest the country is 88% white, 8% mestizo and 4% black.¹⁶ As regards Uruguay, Campomar states that, 'racist though the diminutive republic was, her small size demanded a certain amount of expediency.'¹⁷

One area in which the development of football diverged between Argentina and Uruguay was in the role of the State. Football fought for space in the rapidly expanding city of Buenos Aires, where land was at a premium, and was confined in the main to inner-city wasteland or spaces in the suburbs. The situation in Uruguay was somewhat different. The Uruguayan government of President Batlle y Ordóñez which emerged victorious after the civil strife of 1897-1904, pursued a progressive social agenda including significant investment in public education.¹⁸ The provision of public playing fields by the government under the auspices of the Comisión Nacional de Educación Física, founded in 1911 'to promote athletic activity', rose exponentially from just two in 1913 to 118 in 1929. This facilitated the development of players of all classes on grass pitches in a way that was not seen on the other side of the Río de la Plata, acting as a precursor to Uruguay's later success.¹⁹

¹⁴ A. Giménez Rodríguez, *La pasión laica: una breve historia del fútbol uruguayo*, (Montevideo, 2007), p. 52.

¹⁵ E. Galeano, *Football in Sun and Shadow* (London, 1997), p.35; Prats, *La Crónica Celeste*, pp. 33-4.

¹⁶ Giulianotti, *Built*, p. 135.

¹⁷ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, p. 86.

¹⁸ Goldblatt, *Round*, p. 128.

¹⁹ R.Giulianotti, *Built*, pp. 138-9; Prats, *La Crónica Celeste*, pp. 38-40.

1924 and All That

Some way ahead of other South American footballing nations, including their larger neighbour Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay dominated the South American Championship which began on annual basis in 1916, and soon began to look for a wider stage to project themselves. This opportunity would come with the Olympic Games, at this point the only global football tournament, albeit expressly for amateurs and precluding the participation of professionals from the British Isles. The Olympics were thus denied the status of a genuine world championship.²⁰ However, both were invited to compete at the 1924 Games in Paris, an invitation that in the event was only taken up by Uruguay, whose government saw the potential benefits of a strong performance cementing the country's place in a globalised world. As its Foreign Minister, Enrique Buero wrote, 'a victory for the Uruguayan team in the 1924 Olympics would have great repercussions in the sporting world, which nowadays links all the politicians and leaders of these old societies.'²¹ Argentina was not able to overcome the administrative gridlock of two rival governing bodies unable to reach consensus on selecting a single team. Despite never having previously played outside of South America, the Uruguayans defeated Yugoslavia, USA and France with consummate ease, before dispatching Switzerland 3-0 in the final. Initially seen as an exotic folly, not least because of the presence of the black player, José Andrade, Uruguay demonstrated a unique playing style. Differentiating Uruguay from the European 'other', Galeano described the team as 'the second discovery of America.'²² Meanwhile Gabriel Hanot reported in *Le Miroir des Sports*:

The Uruguayans are supple disciples of the spirit of fitness rather than geometry ...they created a beautiful football, elegant but at the same time varied, rapid, powerful, effective. Before these fine athletes, who are to the English professionals like Arab thoroughbreds next to farm horses, the Swiss were disconcerted.²³

²⁰ Goldblatt, *Round*, p. 246.

²¹ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 102-5.

²² P. Lanfranchi & M. Taylor, *Moving with the Ball* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 69-70; Galeano, *Football*, pp. 42-3.

²³ *Miroir des Sports*, 12 June 1924.

The short-passing style of the Uruguayans, so admired by the Europeans, was largely the legacy of the influence of Joe Harley, a former Scottish professional. Harley arrived in Argentina to work on the railways and played for Ferrocarril Oeste, before moving to Montevideo and joining Peñarol.²⁴ It was Harley who introduced the short-passing game that came to be known as *a la escocesa*, in celebration of its Scottish roots and in contrast to the disavowal of football's British origins that was taking place in Argentina. Giulianotti contends that *a la escocesa* was in contrast to the English-taught 'kick and rush' game of earlier times, and facilitated the switch between the two modes of play 'according to the individual demands of a particular game.'²⁵

Response to the victory back in Montevideo was understandably jubilant, as was the press, who conflated the team with the nation as a whole. In *El Día*, Lorenzo Batlles Berres wrote, 'you are Uruguay. You are now the motherland boys ... the symbol of that little dot, nearly invisible on the map ... which has been getting larger, larger, larger.'²⁶ The Uruguayan press was also magnanimous towards its Argentine neighbours, with this editorial by *El Día* reprinted by *La Nación* in Buenos Aires:

The Argentine soul and the Uruguayan soul have vibrated in unison in these times of clamorous jubilation. The hearts of these two peoples have had palpitations that have made it seem, at times, that only one heart was beating. Before now, it often upset us [Uruguayans] ... that we were referred to as an Argentine province. But this time we have happily embraced that misunderstanding: with pleasure we have wanted to show the world that the two countries on the shores of *La Plata* are brothers, not in a trivialised externalization of a merely courteous formula, but in the profound and cordial fullness of unmatched affection.²⁷

The reaction in Argentina was one of missed opportunity and not a little jealousy. The natural order of things had been overturned by 'little' Uruguay having the temerity to go to Europe and emerge victorious. Argentina had greater resources both economically and in terms of footballing talent. As Campomar notes, 'the 1920s

²⁴ Taylor, *Beautiful Game*, p. 29.

²⁵ R. Giulianotti, *Built*, pp. 138-9.

²⁶ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 102-5.

²⁷ *La Nación*, 12 June 1924, p. 2, cited in J. W. Richey, 'White Mestizaje: Soccer and the Construction of Argentine Racial Identity, 1924-1930', 2007.

should have belonged to Argentina'.²⁸ Argentinian goalkeeper, Américo Tesorieri, bitterly reflected,

the campaign carried out by the Uruguayans is magnificent and it rejoices me. I would have liked to be in Paris with the Argentine team to play the Olympic tournament's final match ... It is essential that our officials learn once and for all. They have to choose a team in due time without thinking of useless factions in order to reach the unity of action.²⁹

It only remained to try and claim partial victory as part of a shared *rioplatense* enterprise, with *La Nación* editorialising, 'victory in the Olympic Games has been primarily a *rioplatense* victory, linked to football of the two countries in all manifestations of its active life.'³⁰ To satisfy their pride, the Argentines challenged their neighbours to a two-match home-and-away decider. After a tight 1-1 draw in Montevideo, the initial attempt to play the return match in the stadium of Sportivo Barracas had to be abandoned in the face of a hopelessly over-capacity crowd encroaching onto the pitch. When the game was played on the following Tuesday, a 3.5 metre-high wire fence had been erected to keep spectators off the field of play. Argentina won 2-1, thanks in no small part to a goal scored direct from a corner by Cesáreo Onzari, something only recently allowed following a recent rule change, and which came to be known as the 'Olympic Goal'. The game would end in acrimony as Uruguay's players responded to the hostile atmosphere, the target of stones and other missiles thrown at them, by walking off the field with minutes left to play.³¹ Thus the match was something of an 'own-goal' for the Uruguayans. As Quique Aramburu says:

Politically, Uruguay handled that badly because they didn't need to go. They should have said: "Excuse me, we're world champions. What are you?" But they went and the Argentinians won 1-0 ... It was a political error to go there. They claimed they were the moral champions.'³²

²⁸ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, p. 131.

²⁹ *La Nación*, 10 June 1924, p. 3, cited in C. R. Torres, "'If We Had Our Argentine Here!': Football and the 1924 Argentine Olympic Team", *Journal of Sport History*, 2003, pp. 15-16.

³⁰ *La Nación*, 10 June 1924, p. 8.

³¹ Goldblatt, *Round*, pp. 244-6.

³² Taylor, *Beautiful game*, p. 33.

The result assumed a far greater significance that it warranted and Argentina would claim the psychological upper-hand until the Olympic title was up for grabs again in 1928. Indeed, the Argentine press was swift to take the moral high ground concerning the unsavoury incidents at the conclusion of the match. *La Prensa* reported, 'the loss of a football match does not inflict any injury on the sovereignty of the country of the losing team or imperil the safety of the nation.'³³ Meanwhile, *El Gráfico* complained that 'the scenes of guerrilla combats between Olympic champions and the public, Scarone against police officers, have no precedent in *rioplatense* matches. How can this happen? How did both sides and fans manage to create this?'³⁴

A New World Order

In 1925 two *rioplatense* clubs, Nacional from Uruguay and Boca Juniors from Argentina, capitalised on the region's newfound prominence to undertake successful European tours. However, the apparent misbehaviour of the Uruguayan players in fighting amongst themselves gave sectors of the Argentine press leverage to distance themselves from their neighbours, using derogatory racial language to differentiate them from the civilised, 'European' Argentines. In an editorial entitled 'The Savage South Americans,' *Crítica* wrote of the Nacional players, 'quarrels and resentments should be aired at home, not on foreign soil ... [Europeans] might wrongly suppose that beneath the polite and cultured appearance of a South American lies a wild and savage Indian.'³⁵

Indeed, bad blood became a feature of Argentine/Uruguayan encounters at both international and club level, as Keblaitis records in his description of a 'friendly' between Independiente and Wanderers de Montevideo in March 1929:

The old brotherhood that united these old institutions cracked this evening and it was the fault of the exaggerated violence that the Uruguayans

³³ *La Prensa*, 13 October 1924, cited in T. Mason, *Passion of the People?* (London, 1995), p. 35.

³⁴ J. Wilson, *Angels With Dirty Faces* (London, 2016), p. 43.

³⁵ *Crítica*, 17 March 1925, p.14, cited in M. B. Karush, 'National Identity in the Sports Pages: Football and the Mass Media in 1920s Buenos Aires', 2003, p. 26.

came to play. It would seem that the recent international matches between the national teams elevated the rivalry to that of hatred.³⁶

When Uruguay came to defend their Olympic title four years later in Amsterdam, Argentina made sure they would be there too. The pair showed once more that they were head and shoulders above the amateurs of continental Europe and the rest of the world as they both progressed to the final. Appetite for news of the Olympic campaigns in the respective capitals was enormous. Newspapers set up loudspeakers outside their offices and in public plazas to relay commentaries of the games as telegrams were received from Holland with updates.³⁷ Uruguay eventually prevailed 2-1 in a replay after the first game was drawn, with their captain, José Nasazzi leading a tremendous rear-guard action. The Uruguayan victory served to cement their place as a global nation, with the team's rich benefactor, Atilio Narancio proclaiming, 'we are no longer just a spot on the map of the world.'³⁸ As professionalism becoming more widespread in Europe, FIFA moved to create a world championship that was open to all players and not restricted to Olympic amateurs. On the back of its healthy economic situation from the export of beef and wool, and its status as double Olympic champions, Uruguay suggested themselves as hosts of the inaugural World Cup in 1930, and were subsequently accepted as such by FIFA. The construction of a new stadium, the Centenario (in celebration of 100 years of independence), was the centrepiece of the bid.³⁹ With few European teams prepared to travel across the Atlantic for this novice competition, despite the Uruguayan organizers offering to pay their passage, Argentina and Uruguay once more dominated and met again in the Final. The hyperbole surrounding the game was intense with hundreds of newspaper column inches devoted to it, whilst upwards of 15,000 Argentines made their way across the Río de la Plata in the hope of watching the game. Many were in fact stranded on boats in the middle of the estuary stuck in fog and missed the match. As in 1928, thousands gathered outside newspaper offices for updates or were glued to the radio.⁴⁰ The final also reinforced perceived cultural differences between the two nations that had started to build since 1924, as ideas of a uniform *fútbol rioplatense* broke down. Central to this

³⁶ C. G. Keblaitis, *Alma Roja. Independiente ejemplo de amateurismo*, (Buenos Aires, 2007), p. 521.

³⁷ T. Mason, *Passion of the People?* (London, 1995), pp. 36-7.

³⁸ Galeano, *Football*, pp. 42-3.

³⁹ Goldblatt, *Round*, pp. 247-252.

⁴⁰ Goldblatt, *Round*, pp. 247-252.

deconstruction was the notion that the Uruguayans were inherently mentally tougher than their Argentine counterparts. As the academic Andrés Morales claims, the Uruguayans

started to forge a style that felt itself superior to the Europeans and different to the Argentines. The skill based on the break of the waist, the hair ribbon, the nutmeg, the *sombrero*, the *gambeta*, combines itself with a profound 'courage' in the face of difficult moments ... It is in the 1920s, then, that it started to generate a self-image that would as principal disturb Argentina.⁴¹

This was demonstrated in the performance of Argentina's Luis Monti, a key player noted for bullying opponents on the pitch and his team's 'strong man'. In the biggest game of the competition he was a shadow of his former self, cowed by death threats received at the Argentina's Santa Lucia hotel on the eve of the match. This appeared to transmit fear to his team-mates, who lost 4-2 after holding a 2-1 lead at half-time.⁴² Ironically, Monti was considered in essence a more Uruguayan style of player, 'the Argentinian as pugilist' as Campomar labels him. Monti played instead of the more archetypal exponent of *La Nuestra*, Adolfo Zumelzú, described by *El Gráfico* as being, 'noble ... neat sidestep, a short passer ... complete intelligence.'⁴³ Scapegoated by the Argentine press and public, Monti would later complain, 'the Argentinians had made me feel like rubbish, a maggot, branding me a coward and blaming me exclusively for the loss against the Uruguayans.'⁴⁴ The episode would strike to the core of the Argentine psyche. The narrative was very much couched in gender terms, in the loss of masculinity and virility at the hands of the Uruguayans. In the contemporary media, *La Prensa* complained that

Argentine teams sent abroad to represent the prestige of the country in any form of sport should not be composed of men who fall at the first

⁴¹ Cited in J. Osaba, 'Mas allá de la garra. El estilo del fútbol uruguayo a través de *El Gráfico* y Nilo J Suburú' in P. Arrighi et al (Eds.), *Cuaderno de Historia 8, A romper la red. Aboradajes en torno al fútbol uruguayo* (Montevideo, 2012), pp. 59-60.

⁴² Goldblatt, *Round*, pp. 247-252.

⁴³ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 139-46.

⁴⁴ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 139-46.

blow, who are in danger of fainting at the first onslaught even if they are clever in their footwork ... These 'lady players' should be eliminated.'⁴⁵

Nearly eighty years later, Bayer would be describing the 1930 World Cup in similar terms in his history of Argentine football:

It is a true state of war. The Uruguayans want to win or win. The Argentinians, at least to show them that they have finished with the complex of paternity ... The Argentinians team starts to wobble. It is a sieve. The Uruguayans score three times ... They are crowned the first World Champions of football. We continue being their sons.⁴⁶

As Goldblatt identifies, it was at this point that, 'the roots of both national footballing paranoia and self-loathing were born.'⁴⁷

In Montevideo meanwhile, the Uruguayans were ecstatic. Reaction in Argentina was naturally the reverse of the exaltation felt across the Río de la Plata, with very nationalist overtones. Outposts of Uruguayan presence in Buenos Aires like the Consulate and the Oriental Club were attacked, whilst youths marched through the streets with the national flag, playing *Sacarse el Sombrero*. Passers-by were expected to tip their hats to this venerable symbol.⁴⁸

Conservative press opinion reflected disappointment in the perceived lack of dignity in Argentine society's reaction to the defeat, considering it as a seditious threat to public order. More revealingly, they failed to grasp the true extent to which football had infused the consciousness of the popular classes as an expression of their hopes and aspirations. For example, *La Nación* opined that:

We quite understand the vehement desire on the part of the people to see the Argentine side win the match and the championship; we can make allowances for the passionate enthusiasm of the crowd. But this is not the sort of conflict which calls either for acts of ruffianism, and then, on top of that, a sudden call to pseudo-patriotism, in the shape of the National Anthem, to prevent the police from taking repressive measures. Above

⁴⁵ Mason, *Passion*, pp. 40-3.

⁴⁶ O. Bayer, *Fútbol Argentino* (Buenos Aires, 2016), pp. 32-3.

⁴⁷ Goldblatt, *Round*, pp. 247-252.

⁴⁸ Mason, *Passion*, pp. 40-3.

football ... comes the grade of culture which we have achieved, and it is the business of the authorities to take whatever steps they deem necessary to maintain that culture. This is something we ought to take care never to lose.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, *El Gráfico* – with some irony as Archetti notes, given that its writers were fundamental to notions of Argentine football representing national identity – bemoaned how ‘the poor sporting education of the football directors has created this attitude in the fans. It looked as though these twenty-two men trying to kick the ball in the opposition goal lay the future of the nation’.⁵⁰ Throughout the competition the AFA had complained about aggression on the part of home crowds and discrimination against them by the hosts, and following the final took the decision to break off relations with their Uruguayan counterparts. Delegation member, Augusto Rouquette complained, ‘I returned to Buenos Aires so disgusted by these incidents, that I consider it sufficient to think of ending international matches.’⁵¹ It was a rift that would have wider continental implications, with the South American Championship being held in abeyance until 1935 when it was contested in Peru.⁵² Meanwhile, a contemporary British observer, Forbes, noted that ‘the breaking off of relations between Argentina and Uruguay in August 1932, may be traced to the bitterness on one side and the impolitic rejoicing on the other which followed the defeat of the larger republic in the stadiums of Montevideo.’⁵³ Indeed, the wounds would never fully heal, despite attempts at sporting reconciliation through a series of ‘friendly’ competitions. In the 1938 edition of the Torneo Internacional Nocturno, featuring clubs from Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Rosario and La Plata, Nacional played Estudiantes in front of a hostile crowd in La Plata. One of the Uruguayan delegation implored the Nacional skipper, Ricardo Faccio to let the home side win so that they could return across the Río de la Plata safely. Faccio refused, saying, ‘whatever happens, happens. We will win this match for our honour, for Nacional, our country and our family.’⁵⁴ Nacional, did prevail 2-1 but not before the encounter had descended into what became known as ‘the match of the bloodstained shirts.’

⁴⁹ Mason, *Passion*, pp. 40-3.

⁵⁰ Archetti, *Masculinities*, pp. 74-5.

⁵¹ Prats, *La Crónica Celeste*, pp. 77-82.

⁵² L. Wernicke, *Historias insólitas de la Copa América* (New York, 2016), pp. 65-6.

⁵³ R. Forbes, *Eight Republics in Search of a Future? Evolution & Revolution in South America*, (1933), p. 5.

⁵⁴ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, p. 199.

Ultimately, what the 1930 World Cup showed was that it was no longer possible to view *fútbol rioplatense* as a uniform description for the game in South America, that individual signifiers were now routinely being deployed to describe Argentina and Uruguay separately rather than together. Brera's 'ants and cicadas' analogy seems particularly apposite in describing the Uruguayans as serious workers, with an organised mindset focused on getting the job done, with the Argentines seen as loud, showy and carefree.

Separate Identities

This dichotomy would further express itself with individual descriptors that would henceforth be used to describe their respective national styles. This was not unique to the River Plate and became common elsewhere in South America, with *el toque* in Peru and *futebol arte* in Brazil becoming self-representations of those nations.⁵⁵ In Argentina, *la nuestra* (literally 'ours') was essentially an extension of existing notions of *fútbol rioplatense* but incorporating elements felt to be unique to Argentinian football. This included playing in large-sided games on the *potrero*, or waste-ground, in which individual expression and spontaneity was essential as well as close control of the ball and the ability to dribble past opponents in a confined space. This would be most famously expressed in the pages of the popular weekly magazine, *El Gráfico*, and its star writer Ricardo Lorenzo (ironically a Uruguayan) who wrote under the pen-name Borocotó. He wrote in 1928, 'one of the high quality 'popular products' is dribbling, and its exponents are refined Argentinian football players. The practice of football permits the Argentinians – and the nation to be seen in the world, to be remembered, and above all to be prized.'⁵⁶ The Uruguayan written press would play its part in defining what were considered to uniquely Uruguayan national traits, distilling them into what came to be known as the *garra charrúa*. Meaning 'claw', *garra* was taken to mean the courage and fighting spirit of the indigenous Charrúa population of Uruguay, who were not subjugated by their Spanish colonial masters in the same way that the more numerous Guaraní population were.⁵⁷ Thus *El País* was able to claim after the 1930 World Cup Final:

⁵⁵ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 100-1.

⁵⁶ *El Gráfico*, Issue 467, 1928, p. 16.

⁵⁷ Taylor, *Beautiful Game*, pp. 35-6.

The whistle of the referee signalled the end of a titanic fight between the two colossuses. And, with it, flourished with the success, that deserved by Uruguay, of this tiny Uruguay in territorial extension, but great, immeasurably great, through its moral values, through the proud strength, of its race of fierce blood, like good *charrúa* blood.⁵⁸

Meanwhile the full term, *garra charrúa* was first coined after Uruguay's 3-0 victory over Argentina at the 1935 South American Championship in Peru helped them claim the continental crown against the odds with an ageing team, many of whom were in their thirties.⁵⁹ However, it could also be seen as negating the more positive traits of attractive football with which Uruguay had dominated world football in the 1920s. As Campomar identifies, 'it would sit uneasily with the finesse that many of the country's players possessed.'⁶⁰ One Uruguayan commentator of the 1940s claimed that it was a 'synthesis of racial fortitude, a tangible and spiritual manifestation of Latin mental agility and physical virility.'⁶¹ But as Campomar rightly counter-claimed, 'it somehow seems disingenuous to identify ourselves with poor semi-nomadic Charrúa Indians, the last of whom were betrayed and vanquished in 1832, leaving the country without any semblance of an indigenous culture'.⁶² Perhaps the best explanation belongs to that of Bayce, who posits that it was an attempt by Uruguayan nationalists towards 'washing their hands of the blame for the genocide and reclaim the indigenous ancestry of the *charrúa* as part of the national patrimony'.⁶³

Isolation

After the 1930 tournament, Uruguay shied away from the World Cup until 1950, boycotting tournaments held in Europe due to the lack of logistical support offered by the Europeans. Argentina meanwhile sent an amateur team to the 1934 World Cup, due once more to internal administrative schisms, but were eliminated by Sweden after just one match. Argentina subsequently chose to stay away from the

⁵⁸ *El País*, 31 July 1930, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Prats, *La Crónica Celeste*, pp. 9-11.

⁶⁰ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 391-5.

⁶¹ Giménez Rodríguez, *La pasión laica*, p. 9.

⁶² Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 2-9.

⁶³ R. Bayce, 'El sinuoso proceso de constitución de la identidad nacional y futbolística' in J. C. Luzuriaga, A. Morales & J. Osaba (Eds.), *Cuaderno de Historia 14, A romper la red Miradas sobre fútbol, cultura y sociedad* (Montevideo, 2014), p. 57.

competition for a variety of reasons until 1958. Uruguay emerged from their self-imposed exile at the 1950 World Cup on the back of rising living standards from the high demand for its agricultural produce, from a Europe recovering from World War Two. This served the belief that the country was once more a player on the global stage as it revelled in the motto, *Como el Uruguay no hay* – ‘There is nowhere like Uruguay.’⁶⁴ They met the hosts and favourites Brazil in the final, a country that for so long had designs on its national territory. Prior to the final, the president of the Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol (AUF), Dr Jacobo, made the downbeat comment that, ‘what’s important is that these people don’t make six goals. If they score only four goals our mission will be successful.’⁶⁵ But the team’s captain Obdulio Varela would have none of it, invoking the *garra charrúa* in his team-talk before the game: ‘Enter walking slowly, quietly confrontational. Don’t look up at the stands but straight ahead, because the match is played on the ground and we are eleven versus eleven. They don’t count out there! Let the show begin’.⁶⁶

Having played much of the game with their backs against the wall as the Brazilians outplayed them, led by Varela Uruguay prevailed through sheer will-power. The captain proved to be an obdurate opponent, entering into a dispute over a refereeing decision to disrupt the Brazilians’ rhythm.⁶⁷ According to Giulianotti, ‘the argument with the referee became an almost mythical moment, a metonym for the new Uruguay, and a pivotal image in the formation of a collective memory within the modernizing nation.’⁶⁸ Their victory served to maintain the illusion of global invincibility, their record being four international tournaments played, four won. Had they entered in 1934 or 1938, the likelihood is that the more powerful European sides, especially Italy, would have beaten them, but on such misappropriations of history are myths built. Football had thus again ensured the Uruguay had a far higher international profile than it would otherwise have had. As Uruguay’s coach at the 1966 World Cup, Ondino Vieira, would later say, ‘other countries have their history, Uruguay has its football.’⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Campomar, *¡Golazo!*, pp. 2-9.

⁶⁵ Goldblatt, *Round*, pp. 263-5.

⁶⁶ Campomar, *¡Golazo*, p. 226.

⁶⁷ Campomar, *¡Golazo*, pp. 2-9.

⁶⁸ R. Giulianotti, *Built*, p. 141.

⁶⁹ B. Glanville, *The Story of the World Cup* (London, 2005), p. 19.

Arguably the apotheosis of Uruguayan football came not with victory at the 1950 World Cup but instead four years later in Switzerland (the country's European twin according to the *New York Times* in 1951) when they mixed it with the very best of European football to finish in fourth place.⁷⁰ After destroying Scotland 7-0 and defeating England in the quarter-final, they played out one of the greatest games in World Cup history against Hungary in the semi-final, bowing out after extra-time. The 'scientific football' of the 'Mighty Magyars' demonstrated that European football had not only caught up with Latin American football after recovering from the ravages of the Second World War, but was threatening to pull significantly ahead.⁷¹

Double Helix

1930 would be a watershed in *rioplatense* football, when both Uruguay and Argentina were at the summit of world football. From that point on their footballing fortunes would be like a double-helix – when one was in the ascendant the other would be descendant with occasional periods like the 1958, 1966 and 1974 World Cups where they were once more on a par; for all the talk of exceptionalism, there was as much uniting the pair as separated them. After their heroics in Switzerland, Uruguay entered a period of decline, failing even to qualify for the 1958 World Cup in Sweden. That tournament not only marked Argentina's return from the international wilderness but also its greatest footballing catastrophe, a 6-1 defeat to unheralded Czechoslovakia which eliminated them in the first round. Both teams were hampered in this period by the plundering of their best players by Italy, who skirted round their own ban on foreigners by naturalizing them as Italians due to their antecedents who had earlier migrated to the Río de la Plata. Thus Uruguayan World Cup winners, Schiaffino and Ghiggia, and Argentina's 'Trio of Death' from their 1957 South American Championship-winning team, Omar Sivori, Humberto Maschio and Antonio Angelillo would henceforth wear the *azzurri* of the Italian national team on the international stage.⁷² A quarter-final place in 1966 and fourth place at the 1970 World Cup, along with strong performances by Peñarol in the Copa Libertadores were to be but brief respites in the downhill trajectory of Uruguayan football, which became renowned for its spiteful and dirty play. When challenged about Uruguay's negative

⁷⁰ Campomar, *iGolazo*, pp. 2-9.

⁷¹ Goldblatt, *Round*, p. 295.

⁷² Giulianotti, *Built*, p. 141.

approach at the 1970 World Cup, at which they reached the semi-final, their coach, Juan Hohberg, a veteran of the 1954 side, dismissively replied that it wasn't his job 'to think like the crowd.' Indeed, this tough, physically uncompromising style of football came to be considered as the very embodiment of *garra charrúa*.⁷³ Argentine football also entered a destructive phase during the 1960s in a misguided attempt to mimic the 'scientific football' of the Europeans. The expulsion of Antonio Rattín against hosts England in the 1966 World Cup quarter final and the accompanying charge of Alf Ramsey that they 'acted like animals', was but a prelude to the violence meted out by Estudiantes de La Plata in the stadiums of South America and Europe as they dominated the Copa Libertadores with a brand of football that came to be known as *anti-fútbol*. Neither team had a response to the 'Total Football' of Johan Cruyff's Dutch side at the 1974 World Cup. For the Uruguayans this was another staging post on the road to mediocrity, which it had reached economically and politically in 1973 following the military coup and global oil price hike.⁷⁴ For Argentina, 1974 was to prove an epiphany. Coached by the idealistic César Luis Menotti, Argentina won the 1978 World Cup on home soil with an attractive, attacking team which harked back to the golden age of *la nuestra*. For Menotti it was essential that Argentine football to return to its roots if it was to recapture past glories:

An authentic national football exists, in the same way as an Argentinian way of life exists, and it was modelled since the origins of our nationality with passion, with sacrifice, with patience and with rebelliousness ... This made possible the survival of a line, of a style modelling *la nuestra*.⁷⁵

Two years later, Uruguay hosted the *Mundialito* to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the first World Cup, with all the previous winners invited. They would win the competition, beating Holland and then Italy in a fractious match before overcoming favourites Brazil in the final, reviving memories of the *Maracanazo* triumph of 1950. The victory was reported as the embodiment of the *garra charrúa*. The Italian magazine *Guerin Sportivo* wrote, 'the Uruguayan victory was unexpected after the

⁷³ R. Williams, *The Perfect 10* (London, 2006), pp. 123-6.

⁷⁴ Campomar, *¡Golazo*, pp. 2-9.

⁷⁵ Archetti, *Masculinities*, pp. 74-5.

beautiful performance of Brazil, which makes it even more valid. Máspoli's team was tactically perfect.⁷⁶

However, for Argentina, eliminated by Brazil at the group stage, the competition was once more symptomatic of a perceived lack of respect by its smaller neighbour. Their young star, Diego Maradona complained:

I think we treat them [the Uruguayans] so much better than they treated us. They think we are monsters. They throw stones at us in the street ... always saying nasty things about us. We have to do something about it. We should never play in Uruguay again.⁷⁷

Indeed, Morales has argued that the antipathy shown to Argentina in 1980 was opposite to the sympathy shown to Brazil (at least until the final).⁷⁸ Uruguay's nadir came at the 1986 World Cup in Mexico. In the group stage they were humiliated 6-1 by debutants Denmark, before the poverty of their approach was confirmed against Scotland when José Batista was sent off after just 30 seconds.⁷⁹ In contrast to 1928 and 1930, it would be a Maradona-inspired Argentina, the eventual winners, who would deliver the *coup de grâce* in the second round, beating them 1-0. Revelling in a sense of revenge and perhaps overcoming an Argentine inferiority complex, Maradona said afterwards, 'that wasn't just another victory, the Uruguayans' paranoia really pissed me off in those days, and also we hadn't beaten them in a World Cup for fifty-six years.'⁸⁰ Ironically, in terms of their conservative approach, the respective coaches, Argentina's Carlos Bilardo and Omar Barras of Uruguay, were not ideologically that far apart; it was the inventiveness of Maradona, the physical embodiment of *la nuestra* that triumphed over *garra charrúa* taken to its furthest extreme. Enzo Francescoli, Uruguay's playmaker and spiritual heir to the great players of the 1920s was but a peripheral figure.⁸¹

In the present decade, Uruguayan and Argentine football has re-ascended to the top of the world game, reigniting debate over differing identities. In 2010 Uruguay

⁷⁶ Prats, *La Crónica Celeste*, p. 165.

⁷⁷ Campomar, *¡Golazo*, pp. 364-5.

⁷⁸ A. Morales, 'La identidad rioplatense y el fútbol. Confraternidad y violencia en el clásico del Río de la Plata' in Luzuriaga, Morales & Osaba (Eds.), *Cuaderno*, p. 44.

⁷⁹ Campomar, *¡Golazo*, pp. 391-5.

⁸⁰ D. A. Maradona, *El Diego* (London, 2004), p. 126.

⁸¹ Campomar, *¡Golazo*, pp. 2-9.

achieved a surprise fourth place at the World Cup before winning the Copa América (as the South American Championship is now called) in Argentina in 2011. Meanwhile Argentina has established itself as the number one ranked country in the world, not least because of the superlative individual ability of Lionel Messi, the nation's most recent incarnation of *la nuestra* by reaching the final of the World Cup in 2014 and those of the Copa América in 2015 and 2016. Although arguably the latter two, penalty shoot-out defeats to Chile in both finals, have reinvigorated the historic stereotype of Argentines being temperamentally fragile at decisive moments, having dominated both tournaments. This was also demonstrated in arguably the defining game of the era, the quarter-final match between the two, which the Uruguayans won on penalties despite playing nearly two hours a man short, again inducing in Argentina a sense of being usurped by their upstart neighbours. As in 1930, the press accused the side of lacking the mental strength and strategic acumen, with *Olé* complaining, 'it cannot go on like this. Without heart, without defence, without a tactical idea.'⁸² As striker, Luis Suárez further elaborates in his autobiography:

For the Argentinians, the idea of Uruguay winning another Copa América in Argentina, as we had done in 1916 at the first Copa América which was held on Argentina's centenary, and in 1987, when Enzo Francescoli played up front with Rubén Sosa, was horrible for them. Worse, it took our total to fifteen – one more than theirs. That made the satisfaction even greater for us. The Argentinian media were furious; they thought they would have been favourites. They should have been. But we beat them. And here we were, taking over 'their' stadium and 'their' day ... To win the 2011 Copa América was incredible; to win it in Argentina even more so.⁸³

Conclusion

The development of a footballing national identity in the River Plate basin was originally part of a wider nationalist narrative which rejected a perceived neo-colonial Anglo-Saxon domination in the region. Thus, football as it diffused amongst

⁸² G. Balague, *Messi* (London, 2014), p. 420.

⁸³ L. Suárez, *Crossing the Line* (London, 2014), pp. 99-101.

the *criollo* and Italian and Spanish immigrant communities took on certain characteristics. The spontaneity and individual skill that was applied to both sides of the Río de la Plata was a contrast to the playing style practiced by the British and their descendants. However, as Uruguay and later Argentina ascended to the pinnacle of football from the mid-1920s, the ‘other’ became not the British but each other, and a process of differentiation more imagined than real was crystallized. As Taylor notes, ‘and like those diehard antagonists, England and Scotland, Uruguay and Argentina are in fact very similar, or at least have more in common than divides them.’⁸⁴ Indeed, as Paz further elaborates:

“National traits” ... were simply the result of the nationalistic preachments of the various governments. Even now, a century and a half later, no one can explain satisfactorily the “national” differences between Argentinians and Uruguayans, Peruvians and Ecuadorians, Guatemalans and Mexicans.⁸⁵

Evidence for this could be seen in the final qualifier between the two for the 2002 World Cup. Argentina had already qualified, whilst Uruguay needed a point to ensure a place in the repechage. With time running out and the score at 1-1, Argentine midfielder, Juan Sebastián Verón, ran down the clock on the touchline to the thankful cheers of the Uruguayan crowd shouting, ‘Hey thanks Verón.’ Whilst the Colombians who had been edged out cried foul, headlines in the Uruguayan press referred to help from *Gran Hermano* – ‘Big Brother’, a popular Argentine TV programme enjoyed in Uruguay at the time.⁸⁶

However, there is a danger in comparing the relationship between Argentina and Uruguay with that of England and Scotland. Firstly, there has never been a historical feeling of being colonised by their larger neighbour on the part of the Uruguayans. Despite being underdogs in terms of size and vastly reduced talent pool, Uruguay’s spectacular achievement in surpassing Argentina’s record in international competition – two World Cups each, two Olympic titles each, but Uruguay ahead 15-14 in South American Championships – mean that it is Argentina who I would argue

⁸⁴ Taylor, *Beautiful Game*, p. 20.

⁸⁵ O.Paz, *The Labyrinth of Solitude* (New York, 1985), p.122.

⁸⁶ Campomar, *¡Golazo*, pp.2-9; Morales, *La identidad*, in Luzuriaga, Morales & Osaba (Eds.), *Cuaderno*, p.44.

carry the inferiority complex in the relationship. In terms of constructing individual identities it is noticeable that whilst the Argentines did not do so in such demonstrable racial terms, both nations harked back to the pre-immigration period to provide an essential territorial sense of self. Notions of *la nuestra*, especially in the pages of *El Gráfico*, often harked back to the legend of the *gaucho*, whilst Uruguay's press prized the attributes of the country's indigenous antecedents. Indeed, both formed part of the marketing campaigns for international tournaments hosted by the two nations. When Argentina held the 1978 World Cup, a gaucho dressed in football kit was used as the mascot, whilst for the 1980 Mundialito, Uruguay utilised a stylised young *charrúa*. If anything continues to demonstrate the perceived difference between the two nations, it is the supposed philosophy of mental toughness of the Uruguayans compared to the Argentinians. Indeed, the continuing myth of *garra charrúa* that is perhaps best summed up by current Uruguayan star, Luis Suárez in his own inimitable style; 'how do you explain that a country with three million inhabitants won the Copa América [in 2011]? Because we don't have two balls, we have three.'⁸⁷ Whilst in Argentina, a continued tendency towards self-flagellation inhabits society's desire to see itself through its national football team. As *Veintitres* magazine wrote in 2016, 'to lose a Copa América (or two), a World Cup final, can be a catastrophe only in the idea that Argentina has no other destiny than being "first among equals."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Wernicke, *Historias*, p.19.

⁸⁸ *Veintitres*, 30 June 2016, p.3

Pierre Nora, Memory, and the Myth of Elizabeth I

TOM ROSE

The Memory Industry

Since the 1980s there has been a boom in historical discourse on the subject of memory and its relationship with history. Whilst the concept of memory was incredibly under-studied before the 1980s, the term and its various derivatives are now a dominant theme in cultural history, and are especially associated with mentality and identity.¹ Indeed, Confino has argued that memory has become 'deprecated by surplus use, whilst memory studies lack a clear focus and have become somewhat predictable.'² There are various reasons for this revolution in critical thinking: twentieth-century violence and the Holocaust; a rise in consciousness about anniversaries; the ending of the Cold War; the explosion of New Histories; and a growing distance between professional history and public memory.³

The relationship between history and memory has become the battleground for theoretical discussion within this 'memory industry', and the central thinker in this is the French historian, Pierre Nora.⁴ Nora fundamentally believes in the 'conquest and eradication of memory by history'.⁵ The processes of modernity have meant 'we have seen the end of societies that had long assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered values, whether through churches or schools, the family or the state'.⁶ Consequently, memory and history are now in fundamental opposition, exemplified by 'the awakening, quite recently in France, of a historiographical consciousness'; whilst memory is natural and evolving, 'open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting', history reconstructs and is 'a critical discourse that is antithetical to spontaneous memory'.⁷ Spiegel similarly argues that

¹ A. Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method', *American Historical Review*, 102 (1997), p. 1386.

² Confino, 'Problems of Method', p. 1387.

³ D.W. Blight, 'The Memory Boom: Why and Why Now?', in P. Boyer and J.V. Wertsch (Eds.), *Memory in Mind and Culture* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 238-251.

⁴ K.L. Klein, 'On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse', *Representations*, 69 (2000), p. 127.

⁵ P. Nora, 'Between Memory and History': Les Lieux de Memoire', *Representations*, 26 (1989), p. 8.

⁶ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 7.

⁷ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', pp. 8-9.

modern history and memory, whilst not antithetical, are at least very different, with memory using the past in the present whilst history keeps it in the past.⁸ Nora consequently believes sites of memory, *lieux de memoire*, are an artificial, historical reconstruction where remembrance ‘comes to us from the outside’ compared to *milieux de memoire* – natural ‘real environments of memory’ of collective historical consciousness.⁹

Memory studies have not yet reached an end-point. Many complaints exist regarding its fragmented nature and the lack of clarity over key concepts.¹⁰ These theoretical discussions of the relationship between history and memory have largely occurred outside of British history; a profession that is ‘less given to philosophy, theory, or abstraction’, whilst generally sceptical of post-structuralist theory.¹¹ This is especially true of early-modern studies, as when it has been applied by British historians it is mostly within post-Enlightenment contexts or less regularly in ancient and medieval European history.¹² Yet Pivetti exemplifies how early-modern studies can benefit from Nora’s theory, using the idea that history destroys memory to analyse Restoration writers like John Dryden: ‘Dryden [is] an advocate of Nora’s modern society’ by ‘[crafting] a natural history against the dissenting memories of the Puritan Revolution, and against them memories that would break down both logical and political unity’.¹³ Sherlock meanwhile highlights how Nora’s idea of *lieux de memoire* and their categorisation as inherently politicized, subduing the act of natural collective memory, is incredibly useful for early-modernists as they ‘[force] attention to the significance of the ‘will to remember’ sites of memory embody ... [and] their material, symbolic, and functional aspects’.¹⁴

The concept of memory is a vital component of early-modern studies, especially its relationship with identities, ideologies and mentalities. Nowhere is this truer than in

⁸ G.M. Spiegel, ‘Memory and History: Liturgical Time and Historical Time’, *History and Theory*, 41 (2002), p. 162.

⁹ Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p. 7, p. 14.

¹⁰ Confino, ‘Problems of Method’, p. 1387; J.K. Olick and J. Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24 (1998), p. 105.

¹¹ K. Hodgkin and S. Radstone, ‘Introduction: Contested Pasts’, in K. Hodgkin and S. Radstone (Eds.), *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory* (London, 2003), p.2; D.P. Jordan, ‘Introduction’, in P. Nora (Ed.), *Rethinking France: Les Lieux de Memoire. Volume 1: The State* (London, 2001), p. xxxi.

¹² P. Sherlock, *Monuments and Memory in Early Modern England* (Aldershot, 2008), p. 6.

¹³ K. Pivetti, *Of Memory and Literary Form: Making the Early Modern English Nation* (Lanham, MD., 2015), pp. 145-146.

¹⁴ Sherlock, *Monuments and Memory*, pp. 4-5.

the historiography on posthumous perceptions of Elizabeth. This has been termed the myth of Elizabeth; however historians are in effect dealing with how Elizabeth has been remembered from her death in 1603 until the modern day, a form of 'reputation studies' that differs significantly from traditional biographies that give a historical judgement.¹⁵ This has been the subject of much historical study. As Dobson and Watson argued in the topic's seminal study, Elizabeth I is 'the most glamorous of English monarchs', 'the nearest thing England has ever had to a defining national heroine'.¹⁶ The myth has also constantly evolved, as 'different anecdotes and texts [achieve] currency and prominence in different eras, some to be forgotten, some utterly to change their meanings, and some to be discredited, as ... different views of past and present alike have become dominant'.¹⁷ Freeman and Doran similarly argued:

This myth has flourished because it explained, and justified, such disparate and incompatible concepts as English nationalism, the British Empire, the Church of England, anti-Catholicism, religious toleration, the subjection of women and, in a different era, their equality with men.¹⁸

Clearly the myth of Elizabeth is imbued with various values and beliefs, and the ideas of memory studies could potentially help to delineate and categorise the many aspects of the myth.

However, studies of the myth of Elizabeth follow a trend in British early-modern studies in being significantly under-theorized. Beyond Sherlock, no one explicitly interacts with Nora.¹⁹ Hutton's studies of the ritual year in early-modern England exemplify this insularity.²⁰ Despite dealing with the issue of collective memory, Hutton is typically neo-Rankean and non-interdisciplinary, articulating solely what the archive reveals. Still, key terms of memory studies consistently appear throughout studies of the myth of Elizabeth – notably 'collective memory', 'remembering',

¹⁵ Olick and Robbins, 'Social Memory Studies', p. 130.

¹⁶ M. Dobson and N.J. Watson, *England's Elizabeth: An Afterlife in Fame and Fantasy* (Oxford, 2002), p. 1.

¹⁷ Dobson and Watson, *England's Elizabeth*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁸ T.S. Freeman and S. Doran, 'Introduction', in S. Doran and T.S. Freeman (Eds.), *The Myth of Elizabeth* (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 3.

¹⁹ P. Sherlock, 'The monuments of Elizabeth Tudor and Mary Stuart: King James and the Manipulation of Memory', *Journal of British Studies*, 46 (2007), pp. 263-289.

²⁰ R. Hutton, *The Rise and Fall of Merry England: The Ritual Year 1400-1700* (Oxford, 1994) & *The Stations of the Sun: A History of the Ritual Year in Britain* (Oxford, 1996).

'forgetting', 'identity' and 'site of memory'. Therefore Nora and other ideas can be applied to its historiography, even if it is under-theorized. This article will thus analyse what historians argue about the myth of Elizabeth through the prism of memory studies and Nora's theory. The first section will deal with what Nora calls 'pre-modern' memory – the pre-nineteenth-century myth. The final two sections will then apply the historiography to Nora's contention that history has destroyed memory. It will show that whilst Nora's theory has its merits, notably about the 'national' memory of Elizabeth, in reality history's relationship with memory is far more nuanced than simply destroying it – demonstrated markedly by feminist critiques of the myth. Instead post-modern historiography, especially that which interacts with social identities, is constantly evolving 'in light of particular cultural biases and assumptions'.²¹

The Pre-Modern Elizabethan Myth

Pre-modern memory was simply defined by Nora as the natural collective memory that served a purpose in the present ('throughout the past we venerated ourselves') and which occurred until the rupture of the French revolution.²² Nora believes memory evolves through three stages – pre-modern, modern, and post-modern.²³ Significantly, these categorisations serve an analysis of primarily modern and post-modern (post-1789) memory of historical events. Yet historical research vis-à-vis Elizabeth has concentrated mainly on her pre-modern remembrance and it shows the myth was central in the creation of a Protestant national identity. Memorialised in a variety of media from almanacs to paintings, Protestantism's centrality in national identity continued into the nineteenth-century.²⁴ This study of the myth of Elizabeth can theoretically be defined as 'mnemohistory', a term coined by Assmann in studying the memory of Moses throughout European history: Mnemohistory does not deal with the past as such, but only with the past as it is remembered. It is not the opposite of history but one of the branches of history. It concentrates exclusively on those aspects of significance and relevance that are the

²¹ Freeman and Doran, 'Introduction', p. 19.

²² Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 16.

²³ W. Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies', *History and Theory*, 41 (2002), p. 183.

²⁴ L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London, 1992), pp. 18-22.

product of memory – that is, recourse to a past – and which only appear in later readings.²⁵

There is a great deal of historiographical consensus over the pre-modern mnemohistory of Elizabeth. Only Hutton doubts the myth's importance in early-modern England, arguing that it was part of a political culture of mainly metropolitan elites, and only gained notoriety when used as a politicised tool to attack the government when they felt the crown was too pro-Catholic; instead the memorialisation of the Gunpowder plot was much more important in popular early-modern religionised memory.²⁶ The historiography has instead followed Cressy's belief that numerous dates – notably 1558, 1588, and 1605 – were 'among a pattern of providences and mercies that underlay the Protestant calendar'.²⁷ 'Queen Elizabeth of famous memory' was the outstanding Protestant heroine who symbolised England's elect status, and the myth that surrounded her in the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries underwent a process of selective remembering and forgetting to create this idealized memory.²⁸ Published in 1989, *Bonfires and Bells* is significantly under-theorized, with no attempt made to define key concepts. Yet perhaps unwittingly, Cressy echoes memory theorists in the title of two chapters: 'History and Providence in the English Revolution' and 'The Politics of Memory in Later Stuart England'. Here history and memory are synonyms, showing that in pre-modern England they are effectively the same, both memorialising past events.

In analysing the seventeenth-century myth of Elizabeth, early-modernists have overall drawn similar conclusions to theorists that have built on Nora's perception of pre-modern memory, despite either not reading or referencing these works. In analysing medieval and post-Holocaust Jewish memory, Spiegel describes memory here being religionised: 'in liturgical commemoration ... the fundamental goal is, precisely, to revivify the past and make it live in the present, to fuse past and present'. This overturns Nora's relationship between modern and post-modern

²⁵ J. Assmann, cited in R.J. Bernstein, 'The Culture of Memory', *History and Theory*, 43 (2004), p. 167.

²⁶ See the chapter 'Blood Month and the Virgin Queen', in Hutton, *Stations of the Sun*, pp. 386-392.

²⁷ D. Cressy, *Bonfires and Bells: National Memory and the Protestant Calendar in Elizabethan and Stuart England* (Stroud, 1994), p. 110.

²⁸ Cressy, *Bonfires and Bells*, p. 130.

history and memory, as ‘history ... is absorbed into cyclical, liturgical memory’.²⁹ Similarly, Birth talks about ‘the immanent past’, where collective memory gives significance to the present, whilst Olick and Robbins term this phenomena ‘presentism’.³⁰ These important concepts are analogous to ideas about the pre-nineteenth-century myth of Elizabeth. In his introduction, Cressy formulates a liturgical, cyclical idea of memory in early-modern England by arguing that ‘momentous episodes ... were memorialized and commemorated as signs of God’s interest in his Protestant nation’.³¹ Walsham’s comprehensive analysis of the posthumous Biblical imagery of Elizabeth, where she was compared to Deborah, Judith and Hester, arrives at similar conclusions that this myth gave seventeenth and eighteenth-century Englishmen a confidence that England was a New Israel and God’s elect nation.³² Whilst not Protestant propaganda in their original Latin, Collinson has also shown that through various translations of William Camden’s popular history, the *Annales*, a myth of Elizabeth being a Protestant heroine was increasingly perpetuated.³³ In early-modern England, history was religionised, serving the same function as memory as a malleable force for present needs. The early-modern historical perceptions of Elizabeth were hence not historically accurate; whilst in the early seventeenth-century Elizabeth was celebrated as a Biblical figure and a quasi-replacement for the medieval cult of the Virgin Mary, during her reign Elizabethans frequently commented on her not doing enough for the Protestant cause.³⁴

Although these analyses by early-modernists do not explicitly interact with memory theory, they do serve a valuable function for memory theorists. Confino has argued that memory is often studied in ‘symbolic isolation’; instead memory should be conceived as a two-way process that includes both how it represents the past and its context.³⁵ Too often the latter is ignored. Similarly, in outlining the future direction memory studies needs to go in, Olick and Robbins emphasise how memory needs to

²⁹ Spiegel, ‘Liturgical Time’, p. 152.

³⁰ K. Birth, ‘The Immanent Past: Culture and Psyche at the Juncture of Memory and History’, *Ethos*, 34 (2006), p.169, pp.180-181; Olick & Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies’, p. 128.

³¹ Cressy, *Bonfires and Bells*, p. xiii.

³² A. Walsham, ‘A Very Deborah?’ The Myth of Elizabeth I as a Providential Monarch’, in J.M. Walker (Ed.), *Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana* (Durham, NC., 1998), pp. 143-168.

³³ P. Collinson, ‘William Camden and the Anti-Myth of Elizabeth: Setting the Mould’, in J.M. Walker (Ed.), *Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana* (Durham, NC., 1998), pp. 79-98.

³⁴ L. Richardson, ‘Elizabeth in Arcadia: Fulke Greville and John Hayward’s Construction of Elizabeth’, in J.M. Walker (Ed.), *Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana* (Durham, NC., 1998), pp. 99-119.

³⁵ Confino, ‘Problems of Method’, p. 1391.

be historicised.³⁶ Due to the nature of their studies, historians naturally do this and analyses of the myth of Elizabeth are exemplary. For example, Rodger's analysis of the myth of Elizabethan sea-power in English history first outlines this myth then historicises it as a potent historical agent throughout seventeenth and eighteenth-century politics.³⁷ Furthermore, a related problem in collective memory studies is the issue of reception; Confino argues that through concentrating predominantly on the 'politics of memory' and 'the sacrificing of the cultural to the political ... we tend to ignore the issue of reception'.³⁸ Perhaps an older historiography that exists on the myth of Elizabeth has been guilty of that. The works of Neale, Yates and Strong concentrated primarily on the politicized creation of the myth – notably the propaganda and the symbolism inherent in the literature and visual arts of Elizabeth. However recent studies have moved beyond this.³⁹ More popular medias of the myth have now been studied which see reception as fundamental: Cressy's bonfires and bells as 'vocabularies of celebration';⁴⁰ Collinson's study of Camden's popular history and its politicised translations;⁴¹ and Grant and Richardson's analysis of the dramatic representations of Elizabeth.⁴²

The vitality of the theme of reception in studying the early-modern myth of Elizabeth has led to a significant issue being contestation, primarily between elite and popular memory. Hodgkin and Radstone have emphasised the 'struggle involved in producing smooth and non-contestatory narratives', whilst arguing 'official and popular wishes for a memory site do not always coincide'.⁴³ This is especially apparent in the Jacobean period, when James I aimed to use the memory of Elizabeth (and the Tudors in general) to legitimate his claims to the throne, whilst the popular memory of Elizabeth as a Protestant heroine was used as a yardstick which contemporaries had to live up to – notably during the Spanish Match in the 1620s. This theme is discussed in Walker's analysis of posthumous images of Elizabeth.

³⁶ Olick & Robbins, 'Social Memory Studies', p. 134.

³⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, 'Queen Elizabeth and the Myth of Sea-Power in English History', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004), p. 153.

³⁸ Confino, 'Problems of Method', pp. 1393-1395.

³⁹ Freeman & Doran, 'Introduction', p. 4.

⁴⁰ Cressy, *Bonfires and Bells*, p. 67.

⁴¹ Collinson, 'Camden and the Anti-Myth', p. 85

⁴² T. Grant, 'Drama Queen: Staging Elizabeth in *If You Know Not Me You Know Nobody*', in J.M. Walker (Ed.), *Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana* (Durham, NC., 1998), p.137; Richardson, 'Elizabeth in Arcadia', p. 99.

⁴³ Hodgkin & Radstone, 'Contested Pasts', p. 16.

Whilst the popular Cecil engraving of Elizabeth in armour evokes a memory of a militant Protestant England that fought off the Armada, a comparative royally-commissioned Gheeraerts portrait aimed to revise the memory of Elizabeth as an aged woman of a bygone age, whose politics were outdated in the 1620s.⁴⁴ Moreover, Sherlock's analysis of the monuments of Elizabeth and Mary Queen of Scots at Westminster Abbey and James' attempts to manipulate memory explicitly discusses this contestation, whilst directly engaging with Nora. Sherlock argues that 'James hoped to rewrite the past in his own image', giving relative equality to Elizabeth and Mary's monuments by '[adopting] virtually identical forms'; they are thus a *lieux de memoire* that aim to give an aura of continuity at a time of discontinuity in English history.⁴⁵

Nora contrasts *lieux de memoire* with *milieux de memoire*: the former being artificial, 'material, symbolic, and functional' whilst the latter were 'real environments of memory', 'collectively remembered values' of a profoundly religious society.⁴⁶ These categorisations are extremely useful both in studying the myth of Elizabeth and early-modern studies in general. For example, Sherlock contrasts James' *lieux de memoire* to Elizabeth with the more organic monuments to Elizabeth in London parish churches that 'contained quite different versions of the queen's life than that found at the abbey'.⁴⁷ Cressy also indirectly uses these categories through explaining the Spanish Armada was a national *milieux de memoire*: 'The deliverance of 1588 was forcefully imprinted on English national memory. It was not institutionalized, there being no 'Armada day', but the horror of the invasion attempt and the miracle of God's judgment were too remarkable to be forgotten'.⁴⁸ Similarly bonfires and bells as the vocabularies of commemorative celebration were naturally infused into early-modern Englishmen's memory.⁴⁹ In early-modern England, one can therefore see a contestation over Elizabeth at sites of memory to her – monuments, paintings and literature. Some were a natural, cultural product of the dominant Protestant ideology whilst others were artificial aiming to rewrite history,

⁴⁴ J.M. Walker, 'Bones of Contention: Posthumous Images of Elizabeth and Stuart Politics', in J.M. Walker (Ed.), *Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana* (Durham, NC., 1998), p. 252.

⁴⁵ Sherlock, 'Monuments', pp. 263-266, p. 273.

⁴⁶ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 7, p. 19.

⁴⁷ Sherlock, 'Monuments', p. 289.

⁴⁸ Cressy, *Bonfires and Bells*, p. 122.

⁴⁹ Cressy, *Bonfires and Bells*, p. 67.

with limited political and functional effect. Without either realising it or referencing it, early-modernists directly engage with Nora and other memory theorists, showing just how useful Nora's perceptions were.

Engaging with Nora – The National Myth of Elizabeth

Nora's idea of pre-modern memory and its further conceptualisation as cyclical and liturgical therefore stands up to the historical scrutiny placed on the pre-nineteenth-century myth of Elizabeth. However, much more important to Nora's mainly post-1789 analysis is the idea that 'history is perpetually suspicious of [traditional, collective] memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it'.⁵⁰ This is a modern phenomenon, a by-product of both the nineteenth-century secularization of the state and the 1930s academic development of the *Annales* school – where perceptions of the nation-state were replaced by the state-society. History consequently emerged as a social science.⁵¹ Significantly Nora is very specific in arguing that this phenomenon was unique to France; for example, in the USA traditions have continued because they were not pre-modern but created in the modern world.⁵²

Nora does not express his beliefs about Britain, however parallels can be deduced. It was only in the 1980s when historians stopped reinforcing the national myth of Elizabeth in their academic work, however implicitly. Freeman and Doran have shown how the old Oxford DNB article on Elizabeth was very celebratory and patriotic, ending with 'her name was held in something more than honour from Persia to Peru, from Russia to Algiers'; meanwhile Black's 1959 volume for the *Oxford History of England* believed that when Elizabeth died 'she left behind her a kingdom that had won a commanding position among the great powers of Europe'.⁵³ A similar picture of British academia is presented by Frye through analysing the myth of Elizabeth at Tilbury. She argues 'as a myth of nationalist sentiment, the Queen was as appealing to anti-royalists of the seventeenth-century as she was to those historians who experienced World War II'. Historians like Rowse and MacCaffrey are

⁵⁰ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 9.

⁵¹ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', pp. 9-11.

⁵² Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 10.

⁵³ Oxford DNB and J.B. Black, cited in Freeman and Doran, 'Introduction', p. 17.

quoted as still 'remembering' in their historical arguments; here memory was still repressing true history.⁵⁴ In his appraisal of A.L. Rowse, Haigh arrives at similar conclusions that 'presentism' was evident: "The England of Elizabeth' [Rowse] projected was a myth. He created the England of his dreams. It was an England that had all the qualities he thought his own had lacked – leadership, bravery, energy, achievement'.⁵⁵

These twentieth-century historians continued the Victorian and Edwardian popular myth of Elizabeth evident in children's books, of her being the progenitor of the British Empire and a model for modern-day empire-builders.⁵⁶ They also correspond with the popular national memory that perpetuated a belief that Elizabeth's resolve was also a model for Britain in times of hardship, evident in late 1930s films like *Fire Over England* that paralleled Elizabeth's experiences against Spain with the contemporary threat of Nazism.⁵⁷ Therefore, if history does become antithetical to memory in British academia, it was a post-World War II phenomenon, perhaps even post-decolonisation when the myth of Elizabeth that was so imbued with nationalist sentiment and ideas of empire became archaic. Indeed, Nora has recognised parallel events occurring in France, with the 1970s being an important decade when 'national identity was replaced by social identities'.⁵⁸

Published in anticipation of the four-hundredth anniversary of Elizabeth's death, Dobson and Watson argue:

We are able to write [*England's Elizabeth*] because we live at a historical moment in which the partial unravelling of certain notions of Englishness and Britishness alike ... has made the processes by which they once coalesced available for interrogation as perhaps never before.⁵⁹

It appears Dobson and Watson believe Britain is at the post-modernist stage of Nora's history of memory, no longer tied to notions of national identity or the nation-

⁵⁴ S. Frye, 'The Myth of Elizabeth at Tilbury', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 23 (1992), pp. 113-114.

⁵⁵ C. Haigh, 'Rowse, Elizabeth and England', *History Today*, 53 (2003), p. 26.

⁵⁶ V.B. Richmond, 'Elizabeth I in Imperial Britain: A Myth for Children', in C. Jansohn (Ed.), *Queen Elizabeth I: Past and Present* (Munster, 2004), p. 231.

⁵⁷ T. Betteridge, 'A Queen for all Seasons: Elizabeth I on Film', in J.M. Walker (Ed.), *Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana* (Durham, NC., 1998), pp. 242-259.

⁵⁸ P. Nora, 'General Introduction', in P. Nora (Ed.), *Rethinking France: Les Lieux de Memoire. Volume 1: The State* (London, 2001), p. xv.

⁵⁹ Dobson and Watson, *England's Elizabeth*, p. 3.

state. Haigh has similarly argued that there has recently been a widening gap between academic history and the public, with academics no longer feeling they have to create a certain type of history in the public interest whilst the public are concurrently less interested in history because of the declining importance of the monarchy, religion, and traditional communities and values.⁶⁰ Since the 1980s we have seen two anniversaries – the four-hundredth anniversaries of the Armada in 1988 and Elizabeth's death in 2003 – that would appear ripe to celebrate and commemorate this myth. Instead, there has been scepticism.

The Armada's anniversary saw a wide range of 'commemorative' scholarship produced that, in reality, was not celebratory. Padfield, in a monograph entitled 'Armada: A Celebration', argued it was indecisive: 'The winner, Elizabeth, gained extraordinary fame, but nothing else'; instead, Padfield outlines the importance of Dutch rebels and economic forces that saw the rise of north European capitalism and Spain's decline.⁶¹ Previous English historians imbued with this memory of Elizabeth had thus misinterpreted events to serve a nationalist purpose. It was only in this post-modern stage that history could truly escape memory, and historiographies, like Marxism in this case, could reinterpret dominant interpretations. Williams has also been derogatory about this past nationalist historiography imbued with the myth: 'The Armada deserved a better history than this, and in recent years it has had it as scholars ... have addressed themselves to the real issues in the tumultuous campaign'.⁶²

Even some monographs more celebratory of the Armada can be viewed through the prism of history destroying memory. Nora has argued that 'what we call memory today is ... not memory but already history'; that there has been a 'materialization of memory' and that 'modern memory is, above all, archival'.⁶³ Whilst pre-modern memory was naturally imbued in the collective memory of Protestant English people, this modern-day memorialisation was materially and visually reconstructed as if trying to recover this forgotten collective memory. For example, Rodger published a

⁶⁰ Haigh, 'Rowse', p. 28.

⁶¹ P. Padfield, *Armada: A Celebration of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada 1588-1988* (London, 1988), pp. 194-201.

⁶² P. Williams, *Armada* (Stroud, 2000), pp. 163-164.

⁶³ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 13.

monograph entitled 'Armada in the Public Records' that aimed to give non-academics access to the archives, whilst the National Maritime Museum's commemoration was dominated by the visual and material culture of the Armada.⁶⁴ The memory of the Armada here is thus 'surviving only as a reconstituted object beneath the gaze of critical history'; Nora continues this statement by saying that '*Lieux de Memoire* are fundamentally remains, the ultimate embodiment of a memorial consciousness that has barely survived in a historical age that calls out for memory because it has abandoned it'.⁶⁵ These celebrations of the Armada and of Elizabeth's role within it are artificial, historicised sites of memory that relied on visual and material aids to recover and present a lost past in England's collective memory.

Whilst the Armada commemorations of 1988 celebrated the event, albeit with some scepticism, the 2003 academic commemorations of Elizabeth's death were very different. The anniversary 'inspired a number of conferences, the majority seemingly devoted to the new Stuart Britain'.⁶⁶ In academic circles, 1603 was thus considered more important for the accession of James I and a new royal family than for the end of the Tudors. Even in the *TRHS* conference where the above statement comes from, entitled 'Elizabeth I and the Expansion of England' at the National Maritime Museum', articles by Armitage and Mason which re-evaluate Elizabeth's role in creating an empire and Britain respectively diminish her importance compared to the imperial myth of her.⁶⁷ In doing so, they are part of a more positivist recent historiography about the early Stuarts that aims to re-accommodate James and Charles' importance in 'British' issues such as empire and union in direct comparison to Elizabeth's unimportance. Yet in the English national memory, Elizabeth had a greater importance than the early Stuarts which, in the dominant Whiggish conceptualisation of English history, were seen mostly as the deposed family during the English revolutions. Here academic history is diametrically opposed to past popular memory.

⁶⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *Armada in the Public Records* (London, 1988); M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado, *Armada, 1588-1988: An International Exhibition to Commemorate the Spanish Armada* (Harmondsworth, 1988).

⁶⁵ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 12.

⁶⁶ S. Adams, 'Introduction', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004), p. 199.

⁶⁷ D. Armitage, 'The Elizabethan Idea of Empire', pp.269-277; R.A. Mason, 'Scotland, Elizabethan England and the Idea of Britain', pp.279-293.

Adam's introduction to the *TRHS* conference reveals professional history's new suspicions of this memory of Elizabeth being central to England's expansion: 'To avoid yet another explosion of the myth of Elizabeth I, the conference was given a deliberately neutral stance with contributors encouraged to take whatever position they chose'.⁶⁸ Significantly, the contributors aimed to deconstruct the myth of Elizabeth in what Nora would perceive as the 'terrorism of historicized memory'.⁶⁹ Notably interrogated was the naval myth. Whilst Rodger and Knighton's articles acknowledged its importance as a historical agent in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England, other articles by Barber and Rose reach a conclusion that overall 'there are strong reasons for denying Elizabeth any personal role in an expansion of England in her reign'.⁷⁰ Alongside Armitage and Mason's questioning of the imperial myth, Howard and Hearn similarly interrogated and historicized Elizabeth's visual image and both suggested the myth surrounding her in visualized form was less potent as itself but rather subject to other forces that led to its significance in future centuries.⁷¹ The conference's overall aim to normalize the Elizabethan age shows an explicit suspicion of the myth of Elizabeth, and perhaps can only now occur because academic history in Britain has entered a post-modern age that no longer serves the nation-state – an age where 'we no longer unquestionably identify with [the nation's] heritage'.⁷²

Beyond Nora? The Feminine Myth of Elizabeth

In one of the only early-modern studies critiquing Nora's theory that the end of pre-modern society saw the end of real memory, Garnsa and Pivetti argue that 'Nora's distinctions between pre-modern and modern visions of the past ignore the "living" site of memory common to both eras: the eroticized body'.⁷³ Whilst national identity

⁶⁸ Adams, 'Introduction', p. 119.

⁶⁹ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 14

⁷⁰ Adams, 'Introduction', p.121. Articles cited include Rodger, 'Myth of Sea-Power', pp.153-174; C.S. Knighton, 'A Century on: Pepys and the Elizabethan Navy', pp.141-151; S. Rose, 'Mathematics and the Art of Navigation: The Advance of Scientific Seamanship in Elizabethan England', pp.175-184; and P. Barber, 'Was Elizabeth I Interested in Maps – And Did it Matter?', pp. 185-198; *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004).

⁷¹ K. Hearn, 'Elizabeth I and the Spanish Armada: A Painting and its Afterlife', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004), pp.261-268 and M. Howard, 'Elizabeth I: A Sense of Place in Stone, Print and Paint', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004), pp. 123-140.

⁷² K. Hearn, 'Elizabeth I and the Spanish Armada: A Painting and its Afterlife', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004), pp.261-268 and M. Howard, 'Elizabeth I: A Sense of Place in Stone, Print and Paint', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004), pp. 123-140.

⁷³ J.S. Garrison and K. Pivetti, 'Introduction: The Erotics of Recollection', in J.S. Garrison and K. Pivetti (eds.), *Sexuality and Memory in Early Modern England: Erotics of Recollection* (London, 2015), pp. 7-8.

for much of modernity was hegemonic,⁷⁴ social identities have become more significant with the post-modern decline of the nation-state. Nora did argue that ‘the passage from memory to history has required every social group to redefine its identity through the revitalization of its own history’,⁷⁵ however his theory is still dominated by the issue of national identity and gender identity is notably absent. Maybe it is because French history, as Nora admits, is inherently masculinised, with Jeanne d’Arc an anomaly in a history dominated by men – and even Jeanne was defeminized, viewed as a ‘providential man’ to save France.⁷⁶ This is compared to a British past which has had numerous strong heroines that the national memory has had to accommodate. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Nora’s belief in a redefinition of social identities, like gender, is solely a modern phenomenon. In Richmond’s study of Victorian and Edwardian children’s books which evoke both feminine and national myths about Elizabeth, she argues this type of memory text is on a continuum from the plays and histories of early-modern England to the films of the twentieth-century.⁷⁷ This suggests a far more nuanced differentiation between simply pre-modern and modern memory and sites of memory than what Nora perceives.

Dobson and Watson clearly show the myth of Elizabeth is more than just a national myth. The feminine myth was, and is, an equally strong strand of it, and this has either celebrated, or more likely vilified Elizabeth since her death. Whilst the seventeenth-century saw Biblical female comparisons, the eighteenth-century saw her femininity come to the fore emphasised in her sacrifice for the political, public good. Then in the nineteenth-century, a negative myth of her subversive femininity manifested and finally the twentieth-century saw Elizabeth sexualised.⁷⁸ Levin and Carney argue that, even in this post-modern age, we still struggle to deal with gender issues and femininity in similar ways as early seventeenth-century dramatists – something highlighted by the lack of any cinematic depictions of Elizabeth

⁷⁴ Olick and Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies’, p. 126.

⁷⁵ Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p. 14.

⁷⁶ Nora, ‘General Introduction’, p.xiv; M. Winock, ‘Joan of Arc’, in P. Nora L.D. and Kritzman (eds.), *The Construction of the French Past: Realms of Memory* (New York, NY, 1992), p. 478.

⁷⁷ Richmond, ‘Elizabeth I in Imperial Britain’, p. 231.

⁷⁸ Dobson and Watson, *England’s Elizabeth*, pp. 43, 79-83, 103-106, 116, 179-180, 216-221.

accommodating both her private femininity and her public political role.⁷⁹ Therefore, cinematic depictions as memory texts are in many ways not artificial *lieux de memoire*, but natural and evolving *milieux de memoire*, 'open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting'.⁸⁰ Rather than creating a myth of Elizabeth to fit a contemporary cultural functionality – as perhaps physical, 'national' memory places, like monuments, do – these memory texts instead perpetuate a myth that had pre-modern origins.

Dobson and Watson's *England's Elizabeth* is a cultural feminist critique, archetypal of this increasingly dominant strand of historiography on the myth in the twenty-first-century.⁸¹ Whilst recognising the differences between the historical and mythical Elizabeth, these analyses do not place memory and history as antithetical. For example, Levin and Carney's analysis of seventeenth and twentieth-century dramatic depictions of young Elizabeth opens with the historical account and follows with how drama reinterpreted them. They then conclude by arguing that 'the limitations of the representations of young Elizabeth not only fail to give us a more complex and fully realized historical woman, but perpetuate the myths about what young women can do with their lives today'.⁸² Similarly, Freeman and Doran argue for a nuanced relationship between history and memory where 'the mythical Elizabeth is a simplified version of the historical Elizabeth, who was at once more and less than the myth'.⁸³ Betteridge's analysis of twentieth-century cinematic representations of Elizabeth also reveals a symbiotic relationship between academic history and memory. This still occurs, as shown by Kapur's 1998 film depicting a post-modern Elizabeth who becomes and performs the role of the Virgin Queen – a cinematic depiction of Judith Butler's contention that females perform gender roles, and pre-occupied with the post-structuralist issue of image.⁸⁴ Finally, feminine historians like Fraser use history in the present even in this post-modern age, as she compares

⁷⁹ C. Levin and J.E. Carney, 'Young Elizabeth in Peril: From Seventeenth-Century Drama to Modern Movies', in C. Levin, J.E. Carney and D. Barrett-Graves (eds.), *Elizabeth I: Always Her Own Free Woman* (Aldershot, 2003), p. 235.

⁸⁰ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p. 8.

⁸¹ See also Betteridge, 'A Queen for all Seasons', pp.242-259; Levin and Carney, 'Young Elizabeth in Peril', pp.215-237; D.G. Moss, 'A Queen for Whose Time? Elizabeth I as Icon for the Twentieth Century', *Journal of Popular Culture*, 39 (2006), pp. 796-816.

⁸² Levin and Carney, 'Young Elizabeth in Peril', p. 235.

⁸³ Freeman and Doran, 'Introduction', p. 19.

⁸⁴ Betteridge, 'A Queen for all Seasons', p. 254.

Elizabeth to Thatcher.⁸⁵ Clearly history, or more precisely historiography, has not reached an end-point but is still constantly changing 'in light of particular cultural biases and assumptions'.⁸⁶

The pre-modern idea of 'presentism' is therefore still evident in academic work by feminist historians, and thus raises the question about whether it exists in other forms of historiography concerned with social identities. This form of memory studies should consequently be seen as a vibrant historiographical branch that is interacting with memory, not destroying it. Certainly memory and history are different; however the reality is far more nuanced than them being antithetical, perhaps because there has still been no rupture with the past in gender history, thereby giving it a need in the present. Still, despite writing in a firmly post-structuralist setting, and often being academics from non-historical backgrounds like film studies, these feminist critiques again fail to explicitly interact with memory theory beyond simply recognising the post-modern context they are writing in. Whilst Olick and Robbins recognise the need to historicize memory, the historiography on the myth of Elizabeth needs to do the opposite and interact more with memory theory, thereby giving a significant historical example in the interrogation of Nora's notion that history has destroyed memory.

Although needing to increase its theoretical engagement with memory theorists, the study of the myth of Elizabeth and its historicization is still a model for the future direction of memory studies identified by Olick and Robbins in 1998.⁸⁷ Moreover, they show that Nora's ideas about the relationship of memory and history are beneficial to studying the myth of Elizabeth. This notably includes classifications of pre-modern memory, as its conceptualisation as being liturgical and cyclical has stood up to the historical scrutiny that early-modernists have placed on the pre-nineteenth-century myth. Nora's notions of *lieux* and *milieux de memoire* are meanwhile similarly valuable to early-modernists wishing to discuss issues of contestation and the dichotomy of popular and elite memory, as Sherlock has shown. Furthermore, Nora's belief that history destroyed memory is an interesting prism through which to analyse nineteenth and twentieth-century historiography on

⁸⁵ A. Fraser, cited in Moss, 'A Queen for Whose Time?', p. 809

⁸⁶ Freeman and Doran, 'Introduction', p. 19.

⁸⁷ Olick and Robbins, 'Social Memory Studies', p. 134

the myth of Elizabeth and its relationship with national identity, whilst the academic commemorations in 1988 and 2003 show it has conceptual uses beyond the paradigm of French history. Still, Nora's analysis is inherently limited by concentrating on the issue of national identity and memory: as feminist critiques of the myth of Elizabeth reveal memory is still alive and flourishing. This post-modern historiographical field is not trying to destroy memory through historicization, but is instead interacting with memory and accommodating it as a form of mnemohistory because here, unlike with issues of national identity, there has not yet been a rupture in the past. Feminist history – and perhaps social histories in general – are still rooted very much in the present.

The Iconography of Kingship: Masques, Antimasques and Pastorals

THOMAS BLACK

Imagining Men and Kings

In the third part of his trilogy on the image-making of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English rulers, Kevin Sharpe argued that even after the fighting of Civil War broke out in 1642 'both sides had to claim the validating languages and symbols of kingship [i.e.] Scripture, law, [and] the scales of justice.'¹ As the war developed, and the subsequent Protectorate took shape, the office of what James VI had termed the 'little god,' was subjected to the democratising forces of repeated literary renegotiations.² Moreover, the most important writers of the day struggled to reimagine and to produce powerful images of the state across a myriad of genres and mediums. Intrinsicly bound to the debates about constitutional forms are fundamental conceptions of man and his relationships with his fellow men, with the natural world, and ultimately with God himself. In this sense the iconography of man is interwoven with that of the king or state. As the republican theorist James Harrington argued in his *System of Politics* (c. 1661), 'as the form of a man is the image of God, so the form of a government is the image of man.'³ Some of Andrew Marvell's most powerful pastoral poetry presents man in a circumscribed pastoral place, a place free to contemplate his relation to the world. In *The Garden* Marvell imagines 'that happy garden-state / While man there walked without a mate,' under the leaves of grass his mind is free to 'Annihilat[e] all that's made / To a green thought in a green shade.'⁴ Marvell's vision radically resituates man, placing him in liberated, solitary, and direct contact with a world of immanent objects and ideas unmediated by any prior authority. Others, such as Robert Filmer could invoke a similar Edenic solitude only to bolster a vision of hierarchical order predicated on monarchical power. He argues 'a natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed

¹ K. Sharpe, *Rebranding Rule, The Restoration and Revolution Monarchy, 1660-1714* (New Haven, CT., 2013) p. 2.

² King James VI of Scotland, *The Basilicon Doron of King James VI, Waldegrave 1603 Text*, (Ed. J. Craigie), 2 Vols. (Edinburgh, 1944), I, p. 25.

³ J. Harrington, 'A System of Politics' in J.G.A. Pocock (Ed.), *The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 267-294, 273.

⁴ A. Marvell, 'The Garden' in E. Donno (Ed.), *Complete Poems* (London, 2005), pp. 100-102, 57-58, 47-48.

without the denial of the creation of Adam,' as Adam in his solitude was 'the father, king, and lord.'⁵

Masque and Antimasque – Iconographies of (Dis)order 1630-41

In his 'gift' to his heir, *Basilicon Doron*, James VI and I offered advice on how to rule, with meditations on the nature of kingship itself. James wrote:

A king is as one set on a stage, whose smallest actions and gestures, all the people gazinglie doe beholde: and [...] the people who seeth but the outward part, will euer judge of the substance, by the circumstances, and according to outward appearance.⁶

The court masques produced during James's and his successor Charles I's reigns perhaps increased this sense of the staging of the monarch. Masques were a form of festive courtly entertainment that became regular fixtures at the Stuart court in England. Comprising music, dancing, scripted drama, elaborate choreography, and increasingly fabulous theatrical effects, the court masques were the most spectacular form of entertainment of the early seventeenth century. Accepting that the king was indeed to be judged on outward appearances, the masques were used to harness and mould these appearances into a substantial iconography of kingship. The masques enacted and represented the king's authority through a scripted evening of speech, dance, music, and spectacular theatrical effects irradiated with dense symbolism. Though primarily used to praise the monarch, the masque could also advise and, in so doing, offer oblique criticism of king or court.

The writers of the masques themselves often demonstrate an anxiety that their symbolic and iconographic programmes were so abstract or arcane as to be generally impenetrable, and feared that 'many in [...the] audience would be incapable of recognizing what was going on.'⁷ Indeed accounts from audience members suggest responses ranging from boredom to Francis Bacon's outright

⁵ R. Filmer, 'Observations upon Aristotle's Politiques' in D. Wootton (Ed.), *Democracy and Divine Right* (London, 1986), pp. 110-120, 110.

⁶ James VI, *Basilicon Doron*, I, p.163.

⁷ D. Lindley, 'Introduction', in D. Lindley (Ed.), *Court Masques: Jacobean and Caroline Entertainments 1605-1640* (Oxford, 1998), pp .ix-xvii, xi.

dismissal of the entire genre as mere 'Toyes.'⁸ The complex staging of kingship in the masques paradoxically exacerbates the problems of misinterpretation that James warns of in *Basilicon Doron*. James remained an aloof spectator of court masques and was anxious to maintain control of his texts and images. As he admitted in *Basilicon Doron*, he only published an authorised version of that particular text because an unauthorised text was printed, forcing him to:

publishe and spred the true copies thereof [and] by this preface, to cleare suche parts thereof, as in respect of the concised shortnesse of my style, may be misinterpreted therein.⁹

The royal text, and even the royal 'style', disseminated amongst the public, here becomes radically unstable, and James's official publication is an attempt to reinforce his and its authority through reiteration and a proliferation of prefatory material. Walter Ong argues that 'print encourages a sense of completion,' whereas 'manuscript culture had preserved a feeling for a book as [...] an occurrence in the course of conversation.'¹⁰ James's intervention, though it was an attempt to stifle that conversation by harmonising interpretation with the univocality of the printed royal word, demonstrates the ultimate fluidity of even printed text. The Stuart masque – a form that marries the already unstable written word with a baffling array of visual imagery – though ostensibly a celebration of authority, could become a site of uncertainty and confusion.

The masques of Charles's reign subtly shifted emphasis away from the Jacobean focus on the unitary monarch as the fountainhead of virtue and grace, to an idealised, Neoplatonic iconography of love. This love was epitomised not in Charles's elevated solitude but in his relationship with Queen Henrietta Maria. The queen and, for the first time, the king appeared in several masques themselves and, in so doing, broke down the final barriers between court and performance. Their active participation suggests a fuller recognition and endorsement of the iconography of the masques themselves. Indeed Stephen Orgel argues that Charles became so

⁸ F. Bacon, 'On Masques and Triumphs', in M. Kieman (Ed.), *The Oxford Francis Bacon*, 15 Vols., (Oxford, 2000), XV, p. 117.

⁹ James VI, *Basilicon Doron*, I, p. 13.

¹⁰ W. J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy* (London, 1993), pp. 132,125.

involved in their production that he 'was not merely being entertained by his masques; the form was an extension of the royal mind.'¹¹

Describing the masques of Ben Jonson, Orgel argues that 'every masque concluded by merging spectator with masque, in effect transforming the courtly audience into the idealized world of the poet's vision.'¹² In the Caroline masques a significant but subtly different structural blurring of boundaries emerges. William Davenant's *The Temple of Love* (1634) casts Henrietta Maria as 'Indamora', a symbolic representation of divine love, who is travelling towards Britain to restore and reveal its temple but who is blocked by the antimasque of the magi. Masques increasingly included 'antimasques', where a group of disruptive agents had to be banished from or integrated into the masque proper. After dispelling the antimasque of the lecherous Magi she steps through the proscenium arch: 'the Queen being seated under the State by the King, the scene was changed into the true Temple of Chaste love.'¹³ Here the movement of the masque departs from the Jonsonian model described above. Indamora, the idealised figure of chaste love, leaves the masque to sit 'under' the king in a sign of decorous obedience and submission and, through this chaste and properly ordered love emanating from the state, the masque world is transformed and the true symbolic climax achieved. After this metamorphosis the masque moves beyond a mere symbolic tableau and dramatizes the revelation of the ideal through staging the meeting and courting of two chaste lovers. Sunesis and Thelma ('which intimate the Understanding and the Will')¹⁴ enter the temple and sing a brief courtship duet:

Sunesis: Come melt thy soul in mine, that when unite,

We may become one virtuous appetite.

[...]

Both: When perfect Will, and strengthened Reason meet,

¹¹ S. Orgel, *The Illusion of Power: Political Theatre in the English Renaissance* (Berkeley, CA., 1975), p. 43.

¹² S. Orgel, 'Introduction', in S. Orgel (Ed.), *The Complete Masques*, (New Haven, CT., 1969), pp. 1-39, 2.

¹³ W. Davenant, *The Temple of Love, The Dramatic Works of Sir William D'Avenant*, (Eds. J. Maidment and W. H. Logan), 5 Vols. (Edinburgh, 1872), I, pp. 281-316, 302.

¹⁴ Davenant, *Temple of Love*, p. 287.

Then Love's created to endure.¹⁵

Their dialogue elucidates the crux of the masque's aesthetic. Love, presented as a 'virtuous appetite', is valorised as the force that reveals and impels us towards the other virtues. The 'perfect will' and 'strengthened reason' that form the basis of pure love are intended as more than just an abstract concept, they are a pattern for personal *and* public life. As Sharpe has argued, the Caroline masques celebrate love not as carnal pleasure but [...] a Platonic union of souls that represented the victory of higher reason over appetite. Platonic love was an ideal form of government because it led not to forceful regimen but to self-regulation.¹⁶

Though chastity was a prime feature of the love celebrated in Caroline masques, it found its greatest expression not in a virginity such that 'She that has [it] is clad in complete steel,'¹⁷ but in the marriage bed. Contemporaries such as Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clarendon, understood and engaged with this royal program of self-presentation, proclaiming that 'they were the true idea of conjugal affection, in the age in which they lived.'¹⁸ The Magi of *The Temple of Love* complain of Indamora and her followers that 'They raise strange doctrines, and new sects of Love: / [...] and practice generation not / Of bodies but of souls.'¹⁹ However, one of the central features of Caroline imagery was the fecundity of Charles and Henrietta Maria's union. Their chaste love did not just regenerate their own souls but through it they became the virtuous soul of the nation. Their marriage also engendered both new bodies and new souls in their children, and we are told that their line will 'in their offspring never cease, / Till time's too old to last an hour.'²⁰ These images of exemplary marriage are further explored in Thomas Carew's *Coelum Britannicum* (1634) where we are told by Mercury that:

Your [Charles and Henrietta Maria's] exemplar life

¹⁵ Davenant, *Temple of Love*, p. 303.

¹⁶ K. Sharpe, *Image Wars: Promoting Kings and Commonwealths in England, 1603-1660* (New Haven, CT., 2010), p. 262.

¹⁷ J. Milton, *Comus*, *Complete English Poems*, (Ed. Gordon Campbell) (London, 1992), pp. 57-91, 421.

¹⁸ E. Hyde, *Selections from Clarendon*, (Ed. G. Huehns) (London, 1953), p. 100.

¹⁹ Davenant, *Temple of Love*, p. 292-293.

²⁰ Davenant, *Temple of Love*, p. 304.

Hath not alone transfused a zealous heat
Of imitation through your virtuous court,
By whose bright blaze your palace is become
The envied pattern of this underworld,
But the aspiring flame hath kindled heaven.²¹

Here the love of Charles and Maria has triumphed to transform not just the court but even the Olympian pantheon. Jove, we are told, has declared an end to sexual license among the gods and the

Lawgiver himself in his own person observes his decrees so punctually; who, besides, to eternize the memory of that great example of matrimonial union which he derives from hence, hath on his bedchamber door and ceiling, fretted with stars, in capital letters engraven the inscription of CARLOMARIA.²²

The fusion of Charles and Henrietta Maria into one being at once recalls the Platonic conceit that human beings were once joined in double bodies.²³ Simultaneously, the fusion forms a significant part of Charles's presentation of his own rule inasmuch as 'from the moment his wife landed on English soil, [he] made his marriage a very public expression of his rule.'²⁴ The key emphasis of Charles's self-presentation through the masques is consistently not on himself as an isolated and elevated monarch, but as a husband and father to his wife and children as well as the state. The nation was repeatedly figured as an affective family in early modern discourse. James referred to the monarch as the '*communis parens*'²⁵ or common parent of the people, and the Caroline masques form the most extensive exploration of the aesthetics of a government figured as a loving family.

²¹ T. Carew, *Coelum Britannicum, Court Masques*, pp. 166-193, 52-57.

²² Carew, *Coelum Britannicum*, pp. 244-248.

²³ Plato, *Symposium*, (Trans. A. Nehamas & P. Woodruff) in J. M. Cooper (Ed.), *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis, IN., 1997), pp. 457-505, 189e.

²⁴ Sharpe, *Image Wars*, p. 233.

²⁵ James VI, *Basilicon Doron*, I, p. 115.

The discourse of government as family was acknowledged by Hyde who noted – with reservations – that:

The king's affection to the queen was of a very extraordinary alloy; a composition of conscience, and love, and generosity, and gratitude, and all the noble affection which raise the passion to the greatest height; insomuch as he saw with her eyes, and determined by her judgement.²⁶

This passage demonstrates a realisation of masque imagery in politics but Hyde concludes that 'it was not good for either of them.'²⁷ The masques themselves contain dissenting and destabilising voices. *Coelum Britannicum*, one of the most complex and ambitious masques, contains eight antimasques and, in the speeches of Momus, sustained and uneasy satire. The antimasques of *Coelum* are somewhat unique in that they are not banished or reconciled by the revelation of the ideal. Instead Momus – a stock Olympian figure of mockery, but also strongly associated with criticism of tyranny – engages in dramatic dialogue with them; assessing and rebuffing each antimasque in prose laced with sarcasm and lewd jokes. He summons them with a heraldic formula, mockingly occupying a regal linguistic space and displacing the patterned pentameters of the Olympian's chosen herald, Mercury. With his sneering declaration of: 'Oyez, Oyez, Oyez, [...] after mature deliberation and long debate, held first in our / own inscrutable bosom and afterwards communicated with our / Privy Council, seemed meet to our omnipotency [etc.]'²⁸ Momus usurps a particular ceremonial language of the court and destabilises the decorous process of regal address and reply between Mercury and the royal spectators, and indeed disrupts the entire Jovian mission to Britain. The masque, despite its production at the centre of court is not univocal, and Momus refuses to be contained by the normal structures of the masque; he arrives uninvited, and, unprompted, he leaves before the final resolution: 'I came in bluntly without knocking, and nobody / bid me welcome, so I'll depart as abruptly without taking leave, / and bid nobody farewell.'²⁹

²⁶ Hyde, *Selections*, p. 100.

²⁷ Hyde, *Selections*, p. 100.

²⁸ Carew, *Coelum Britannicum*, pp. 385-403.

²⁹ Carew, *Coelum Britannicum*, pp. 789-791.

The transformation or banishment of the antimasque by the simple revelation of the ideal does not function uncontested in either the masque or the world of politics. Davenant's *Salmacida Spolia* (1640) was the last masque performed before the outbreak of Civil War and registers significant tensions both within court and within the very structure of the masque itself. In *Salmacida Spolia* the scene of the antimasque is Britain itself where a Fury whips the surrounding seas into a rage. We are greeted with 'a horrid scene [...] of storm and tempest. No / glimpse of the sun was seen, as if darkness confusion, and deformity had / possessed the world and driven light to heaven.'³⁰ The Fury incites the winds to blow 'Until you raise the seas so high / That waves may hang like tears in the sun's eye.'³¹ The sun here is clearly Charles, whose position is both panoptic and all-illuminating, and, crucially blinded by the events of 1640. Charles is not called upon or indeed capable of dispelling the storms of sea or state. Instead the antimasque in some senses resolves itself, an expression perhaps of hope rather than confidence. Davenant's masque represents a final fossilisation of the form in the face of mounting factional tensions. The cracks in the iconographic façade are revealed in the very stasis of the symbolic structure deployed. The antimasque proper of the Furies departs before the arrival of the forces of good, allowing none of the interaction between them that made *Coelum Britannicum* so dynamic. There follow twenty entries and departures of comic antimasques which, like the Furies, absent themselves before the re-emergence of the ideal. The closing scene sees the king ascend the mountain of honour and the queen descend to meet him from the heavens. The lovers, united and centre stage, are greeted with this encomium:

So musical as to all ears
 Doth seem the music of the spheres,
 Are you unto each other still,
 Turning your thoughts to either's will.
 All that are harsh, all that are rude,

³⁰ Davenant, *Salmacida Spolia*, *Court Masques*, pp. 200-213, 93-95.

³¹ Davenant, *Salmacida Spolia*, pp. 105-106.

Are by your harmony subdued;

Yet so into obedience wrought

As if not forced to it but taught.³²

The emphasis is still on the didactic icon of the king and queen's love, and the capacity for that love to transform chaos, but the retreat from a dramatized engagement and resolution to a series of disjointed tableaux signifies the growing anxiety in the ability of the king's image to reconcile division.

The Antimasque of Civil War

Abraham Cowley's *Civil War* attempts to bring the gravity of epic to the events it chronicles, but it is also informed by elements of a significantly different genre, the Caroline masque. The image of Charles that Cowley develops is imbued with the language of the masques' encomiums, and even the Carlomarian strand persists. After the indecisive battle of Edgehill (1642), here presented as resounding royalist victory, the poet asks: 'Could this white *day* a gift more gratefull bring? / O yes! It brought blest *Mary* to the *King*.' The king and queen are reunited at:

Keinton the Place that Fortune did approve,
To bee the noblest *Scene* of *War* and *Love*.
Through the glad vale ten thousand *Cupids* fled,
And chac'ed the wandring *Spirits* of *Rebells* dead.
Still the lowd sent of *powder* did they feare,
And scatterd *Easterne Smells* through all the Aire.
Looke, happy *Mount*, looke well for this is *shee*,
That toyld and travaild for thy *victory*.³³

Carlomaria and the cupids perform a masque-like transformation of the antimasque of Edgehill battlefield into a lover's glade. Unlike the most successful masques though, this masque fails to incorporate and domesticate the forces of antimasque; instead it only succeeds in displacing them. The final couplet reminds us too of the very real political toils of Henrietta Maria in securing continental arms and aid for her

³² Davenant, *Salmacida Spolia*, pp. 421-428.

³³ A. Cowley, *Civil War*, (Ed. A. Pritchard) (Toronto, 1973), 1, pp. 491-492, 495-502.

husband, a factor that would become a key point of attack for the king's opponents and part of a strategy for displaying both his uxorious weakness and his Machiavellian plotting. With the outbreak of civil war, the icon of a loving and fruitful royal couple and a government patterned on the Platonic ideal of love can be seen to have ultimately failed in reconciling or even containing the forces of the antimasque.

For royalist poets the civil war constituted a fundamental break in the fabric of society. The ordered hierarchy of the world – that both created and was imagined by the masque – was ruptured. This fracture can be seen, like Inigo Jones's great stage device the turning *machina versatilis*, to discover a world of Furies and disorder 'Beneath the silent Chambers of the Earth'³⁴ and behind the idyllic vision of the British polity. In Cowley's poem, as in *Salmacida Spolia*, Britain itself becomes the theatre of antimasque. The tumults are figured as a storm ravaging the country:

from the *North* we find
A *Tempest* conjur'd up without a *Wind*.
So soone the *North* her Kindnesse did repent,
First the *Peace maker*, and next *War* she sent.³⁵

Indeed the storms and upheavals are such that they disjoint the country from itself, firstly Scotland from England and then '*Ireland* which now most basely we begin, / To labour more to *loose*, then Hee [Henry II] to *win*.'³⁶ The English too are enmeshed in this civil uncoupling as the 'high borne *Welch*' give the 'the barbarous *Cyclop[ean]*'³⁷ rebels of Birmingham a proverbial 'Welsh correction.'³⁸ The fracture of British history – a history of incorporation, unification, conquest, and rebellion – visibly splits open across the war-torn British landscape.³⁹ The spectre of self-destruction recalls the aphorism of the then recently translated and popular, Henri, Duc de Rohan: '*England is a mightie Animal, which can never dye except it kill itself*.'⁴⁰

³⁴ Cowley, *Civil War*, 2, p. 365.

³⁵ Cowley, *Civil War*, 1, pp. 193-96.

³⁶ Cowley, *Civil War*, 1, pp. 19-20.

³⁷ Cowley, *Civil War*, 2, pp. 76-77.

³⁸ W. Shakespeare, *King Henry V*, (Ed. T.W. Craik) (London, 1995), 5.1, p. 78.

³⁹ J. G. A. Pocock, 'British History: A Plea for a New Subject', *Journal of Modern History*, 47/5 (1975), pp. 601-621, 609-10.

⁴⁰ H. Duc de Rohan, *A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendom*, (Trans. H. Hunt) (Paris, 1640), p. 35.

The typology of the great flood is enlisted to further emphasise the epic and biblical proportions of the civic carnage:

Thus like a *Deluge War* came roaring forth,
The bending *West* orewhelm'd, and riseing *North*.
A *Deluge* there; and high red *Tides* the while
Oreflowd all parts of *Albions* bleeding *Ile*⁴¹

In *Civil War*, more powerfully than in any of the court masques, the forces of chaos and disorder threaten the good and just rule of the king. Against the roll-call of natural disasters and civil-blood-letting the panegyric to the Thames establishes a vision of the proper ordering of the nation's natural environment now obscured by strife:

Good, reverend *Thames*, the best belov'd of all
Those Noble *floods* that meete at *Neptunes* Hall,
Londons proud Towers which thy faire head adorne
Move not thy *glorie* now (but *grief* and *scorne*).
Thou griev'st to see the *white-nam'd pallace* shine,
Without the Beames of its owne *Lord* and *Thine*.
Thy *Lord*, who is to all as good and free
As thow, Kind *Flood*, to thine owne Banks canst bee.⁴²

In this passage it becomes clear that Charles exists in harmony with a landscape that he 'adornes' and rules, and in return is crowned and glorified. The imagery of Charles as a refulgent king of light and whiteness is consistent throughout the poem and with earlier masques, but it should be emphasised that Charles is notable in the poem largely for his silence and absence. Writing in a situation of ongoing conflict, Cowley was still awaiting the final Caroline victory that would re-order the British state – something which never happened.

Civil War presents a procession of antimasques but history refused their resolution. Cowley stages a demonic 'parlament' chaired by the '*Stygian Tyrant*,' and, in place of the conventional epic catalogue of the armies, he portrays a pageant of grotesque

⁴¹ Cowley, *Civil War*, 2, pp. 1-4.

⁴² Cowley, *Civil War*, 1, pp. 333-340.

sectaries and rebels.⁴³ In an image imbued with the destruction of the old monarchical order, the puritans are described thus: 'Gods Image stamp on Monarchs they deface; / And 'bove the Throne their thundring Pulpits place,' and the Anabaptists are reduced to the 'dismall Hær'esy of wild Muncers crew, / Hether twelve hundred stout Mechanicks drew.'⁴⁴ 'Mechanic' is a term that has masque pedigree and was used in Jonson's *Loves Welcome at Bolsover* to describe the antimasquers following Vitruvius. John Denham also deployed the word in a similar denouncement of the plebeian nature of the commonwealthsmen in his 'Prologue to his Majesty':

This spacious Land their Theater became,

And they *Grave Counsellors*, and *Lords* in Name;
Which these Mechanicks Personate so ill.⁴⁵

In Cowley the satire is dynamic and energetic, if embattled and bitter; Carlomaria are conspicuous by their absence. After his defeat at Naseby (1645) some of Charles's personal correspondence was captured and subsequently published by the Parliamentarians. It is striking that absence is the first charge the publishers lay against Charles:

a prince seduced out of his proper sphear; one that has left the seat in which he ought, and hath bound himself to sit, to sit (as the psalmist speaks) in the *Chair of the scornfull*, and to the ruine (almost) of three kingdoms.⁴⁶

The publishing of his letters marked a new phase in the representation of the Charles, and further highlights the instability of interpreting royal texts. Those who published it highlighted Henrietta Maria's attempts to bring in foreign arms and troops, and the king's dialogue with the Irish confederates as proof of his betrayal of the law, parliament, and people. The letters to Henrietta Maria are themselves framed with the everyday tokens of the love and affection that had been so idealised in the rarefied setting of the court masque. Paradoxically – and wholly against the

⁴³ Cowley, *Civil War*, 2, pp. 504-507.

⁴⁴ Cowley, *Civil War*, 3, pp. 61-62, 87-88.

⁴⁵ J. Denham, 'The Prologue to His Majesty' in T. H. Banks JR (Ed.), *The Poetical Works of Sir John Denham*, (New Haven, CT., 1928), pp. 94-5, 95.

⁴⁶ *The Kings Cabinet Opened* (London, 1645), p. i.

publishers' intentions – the minutiae of state, of family news, of the conferring of titles, and the daily business that makes up the bulk of the letters lose a certain focus between preambles such as 'Dear heart, I wrote to thee yesterday [...] the subject of it was only kindness to thee; which, I assure thee shall ever be visible in all my actions,' and conclusions such as 'I have now no more to say, but praying for and impatiently expecting of good news from thee, I rest eternally thine.'⁴⁷ The conceit of the masques that imagine the 'polity as affective family' is unconsciously realised in the letters between husband and wife, and the icon of Charles as a monarch patterned on familial love and devotion was both fractured and revived by his enemies.⁴⁸ The publication of his private correspondence perhaps shattered the esoteric and mystical display of ideal kingship developed by the masques, but it displayed 'a man, a husband, flawed but human, with whom other mortals could empathize.'⁴⁹

Royalist Topographies of Order and Disorder

Intimately related to the world of masque and antimasque, order and disorder, are the topographical and pastoral spaces evoked by royalists and regicides alike. Harmony and order can be celebrated in apostrophes to the natural environment, but pastoral is a double-edged genre, one that offers retreat from the fallen world of state politics, but also constructs a space to think with and refract that chaos across a rural landscape or garden. Written in 1642, John Denham's *Cooper's Hill* explores a specifically royal space and history, but, within the circumscribed limits of Windsor and its environs, the civic turmoil of the day intrudes and is to some extent integrated. As John M. Wallace argues 'The view from a hill afforded him the needed distance to see all the problems of the crown and the capital in perspective.'⁵⁰

The poet hails '*Windsor* [...] (where *Mars* with *Venus* dwells. / Beauty with strength) above the valley swells.'⁵¹ Though proclaiming Windsor the seat of Mars and Venus continued some of the Carlomarian strands from the court masques, it was, by 1642,

⁴⁷ Charles I, *Kings Cabinet*, p. 3, p. 4.

⁴⁸ K. Sharpe, *Reading Authority and Representing Rule in Early Modern England* (London, 2013), p. 211.

⁴⁹ Sharpe, *Reading Authority and Representing Rule*, p. 160.

⁵⁰ J. M. Wallace, 'Cooper's Hill: The Manifesto of Parliamentary Royalism, 1641', *ELH*, 41/4 (1974), pp. 494-540, 497.

⁵¹ Denham, 'Cooper's Hill' in *The Poetical Works*, pp. 63-89, 39-40.

problematic. Not only had the king fled London in January 1642, but the irony of choosing the famous adulterers Mars and Venus as symbols of the scrupulously chaste royal couple ironically undermines Denham's image. The poem offers a vision of a particularly regal topography, in the words of William Rockett 'the places in the landscape of "Cooper's Hill" – St Paul's Cathedral, Windsor Castle, Chertsey Abbey, and Runnymede – are creatures of sovereignty.'⁵² In a way that echoes the court masques, these 'sovereign' spaces are integrated with a wider world of spiritual and mythological significance. Carew describes the scene at the close of *Coelum Britannicum* as showing:

*In the firmament [...] a troop of fifteen stars,
expressing the stellifying of our British heroes; but one more great and
eminent than the rest, which was over his head, figured his Majesty.
And
in the lower part was seen afar off the prospect of Windsor Castle, the
famous seat of the most honourable Order of the Garter.*⁵³

This vista shows the British constellations, the king, and Windsor in harmonious perspective, locating regality in a supernatural hierarchy, a 'golden chain' that reaches down to the very stones of Windsor. *Cooper's Hill* performs a similar conceit in describing the Thames as it skirts the hill:

This scene had some bold Greek, or Brittish Bard
Beheld of old, what stories had we heard,
Of Fairies, Satyrs, and the Nymphs their Dames,
Their feasts, their revels, & their amorous flames:
'Tis still the same, although their aery shape
All but a quick Poetick sight escape.⁵⁴

⁵² W. Rockett, "Courts make not Kings, but Kings the Court": "Cooper's Hill" and the Constitutional Crisis of 1642', *Restoration: Studies in English Literary Culture, 1660-1700*, 17/1 (1993), pp. 1-14, 1.

⁵³ Carew, *Coelum Britannicum*, pp. 1010-1014.

⁵⁴ Denham, 'Cooper's Hill', pp. 229-234.

The royal grounds are peopled with the demi-gods of classical mythology and amongst them moves a herd of deer: 'that noble herd / On whose sublime and shady fronts is rear'd / Natures great Master-piece.'⁵⁵ The king is capable of stepping into this world of half-fantasy to hunt the stag. The hunting of the stag, a traditionally regal pursuit, confirms Charles' position at the head of the hierarchy of nature, and the stag – itself a monarch of the valley beasts:

disdains to die

By common hands; but if he can descry

Some nobler foes approach, to him he calls,

And begs his Fate, and then contented falls.

So when the King a mortal shaft lets fly

From his unerring hand, then glad to dy,

Proud of the wound, to it resigns his bloud,

And stains the Crystal with a purple floud.⁵⁶

The symbolic slaying of a king by a king takes on prophetic resonances in the uneasy situation of 1642, and its position in the wider structure of the poem encourages us to read the hunt in the context of an evaluation of sovereignty and kingship. Immediately after the king's 'mortal shaft' looses a royal purple 'flood' from the Stag, comes a meditation on the Magna Carta and the proper relations between king and subjects. The poet exclaims that:

Here was that Charter seal'd, wherein the Crown

All marks of Arbitrary power lays down:

Tyrant and slave, those names of hate and fear,

The happier stile of King and Subject bear:

⁵⁵ Denham, 'Cooper's Hill', pp. 237-239.

⁵⁶ Denham, 'Cooper's Hill', pp. 237-239.

Happy, when both to the same Centre move,
When Kings give liberty, and Subjects love.⁵⁷

When the poem was written king and subject were patently not moving to the same 'centre', indeed Charles expected 'love' and increasing factions among his subjects 'liberty.' Denham's is a moderate voice, a royalist, but one perhaps sympathetic to those opposing so-called arbitrary government. However, he goes on to chastise the commons who take advantage of the king's liberality: 'The Subjects arm'd, the more their Princes gave, / Th' advantage only took the more to crave. / Till Kings by giving, give themselves away.'⁵⁸ This insistence on the king's fault consisting simply in excessive generosity was to become a royalist trope and is echoed throughout the arch-monarchical text *Eikon Basilike*. There Charles explains his decision to call the Long Parliament in saying 'I hoped, by my freedom and their moderation, to prevent all misunderstandings.'⁵⁹ Continuing the imagery of the stag hunt, *Cooper's Hill* depicts a sovereign wounding itself and paints in the stark, almost Machiavellian, words of 'tyrant', 'slave', 'arbitrary power', and 'advantage' a very real and immediate struggle for the position and meaning of the king. The language, abstracts him entirely from the poetic fantasy of the sprite inhabited riverbank. The confluence of kingly liberality and the grasping of subjects is resolved in the poem into an image of unbridled force. A river in spate, and partially dammed, to 'a Deluge swells: / Stronger, and fiercer by restraint he roars, / And knows no bound, but makes his power his shores.'⁶⁰

The 'deluge' of *Cooper's Hill*, echoed in Cowley, forms a powerful royalist trope that was revisited even in regal pronouncements. In 'The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Parliament' the British polity is imagined as a river that has absorbed the three constitutional tributaries of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. This gives to the kingdom:

the conveniences of all three, without the inconveniences of any one, as long as the balance hangs even between the three estates, and they run jointly on in their proper channel (begetting verdure and fertility in

⁵⁷ Denham, 'Cooper's Hill', pp. 329-334.

⁵⁸ Denham, 'Cooper's Hill', pp. 337-339.

⁵⁹ *Eikon Basilike*, (Ed. P. A. Knachel) (New York, 1966), p. 3.

⁶⁰ Denham, 'Cooper's Hill', pp. 356-358.

the meadows on both sides) and the overflowing of either on either side raise no deluge or inundation.⁶¹

In *Civil War* the fertility engendered by this balance is destroyed. The poems presents a loss of control of the natural environment and the inversion of order depicted ultimately in Charles's loss of the navy: 'The Sea they [the rebels] subject next to their Commands, / The Sea that Crownes our *Kinges*, and all their *Lands*.'⁶² Although the rebels temporally control the lands and shipping, Charles's authority is confirmed by the sea, and he will eventually reassert it over the landscape to reinstitute the proper realignment of power. The centrality of the sea to the strength of the British monarchy is a poetic trope with a heritage in masques such as *The Masque of Blackness* and reaches its apogee in John of Gaunt's famous speech – elicited by another moment of civil crisis – in which Britain is described as:

This royal throne of kings, this scepter'd isle,

[...]

This precious stone set in the silver sea,

Which serves it in the office of a wall,

Or as a moat defensive to a house.⁶³

Naturally for a maritime nation, water imagery provides a fertile strain for imagining and representing the power of the king. Whilst Cowley's and Denham's poems from the 1640s utilise the language of floods and inundations and depict the loss of royal authority and naval control, poetry written after the Restoration connects with and reverses these images. After 1660 Cowley and Edmund Waller both published ekphrastic poems on Henrietta Maria's rebuilding of Somerset House. The significance of these poetic and architectural restorations is further emphasised if we recall that Somerset House was the main theatre used for staging the court masques before the Civil War and was used as the site of Charles's execution. Cowley's 'On

⁶¹ 'The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Parliament, 18 June 1642', in J.P. Kenyon (Ed.), *The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688*, (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 21-23, 21.

⁶² Cowley, *Civil War*, 1, pp. 165-167.

⁶³ W. Shakespeare, 'Richard the Second', in P. Alexander (Ed.), *The Complete Works of William Shakespeare*, (London, 1991), pp. 446-479, 2.1, pp. 40-48.

the Queen's Repairing Somerset House' is written in the voice of the palace itself, and meditates on the Civil Wars' local effects on the building. The house complains:

In all my rooms and galleries, I found
The richest figures torn, and all around
Dismembered statues of great Heroes lay;
Such Naseby's field seemed on the fatal day.⁶⁴

The poem adopts an inward perspective to read the misfortunes of a particular place into a wider matrix of parallel events, but the situation of the house on the banks of the Thames allows the restored palace to look outwards once again. Throughout the poem the river is referred to affectionately and possessively as 'my Thames', 'imperial river', and 'fair River.'⁶⁵ Control of the river is explicitly linked with the authority of the restored monarch as the house looks across the water 'Tow'rds the white palace where that King does reign / Who lays his laws and bridges o'er the main.'⁶⁶ Laws are flung across an unruly nation like bridges across the power of a river which 'does roar and foam and rage' but in the face of majesty 'recomposes straight and calms his face.'⁶⁷ The authority of the monarch (installed in the very seats that Charles I had shamefacedly quit), partially undoes the damage that had 'dismembered' the palace's statues and the icon of kingly power at the battle of Naseby. Waller's poem on the same subject also emphasises the harmony realised by the Queen Mother's restoration of the palace:

This, by the Queen herself designed,
Gives us a pattern of her mind;
The state and order does proclaim
The genius of that royal dame,
Each part with just proportion graced,

⁶⁴ Cowley, A., 'On the Queen's Repairing Somerset House', in J. Griffin (Ed.), *Selected Poems of Abraham Cowley, Edmund Waller and John Oldham*, (Harmondsworth, 1998), pp. 29-31, 7-10.

⁶⁵ Cowley, 'On the Queen's Repairing Somerset House', pp. 69, 88, 93.

⁶⁶ Cowley, 'On the Queen's Repairing Somerset House', pp. 77-78.

⁶⁷ Cowley, 'On the Queen's Repairing Somerset House', pp. 73, 74.

And all to such advantage placed
That the fair view her window yields,
The town, the river, and the fields.⁶⁸

Palace, city, river, and countryside are integrated in the royal vision – afforded by the elevated perspective from the windows of Somerset House – into a harmonious whole. Cowley's poem concludes with a vision of the Thames' waters and the king's fleets pouring out through the world's oceans: 'Thy mighty Master's sovereign fleet, / Which now triumphant o'er the main does ride, / The terror of all lands, the ocean's pride.'⁶⁹ This exultant vision banishes the nightmares of the Civil War which were grounded for Cowley in images of London's betrayal, of the loss of control over the sea and navy, and ultimately the destabilisation of the English landscape itself which could conceal a hellish foundry of corrupting metals and demonic plots. It is a recurring image of the masques that 'the opening of the earth is troped as an inherently dangerous process, since it is associated with both antimasque as well as masque elements,' yet it also represents access to a realm of 'mineral wealth.'⁷⁰ The material world is realigned by the return of the Stuarts; the dangers of opening the earth are set aside in Cowley's topographical poem which indulges in a vision of global empire and trade buoyed on the waters of the Thames: 'The peaceful mother on mild Thames does build, / With her son's fabrics the rough sea is fill'd.'⁷¹

After a Republic – a New Age and a New History

When Cromwell finally refused the offer of a crown he stated that:

Truly the providence of God has laid this title aside providentially. *De facto* it is laid aside [...] it has been the issue of a great deliberation as ever was in a nation. It has been the issue of ten or twelve year's civil

⁶⁸ Edmund Waller, 'Upon her Majesty's New Buildings at Somerset House', *Selected Poems of Abraham Cowley, Edmund Waller and John Oldham*, pp. 82-83, 31-38.

⁶⁹ Cowley, 'On the Queen's Repairing Somerset House', pp. 100-102.

⁷⁰ P. Berry & J. E. Archer, 'Reinventing the Matter of Britain: Undermining the State in Jacobean Masques' in D.J. Baker & W. Maley (Eds.), *British Identities and English Renaissance Literature* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 119-134, pp. 128 ; 129.

⁷¹ Cowley, 'On the Queen's Repairing Somerset House', pp. 107-108.

war, wherein much blood has been shed [...] And God has seemed providentially not only to strike at the family but at the name.⁷²

He lays emphasis on the lead and the paper bullets that had been fired in resolving the issue and the finality of that deliberation. The consequences of this radical discourse were far reaching; so much so that Lawrence Stone claims the American revolutionaries 'invoked the same ideals hammered out in the fires of England's revolutionary century.'⁷³ Events soon belied Cromwell, and the rapid collapse of the Protectorate after his death opened the door for the restoration not just of the family, but of the name of king in Charles II. The preceding decades had profoundly affected British conceptions of the citizen, and the monarchy. Though Charles re-established a centralized monarchy the iconography of kingship may be seen to have changed, at least in part. A substantial body of poetry, prose, and drama formed a discourse that reformulated or contested the fundamental images of monarchy. Charles's return was hailed by Katherine Philips in terms directly appropriated from the apocalyptic Puritan typologies that posited the Protectorate as the New Jerusalem. Overlaying England with the history of Israel, she presents the nation as 'Old Jacob' and Charles as 'Joseph that was preserved to restore / Their lives, who would have taken his before.'⁷⁴ Masques, central to the self-presentation of Charles I, were not rehabilitated at the new court, though poets such as Waller and Cowley could still envisage the monarch sitting at the head of an ordered universe. The playhouses were reopened, and the symbolism was noted by supporters such as Denham: 'They that would have no *KING*, would have no Play: / The *Laurel* and the *Crown* together went.'⁷⁵ For Denham the Restoration constituted a reordering of the public sphere in accord with the civil graces of art and majesty. Most of the texts looked at here have been in some way 'elite' productions, generally aimed at a small audience of nobles – in the case of the masques – or a small poetry-reading public in the case of Denham and Waller, and Cowley's *Civil War* went unfinished and unpublished in his lifetime. However, Denham's note on the reopening of the playhouses conveys a positive sense of the accessible and more widely felt socio-cultural consequences of

⁷² O. Cromwell, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, (Ed. W. C. Abbott), 4 Vols. (Cambridge, MA., 1947), IV, p. 470

⁷³ L. Stone, 'The Results of the English Revolutions' in J.G.A Pocock (Ed.), *Three British Revolution: 1641, 1688, 1776*, (Princeton, IN., 1980), pp. 23-108, p. 99

⁷⁴ K. Philips, 'On the numerous accesse of the English to waite upon the King in Holland', in P. Thomas (Ed.) *The Collected Works of Katherine Philips The Matchless Orinda*, 2 Vols. (Cambridge, 1990), I, pp. 70-71, 21 ; 23-24.

⁷⁵ Denham, 'The Prologue to His Majesty', p. 94.

the return of the monarchy. John Dryden's 'Astraea Redux' hailed in Virgilian strains the return of the monarchy as the rebirth of a golden age of justice, but admitted that the interregnum had traumatised both the nation and the new king. The young king had suffered the violence of revolution:

Charles his too too active age,
Which govern'd by the wild distemper'd rage
Of some black Star infecting all the Skies,
Made him at his own cost like *Adam* wise.⁷⁶

Charles's and the nation's experience of exile made them wise, but after the pattern of Adam who acquired the knowledge of good and evil with the consequences of pain and death. However the whiteness of clemency and mercy were imagined to resolve all public wounds; Charles's reign was figured as 'times whiter Series [...] begun / Which in soft Centuries shall smoothly run.'⁷⁷ However traumatic the decades of civil war and regicide had been, they had also opened up new discourses that could not be entirely silenced by appeals to a new *Pax Carolus*.

Despite the decision not to revive court masques (and it must have been a conscious decision) their iconography remained largely viable in early Restoration poetry and Dryden's vision of a new golden age implicitly posits that the masque imagery of kingship would continue to shape England's future. However, aside from the masques and the sacral imagery of kingship, another ideological legacy survived the Restoration and was wielded by John Milton to undercut and erode the legitimacy of the regal icon. John Milton's *History of Britain* (1670) was begun circa 1649 as a Livian project to uncover the glorious remains of England's past – located firmly in an imagined Saxon commonwealth – but his critical reading of the sources revealed a history of kin-slaying, treachery, adultery, rape, and usurpation; a history of continuous falls with little respite. For Milton the ancient Britons and the Saxons were

⁷⁶ J. Dryden, 'Astraea Redux' in J. Kinsley (Ed.), *The Poems of John Dryden*, 4 Vols. (London, 1958), I, pp. 16-24, 110-113.

⁷⁷ Dryden, 'Astraea Redux', pp. 292-293.

‘Progenitors not to be glori’d in.’⁷⁸ Milton’s images of amoral authority undercut monarchical claims of ‘virtuous appetite’ or of a reordering of the nation’s moral life. Instead English history tells the story of a people so degraded by imperial, episcopal, and monarchical abuse that whenever they gained freedom they ‘shr[a]nk more wretchedly under the burden of their own libertie, than [...] under a foren yoke.’⁷⁹ For Milton this is clearly history with a contemporary and prophetic edge – indeed Willy Maley terms it a ‘Trojan Horse bequeathed to the imperial monarchy.’⁸⁰ The *History of Britain*, for all its gloomy content, is a hopeful book. It is a late synthesis of Renaissance Humanism, and it calls for those ‘who can judiciously read’ to uncover its radical truths.⁸¹ Milton calls for a new image and history of man, as the histories of kings (and therefore their futures also) are no more worthy of recounting than ‘Wars of Kites, or Crows, flocking and fighting in the Air.’⁸²

As I have argued above, the Caroline court masques had developed and performed a highly sacralised and ideologically coherent iconography of kingship, and furthermore these images and tropes were utilised in Royalist pastoral, topographical, and even epic poetry. This iconography primarily centred on the moral purity of the monarch which found its purest expression in fruitful marriage, and was deemed to be a force capable of reordering the nation into harmonious union. Finally, the work of poets such as Milton and Dryden demonstrates the possible trajectories for engagement with this iconography after the Restoration of the monarchy.

⁷⁸ J. Milton, *The History of Britain* in *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, (Ed. D. M. Wolfe et. al.), 8 Vols. (New Haven, CT., 1971), V, Part 1, p. 61.

⁷⁹ Milton, *History of Britain*, p. 131.

⁸⁰ W. Maley, ‘The Canon: *The History of Britain*. By John Milton’, *Times Higher Education* (28. 01. 2010) < <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/books/the-canon-the-history-of-britain-by-john-milton/410131.article> > (Accessed: 18/10/17).

⁸¹ Milton, *History of Britain*, p. 129. See also Maley, ‘The Canon: *The History of Britain*. By John Milton’.

⁸² Milton, *History of Britain*, p. 249.

The “Russian” Woman? Cultural Exceptionalism among Noblewomen in Late Imperial and Revolutionary Russia

DARCIE MAWBY

Introduction

In 1869 Natalia Grot and Evgenia Tur, prominent authors of gentle birth, debated the role of the Russian woman by means of a critical exchange, published in *Our Times* and *Moscow News*, on Elena Nikolaevna Stakhova, protagonist of Ivan Turgenev’s *On the Eve* (1860). Grot argued, ‘Elena perfectly embodies the element of destructiveness’ and questioned the influence on society of such a ‘broad’ character and her creator. She outlined the characteristics of Russian women she believed Turgenev had ignored—piety, neighbourliness, maternalism and self-renunciation—before denouncing Elena’s antithetical nature and styling herself “The Russian Woman.” Tur took staunch exception to this signature, proclaiming that ‘up to now we have not met a Russian woman.’ She applauded Elena’s character and systematically denounced Grot’s objections to and interpretation of the novel. Grot’s final response attacked Tur and her critique: she ‘did not think that such a retort could come from the pen of a woman.’¹

This public exchange between two Russian women on the fundamental nature and role of the Russian woman is one inspiration for this research. It embodies the tensions in nineteenth-century Russian intellectual discourse between westernisation and conservatism, constructs of respectable femininity and questions of national identity. Therefore, while the editors of the collection from which this exchange is taken entitled the piece ‘The Russian Woman’, emphasising, as do its authors, the lack of a single ideal, it is the intention of this study to explore the “Russian” woman in national terms. Specifically, it will explore cultural exceptionalism—the concept expressed by Grot and refuted by Tur that Russian women were defined by specifically Russian traits—and the degree to which this was evident among Russian noblewomen in the period c.1840-c.1920.

¹ Evgenia Tur versus Natalia Grot, “The Russian Woman”, in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 44-49.

Lotman and Marrese inspire this focus on noblewomen. Lotman uses literature as a reflection of contemporary reality, proposing the Petrine reforms encouraged foreign behaviour to such an extent that by the nineteenth century, 'the Russian nobleman was like a foreigner in his own country'. Consciously selected European characteristics masked the noblemen's Russianness, producing a theatrical imitation of "correct" behaviour.² This is not a new conclusion. One contemporary Englishwoman commented:

The adaptation of foreign manners which the civilised Russians of both sexes almost universally assume produces a strange impression. They behave in the most ordinary circumstances of life as though they were acting a part in a drama...³

But confined to his literary source base Lotman denies what this observer recorded, namely that noblewomen were also actively adopted foreign customs.⁴ Marrese uses noble family papers for an analysis of Russian nobles' biculturalism through their use of languages that rejects Lotman's idea of conscious theatricality. She argues that cultures coexisted and acknowledges both the opportunities for noblewomen that European customs presented and the importance of European culture to noble identity.⁵ It is the interaction between Russian and European customs amongst the nobility, the value of non-literary Russian material and the benefit of a foreign perspective that this study is concerned with. Specifically, do Russian noblewomen conform to a transnational European nobility, or is national specificity integral to understanding their individual and group identification?

This is intended as a *gendered* history, not a *gender* history and so it will not compare male and female experiences. Rather, it seeks to synthesise the nascent scholarship on noblewomen with the source material they left behind: autobiographies, memoirs, diaries, letters, travel narratives and other published work. Though these are restricted to English translations, their use will demonstrate

² Y. M. Lotman, 'The Poetics of Everyday Behaviour in Eighteenth-Century Russian Culture', in A. D. Nakhimovsky & A. A. Nakhimovsky (Eds.), *The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History* (Ithaca, NY., 1985), pp. 69-72.

³ A. Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry: A Victorian English Lady's Diary of Russian Country Life*, Ed. J. McNair (Nottingham, 1998), p. 23.

⁴ Lotman, *The Poetics of Everyday Behaviour*, p. 75.

⁵ M. L. Marrese, "'The Poetics of Everyday Behaviour' Revisited: Lotman, Gender, and the Evolution of Russian Noble Identity', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 11/4 (2010), pp. 716, 701.

the potential value of such material as objects of study in their own right, and as important supplements to existing cultural narratives. First and foremost, they will allow for a detailed exploration of the extent to which Russian noblewomen can be classified as culturally exceptional.

It is crucial to follow current historiographical trends. Studies of the late imperial and revolutionary periods are increasingly adopting an international comparative element as scholars readdress crucial themes.⁶ Consequently, the experiences of late imperial and revolutionary Russian noblewomen will be compared to those of Victorian and early-Edwardian British upper-class women. Such a comparison allows for an exploration and reassessment of Russia's place in the international order in a socio-cultural sense, as individual stories can be used to question the broader issue of national identity at a personal level. This study will compare Russian experiences of and British perspectives on three key cultural episodes in the lives of nineteenth-century Russian noblewomen: marriage, education and adult vocations. It will endeavour to show that far from being denied choice as Lotman suggests, Russian noblewomen were not only active in the sharing of European customs but, like their British counterparts, underwent significant social, cultural and ideological change that both mirrored and responded to national and international developments.

Considering the framework in which noblewomen's writings were produced is therefore important. To discard the differences between Britain and Russia would be to ignore historical and historiographical frameworks that have shaped the course of Russia's development and our understanding of it. Chief among these differences are the social and political contexts. While Britain fitted into a Western path of development, in Russia increasing pressures to modernise clashed with traditional values epitomised by the "Westerniser" versus "Slavophile" debate. The predominantly bureaucratic Westernisers envisaged European-style reforms, while Slavophiles viewed these as incompatible with the Russian regimen and character.⁷ This debate manifested throughout elite culture from the eighteenth century, as

⁶ For example, see J. Burbank, 'An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 7/3 (2006), pp. 397-431; E. Lohr, 'The Ideal Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 7/2 (2006), pp. 173-194; E. Lohr, *Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 1-10; D. C. B. Lieven, *The Aristocracy in Europe, 1815-1914* (New York, 1993).

⁷ D. Saunders, *Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform, 1801-1881* (Harlow, 1992), pp. 163, 167, 169.

elements of tradition conflicted with emerging Westernised forces. The tensions between these cultural forms in elite society were exacerbated over the next century by Russia's industrial, economic and social development, which sometimes followed a Western path.⁸ Noblewomen were not immune from the subsequent questions raised about Russian identity, particularly with the emergence of the "woman question"—intellectual disagreement on the role and rights of women—across Europe and the United States, with which women were actively engaged. However, despite the existence of similar movements and cultural developments, the specificity of national context is of course central to evaluating noblewomen's culture and national identities.

Differences in context are not the only problematic consideration. The problems of the term "noble" are significant. Throughout the nineteenth century the Russian nobility became increasingly stratified with the emergence of "personal" nobles alongside the established families. The overarching noble estate, however, remained distinct from the urban residents who formed the closest thing to a Russian middle class.⁹ Britain differs in that social belonging was based on more fluid classes and so the existence of a nobility was less pronounced. At the same time, however, the practice of endogamy among the upper classes in general and the titled aristocracy in particular is indicative of the continued desire to reinforce and reproduce rank identity.¹⁰ The term is therefore difficult to define adequately. Consequently, the women whose writings are examined here have been chosen based on familial belonging to the Russian noble estate and the British upper class broadly defined. Such an approach yields a useful breadth of examples within this narrow upper stratum of society, from impoverished nobles to leading court figures.

This unsystematic selection is not intended to be representative of the Russian or British noble experience. The personal nature of many of the sources makes this a near impossibility.¹¹ Furthermore, these women have generally been rendered invisible. All were obscured because of their sex and Russian women more so for

⁸ See M. Rahikainen, 'The Fading of the Ancien Régime Mentality', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 30/1 (2015), pp. 25-47.

⁹ M. Rendle, *Defenders of the Motherland: The Tsarist Elite in Revolutionary Russia* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 4-6.

¹⁰ K. Prandy & W. Bottero, 'The Use of Marriage Data to Measure the Social Order in Nineteenth-Century Britain', *Sociological Research Online*, 3/1 (1998), paragraphs 1.3, 6.1, 6.4; K. Schutte, *Women, Rank and Marriage in the British Aristocracy, 1485-2000* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp. 12-13, 16.

¹¹ B. Heldt, *Terrible Perfection: Women and Russian Literature* (Bloomington, 1987), pp. 64-76.

their very Russianness. They were characterised as peripheral to European society with a reputation for backwardness. This conventional image cannot be overcome in a work of this nature. This study is therefore intended to be suggestive, testing the usefulness of noblewomen's writings in deepening our understanding of elite Russian culture and national identity in a comparative framework.

The Importance of a Gendered Perspective

Studies of this sort are few. Only in the 1970s were women integrated into the Russian narrative, though revolutionary women predominated.¹² Hesitantly in the 1990s and more enthusiastically from 2000, scholarship has paid increasing attention to the varied insights Russian noblewomen's writings can provide. However, it remains scant in comparison to that on men. Work on female Russian autobiographers has given prominence to eighteenth-century women and there remains a tendency to use Russian women's fiction to determine how female authors reflected on the "woman question." With regards to scholarship on the British context, the middle classes predominate and their education has been a favourite topic. Consequently some scholarship is of limited relevance to the source base used here or has been extrapolated. Nevertheless, an overview of the nature of the core sources used—Russian women's life writing and English women's travel narratives—is necessary to highlight the new insights that such gendered sources can provide.

Alexandra Kollontai's political pamphlet *Communism and the Family* (1920) defies this categorisation and provides a unique perspective. As a prominent Marxist-feminist Kollontai expounds idealistic communist theories for working-class and female development, resulting in views that contrast sharply with, or far surpass, those expressed by most of the other women considered.¹³ Her perspective is useful to draw upon to demonstrate diversity and change, but is applicable only to specific aspects of this study.

¹² For example, see B. A., Engel, 'The Emergence of Women Revolutionaries in Russia', *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*, 2/1 (1977), pp. 92-105.

¹³ A. Kollontai, *Communism and the Family*, (London, Originally Published 1920, 1971), p. 1.

Russian women's autobiographies constitute the core sources, offering important insights, absent from the male perspective, into noble culture in general and noblewomen's socio-cultural experiences in particular. Establishing a definition is necessary. Gusdorf describes autobiography as a western, masculine production, the 'mirror in which the individual reflects his own image,' but that colours this image with a vindication of the life.¹⁴ It is widely acknowledged that autobiography is ultimately a form of fiction, for memory cannot be free from imagination or distortion.¹⁵ However, Gusdorf is reductive in his confinement of autobiography to great western men.¹⁶ With due focus on context, Holmgren suggests Russian women's autobiographies were written in protest, as a 'road map' for other women.¹⁷ Vera Figner certainly uses her memoirs to offer other radical young women instruction for becoming revolutionaries.¹⁸ However, this is not always an obvious or appropriate interpretation. Therefore, the salient aspect in definitions of autobiography is the categorization of works about the self as a literary genre. As such, it is simultaneously public and private and can assume many forms: private diaries and letters should be considered under this categorization, and not as entirely separate subcategories of "life writing."

The ways in which noblewomen navigated literary space to validate their public selves has significant bearing on any reading of these sources. Vera Figner's memoirs were meant for publication to provide her views in contrast to the prevalent strand of socialism after the 1917 October Revolution. She adheres closely to masculine revolutionary tradition: little of the private self is included where it is not directly relevant to the development of her revolutionary sympathies.¹⁹ For Heldt, such women 'feel no need to disguise their achievements, since they always felt certain of being on the side of progress and history. They easily put their public

¹⁴ G. Gusdorf, 'Conditions and Limits of Autobiography', in J. Olney (Ed.), *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical* (Princeton, NJ., 1980), pp. 33, 36, 39.

¹⁵ S. Benstock, 'Authorizing the Autobiographical', in S. Benstock (Ed.), *The Private Self: Theory and Practice of Women's Autobiographical Writings* (Chapel Hill, NC., 1988), p. 11; Heldt, *Terrible Perfection*, p. 64.

¹⁶ S. S. Friedman, 'Women's Autobiographical Selves: Theory and Practice', in S. Benstock (Ed.), *The Private Self: Theory and Practice of Women's Autobiographical Writings* (Chapel Hill, NC., 1988), p. 34.

¹⁷ B. Holmgren, 'For the Good of the Cause: Russian Women's Autobiography in the Twentieth Century', in T. W. Clyman & D. Greene (Ed.), *Women Writers in Russian Literature* (Westport, CT., 1994), p. 128.

¹⁸ V. Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, Ed. & Trans by Richard Stites (London, 1991), pp. 5-6.

¹⁹ V. Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*. For example, her husband is hardly mentioned. Figner rejected marriage and pursued revolutionary sympathies which her husband did not share (pp. 36, 39, 41). In line with the style of contemporary noble upbringing, she dreamed of becoming a tsaritsa. This ambition, a product of the elitism of her childhood, sits in stark contrast to the stance she adopted later as a radical and revolutionary (pp. 12-14).

selves at peace with their private selves,' extolling theory furnished with the details of a life.²⁰ This is useful, as both the theory and private details provide views on conformity to and rejection of an expected standard. Others reach this public-private consonance by different means. Natalia Grot addresses her memoirs to her children and grandchildren, transforming a public platform into one of private instruction in-keeping with her gender role and conservative views. Grot merged the public and private self in a manner that rendered the concepts mutually dependent for validation of her semi-public ideal self: by recounting the experiences of her feminine sphere, her semi-public self made no claims to greatness. But this conformity allowed her to engage in small part with prominent questions of the day, seen with her disapproval of the modern woman.²¹ The inclusion of both aspects makes such sources invaluable. Finally the anonymous recollections published as "Diary of a Young Noblewoman" illustrate the fundamentally private nature of some of the sources. The young woman documented her interactions with the other European girls at her Geneva school, with whom she integrated seamlessly, and felt no qualms about expressing her emotions, flaws and struggles to come to grips with her own national and religious identities.²² The personal is inescapable and the source is important, primarily, for the insights it offers of the individual and her relationship to the world around her.

All forms adhere to elements of female autobiographical tradition, for nineteenth-century women's autobiography was fundamentally the product of a clever navigation of the intersection between male and female spheres on a literary platform. As such, there are noteworthy similarities between Russian and British women's works: both were primarily written by the upper classes; both tend to focus on everyday life and the domestic sphere;²³ and in both cases they justify their

²⁰ Heldt, *Terrible Perfection*, p. 68.

²¹ Natalia Grot, 'From a Family Chronicle: Reminiscences for Children and Grandchildren', in T. W. Clyman and J. Vowles (eds.), *Russia Through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia* (New Haven, 1996), pp. 220-222, 225, 229, 231-232, 239-241.

²² 'Diary of a Young Noblewoman, on Her Mother', in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 76-77; 'Diary of a Young Noblewoman: Doubts about Religion', in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 252-253; T. W. Clyman, 'Autobiography', in V. Terras (Ed.), *Handbook of Russian Literature* (New York, 1985), p. 27.

²³ J. Atkinson, *Victorian Biography Reconsidered: A Study of Nineteenth-Century 'Hidden' Lives* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 149, 156; S. Bassnett, 'Travel Writing and Gender', in P. Hulme & T. Youngs (Eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 229; Heldt, *Terrible Perfection*, p. 67.

existence or adopt specific forms in order to appear to remain within the confines of “feminine propriety.”²⁴ Therefore, elite Russian women’s autobiographies, when read with due care, are a treasure trove for the study of Russian cultural history.

English women’s travel narratives possess similar characteristics. For example, the anonymous author of *The Englishwoman in Russia* gave her motive for writing:

The interest at present excited by a nation with whom the English are at war has induced her to listen to several friends who have recommended her to present these written observations to the public.²⁵

The implicit self-deprecation and need to justify the act of recording experiences is indicative of the very cultural resemblance that this study intends to explore. This is even more striking in the similar preoccupation with everyday habits and the general confinement of the authors’ experiences to the domestic, elite and female spheres existent at their destinations. Amelia Lyons documented life with her Russian hostesses, using her experiences to comment upon the Russian character, customs and manners. Some of these she related to, some she admired and some she viewed with disenchantment bordering on admonition.²⁶ Similarly, Lady Elizabeth Eastlake used her observations to make judgements on the Russian character, particularly in comparison to English standards of behaviour.²⁷

In this way English travel narratives are reminiscent of Murphy’s findings regarding those of Russian women: they affirmed their membership to a European elite by adopting an abstract European elite understanding of their time abroad as part of their own memory; but when experiences evoked recollections of Russia they expressed their national identity clearly, drawing on personal home experiences to construct themselves in relation to the foreign trigger.²⁸ English women did the same.

²⁴ Bassnett, ‘Travel Writing and Gender’, p. 225; C. H. Mackay, ‘Life Writing’, in L. H. Peterson (Ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Victorian Women’s Writing* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 159-160; Atkinson, *Victorian Biography Reconsidered*, pp. 146-148; Heldt, *Terrible Perfection*, p. 67.

²⁵ *The Englishwoman in Russia: Impressions of the society and manners of the Russians at Home* (New York, 1855), p. ix. The author refers to herself in the third person and the war mentioned is the Crimean War of 1853-56.

²⁶ Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry*, pp. 4, 9-10, 16, 18, 23.

²⁷ Lady Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake, *Letters from the Shores of the Baltic, Vol. II* (London, 1842), pp. 14, 130-131, 187-188, 190-191, 199, 216, 219.

²⁸ E. Murphy, ‘Memory and Identity in Russian Noblewomen’s Francophone Travel Narratives (1790-1842)’, *Avtobiografiya*, 2/1 (2013), pp. 41-43.

Therefore, while Russian autobiography can demonstrate cultural crossover through reflections that suggest the extent to which Russian noblewomen recognised foreign customs as a part of their everyday lives, English women's commentary on the same experiences can challenge this through their identification of points of comparison and contrast between Russian women and themselves.

It is these points of comparison and contrast that inform the focus of the following chapters. The sources will be used as evidence of cultural amalgamation among Russian noblewomen, affirming Lotman's argument regarding the upper-class adoption of foreign customs, while refuting women's negligible involvement in line with Marrese's critique. It will be suggested that the extent of cultural crossover precludes categorisation of Russian noblewomen's culture as truly "exceptional" despite the extent of national difference, inviting new interpretations of the meaning of cultural exceptionalism in a context that saw nationally informed responses to multiple transnational debates.

Marriage and Family Life

Discourse on the family and women's role in it was a significant point of nineteenth-century intellectual discussion. The overarching British theory rested on separate spheres ideology, which constructed gender roles based on the perceived "natural" interests of the sexes, informed and reinforced by Christian ideals.²⁹ As such, British elite women were seen to belong in the domestic sphere, characterised by marriage, motherhood, luxury and feminine enjoyments. They were also dependent on their husbands or male relatives in a patriarchal family structure that pervaded kinship networks beyond the nuclear family.³⁰ As the nineteenth century progressed, the rise of feminism and the "woman question" raised a significant controversy about

²⁹ K. Hughes, 'Gender Roles in the 19th Century', <<https://www.bl.uk/romantics-and-victorians/articles/gender-roles-in-the-19th-century>>, Accessed 28/04/2017; J. Goodman, 'Class and Religion: Great Britain and Ireland', in J. C. Albisetti, J. Goodman, and R. Rogers (Eds.), *Girls' Secondary Education in the Western World* (New York, 2010), p. 11.

³⁰ D. Roberts, 'The Paterfamilias of the Victorian Governing Class', in A. S. Wohl (ed.), *The Victorian Family: Structures and Stresses* (London, 1978), pp. 59, 62, 64; S. Richardson, 'Well-neighboured Houses': The Political Networks of Elite Women, 1780-1860', in K. Gleadle and S. Richardson (Eds.), *Women in British Politics, 1760-1860* (Basingstoke, 2000), p. 66.

women's positions paralleled in the Russian context: were they limited to the home by their innate caring nature, or could they operate beyond this?³¹

Russian parallels also existed within the Russian discourse. Greene identifies piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity as the key elements of the Russian patriarchal ideology. They appear repeatedly through: moral lessons in girls' magazines; foreign princesses' influence over elite girls' boarding schools; translated conduct books; and Russia's involvement in Enlightenment debates.³² The similarities to the British counterpart are striking. However, the purpose Green expounds for her study—to prove the existence of a nineteenth-century domestic ideology in Russia—seems unwarranted. A discourse was evident at least since Peter the Great's reforms, when the emphasis on noblewomen's domesticity tethered them to tradition in the face of other cultural reforms. This created a contradictory public presence.³³

These ideas, foreign and traditional, translated into Russian theory and practice throughout the late imperial and revolutionary periods. Writing in c.1840-1850, Maria Korsini, essayist and graduate of the Smolny Institute, believed a mother to be the ultimate self-sacrificing caregiver, physical and spiritual, while a father was the tireless provider. She adhered to separate spheres ideology, but based this on mutual assistance and love between parents with the goal of achieving domestic harmony.³⁴ This model is highly idealistic, indicative of the romantic idealism that schools such as Smolny instilled, but it does correspond with central aspects of the broader Russian domestic ideology.³⁵ Firstly, family structure mirrored the patriarchal element of its British counterpart and Russian society: Amelia Lyons noted the Russian paterfamilias was "Emperor" in his little domain.³⁶ This observation, immediately following an expression of Lyons's desire to ascertain the Russian character, suggests unfamiliarity with a patriarchy of such rigidity. Another example

³¹ L. Delap, 'The Superwoman: Theories of Gender and Genius in Edwardian Britain', *The Historical Journal*, 47/1 (2004), p. 105.

³² D. Greene, 'Mid-Nineteenth-Century Domestic Ideology in Russia', in R. Marsh (Ed.), *Women And Russian Culture: Projections and Self-Perceptions* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 78-79, 85-90.

³³ B. A. Engel, *Women in Russia, 1700-2000* (Cambridge, 2004), p. 22.

³⁴ Maria Korsini, 'The Ideal Family', in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 26-28.

³⁵ M. Ledkovsky, C. Rosenthal and M. Zirin, 'Introduction: Russian Women Writers 1760-1992', in M. Ledkovsky, C. Rosenthal and M. Zirin (Eds.), *Dictionary of Russian Women Writers* (Westport, CT., 1994), p. xxviii.

³⁶ Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry*, p. 2.

comes from Vera Figner, who recalled that her mother never dared speak against her father's outbursts.³⁷ However, Lady Eastlake observed men sharing kisses with family members on what she considered an unusually frequent basis, concluding that a Russian father's affection 'knows no bounds.'³⁸ The polarity in these observations affirms the diversity between families, but the Englishwomen's tones of unfamiliarity also suggest that Russian elite families were more extreme in their manifestations of prevailing ideology. Secondly, Korsini's model adheres to separate spheres discourse, but practice was rarely as cooperative as she envisaged. Men and boys were usually physically and emotionally detached from women and girls in the home, as family life was geared towards the instruction of children by the parent of the same sex.³⁹ It is for this reason that mother-daughter relationships form such a recurrent theme in the Russian sources.⁴⁰ Finally, Russian kinship bonds were strong but Korsini does not account for their scope. Russians not only mirrored the extended kinship networks of the British elite, but surpassed them. "Family" was based on loyalty. Neighbours, friends and adopted relatives were welcomed, while disgraced blood relatives could be rejected.⁴¹ Indeed, Lyons noted with admiration that most elite families adopted children and claimed it was a 'religious privilege' to do so.⁴²

The importance of religion to domestic ideology is another striking similarity. Russian Orthodoxy emphasised women's domestic role to the end of the imperial period, though after 1860 a liberal branch emerged that, as in the West, engaged with the "woman question" by manipulating women's domesticity to expand their accepted

³⁷ Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry*, p. 2; Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, p. 20.

³⁸ Eastlake, *Letters from the Shores of the Baltic*, Vol. II, pp. 189-190.

³⁹ J. Tovrov, 'Mother-Child Relationships among the Russian Nobility', in D. Ransel (Ed.), *The Family in Imperial Russia: New Lines of Historical Research* (London, 1978), pp. 17, 32-35.

⁴⁰ See S. Khvoshchinskaia, 'Reminiscences of Institute Life', in T. W. Clyman and J. Vowles (Eds.), *Russia Through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia* (New Haven, CN., 1996), pp. 79, 88; E. Lvova, 'From the Distant Past: Fragments from Childhood Memories', in T. W. Clyman and J. Vowles (Eds.), *Russia Through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia* (New Haven, CN., 1996), pp. 282-285; A. Verbitskaia, 'To My Reader', in T. W. Clyman and J. Vowles (Eds.), *Russia Through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia* (New Haven, CN., 1996), pp. 360, 366; G. Rzhavskaia, 'Memoirs', in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), p. 70; M. Ivankova, 'Letter to Her Mother', in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 71-73.

⁴¹ Tovrov, 'Mother-Child Relationships', p. 15; Engel, *Women in Russia, 1700-2000*, p. 37; Grot, 'From a Family Chronicle', p. 228.

⁴² Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry*, p.9.

roles.⁴³ However, the domestic ideology explored above survived these developments. Not long before the publication of Alexandra Kollontai's pamphlet, *Communism and the Family* (1920), proposing equality in marriage and collectivity in childcare, Natalia Grot argued women should be instilled with a sense of domestic duty, familial loyalty, piety, privacy and an acceptance of circumstance.⁴⁴ Russian domestic ideology was remarkably similar to that in Britain and was persistent in the face of challenge. Its more acute manifestations, however, hint at the adaptations it underwent to align with the Russian character and context.

It is important, therefore, to explore examples of certain shared experiences of marriage. One is of the arrangement of marriage. Schutte argues that British aristocratic women's marriage patterns were integral to, and are telling of, their identity formation. The inclusion of the family in considering a prospective match and persistent upper-class endogamy shows that family and rank preservation were the main considerations.⁴⁵ Similar observations can be made in Russia. Rahikainen has found that a woman's father's rank was the most important factor to prospective suitors and that the Russian elite also resisted exogamy until the revolutionary period.⁴⁶ Lady Eastlake noted the rarity of intermarriage between Russian nobles and English aristocrats.⁴⁷ Anna Vyubova recounted how anxiety about her marriage was overridden by the approval of her parents and the Empress, whom Vyubova regarded as a motherly figure.⁴⁸ In a very different case, Emiliia Pimenova used marriage to gain the independence to study in St Petersburg. After she ended her engagement with a man of her father's choosing who repudiated her ambitions, her father (temporarily) disowned her. Her subsequent marriage to a man she found more suitable (a mechanical engineer) was permitted only for her happiness. To compensate for the poor match her father used the occasion of the wedding for

⁴³ W. G. Wagner, "'Orthodox Domesticity': Creating a Social Role for Women", in M. D. Steinberg and H. J. Coleman (Eds.), *Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia* (Bloomington, IN., 2007), pp. 124, 125, 127, 130, 135, 139.

⁴⁴ Kollontai, *Communism and the Family*, p. 14-17; Grot, 'From a Family Chronicle', pp. 219, 238-239.

⁴⁵ Schutte, *Women, Rank and Marriage in the British Aristocracy*, pp. 11-13, 16, 19, 160-163.

⁴⁶ Rahikainen, 'The Fading of the Ancien Régime Mentality', pp. 28-29, 35, 38.

⁴⁷ Lady Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake, *Letters from the Shores of the Baltic, Vol. I* (London, 1842), p. 73.

⁴⁸ *Alexander Palace: Anna Vyubova, Memories of the Russian Court*, Ed. Bob Atchinson (2011), 'My Duties, Marriage and the Standart'; J. T. Fuhrmann, *Rasputin: A Life* (New York, 1990), p. 37.

political gain.⁴⁹ Clearly Russian elite women's marriage was a family affair, privileging family and status preservation.

Another experience is that of noblewomen's roles in marriage. The fathers of Anastasiia Verbitskaia, a Russian noblewoman, and Eglantyne Jebb, the upper-class English philanthropist, both expressed disapproval of their wives' endeavours that removed them from their children.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Varvara Tatishchevna's diary is telling of the flow of a Russian noblewoman's life. She experienced twelve pregnancies in twenty years of marriage, oversaw her children's education and recorded a monotonous pattern of trips to St Petersburg, her husband's long absences and visits from her relatives.⁵¹ This all adheres to a shared domestic ideology. But Tatishchevna recorded the salaries she issued: 1,200 roubles per year for a foreign nanny, later rising to 2,000.⁵² This record suggests that Tatishchevna had some control over, or at least input regarding, finances. Tenuous as this jump may seem it is justified, as Russian women were permitted by law to inherit and hold property. Furthermore, it was not uncommon for noblewomen to run estates for absentee husbands as the role was viewed as complementary to housewifery, perhaps due to this tradition of female property holders.⁵³ Therefore, while British and Russian noblewomen appear to have similar roles in marriage in relation to contemporary ideology and male expectations, in practice they could have significantly different experiences.

Finally, disenchantment with or rejection of marriage is a common theme with similar nuances. With the rise of the "woman question" globally, Britain saw the emergence of the "New Woman," a literary motif adopted as a feminist model to challenge social limits.⁵⁴ This was primarily a middle-class movement. The Russian counterpart had

⁴⁹ E. Pimenova, 'Bygone Days', in T. W. Clyman and J. Vowles (Eds.), *Russia Through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia* (New Haven, CN., 1996), pp. 312-315, 317, 319-321.

⁵⁰ Verbitskaia, 'To My Reader', p. 72. Anastasiia recalls her mother who transformed from an 'eternally pregnant' housebound wife into a society woman, to the displeasure of her father. L. Mahood, *Feminism and Voluntary Action: Eglantyne Jebb and Save the Children, 1876-1928* (New York, 2009), p. 28. Eglantyne's father disapproved of her mother's philanthropic work in Ireland because it took her away from her children.

⁵¹ V. Tatishcheva, 'From 1797, A Journal', in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 65-69.

⁵² Tatishcheva, 'From 1797, A Journal', pp. 66-67.

⁵³ Engel, *Women in Russia, 1700-2000*, p. 36.

⁵⁴ G. Buzwell, 'Daughters of Decadence: the New Woman in the Victorian fin de siècle', <<https://www.bl.uk/romantics-and-victorians/articles/daughters-of-decadence-the-new-woman-in-the-victorian-fin-de-siecle>>, Accessed 28/04/2017.

much more of an elite presence, perhaps due to the more charged social and political context of autocracy and radicalism in which the Russian nobility were intimately involved.⁵⁵ Nikolay Chernyshevsky's *What Is To Be Done?* (1862) proposed an answer to the "woman question" by providing a model for imitation. Vera Pavlovna, the protagonist, enters a fictitious marriage to escape parental oppression and devote herself to the revolutionary principles of egalitarianism and collectivity, practiced in her pragmatic marriage and her seamstresses' cooperative. While she does become a mother in her second marriage (a love match), she continues to pursue socially useful work as a physician.⁵⁶ Vera Figner followed this model in part. Her marriage in 1870 to a man who allowed her to study medicine in Zurich removed her from the guardianship of her father, who refused this request. The marriage did not last as her increasingly radical political views clashed with his relative conservatism.⁵⁷ Emilia Pimenova similarly entered a fictitious marriage. In Pimenova's case the marriage developed beyond pragmatism and she had two children, but she lamented the obstacle this presented to her aspirations:

I should not have turned this fictitious marriage into a real one... I had become a wife to my husband through passive acceptance and continued along that same path.⁵⁸

Both women used marriage in the hopes of escaping their expected paths and pursuing revolutionary ideals.⁵⁹ They were not anomalous. Sofia Kovalevskaia wrote:

Ask whatever noble family you would at that time [c.1860s], you always heard one and the same thing--the parents had quarreled with the children... An epidemic seemed to seize upon the children--especially the girls--an epidemic of fleeing from the parental roof.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ D. R. Brower, *Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia* (London, 1975), p. 41.

⁵⁶ *Internet Archive*: Nikolay Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky, *What Is To Be Done?*, Trans. N. H. Dole & S. S. Skidelsky (New York, 1886).

⁵⁷ Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, pp. 36, 39.

⁵⁸ Pimenova, 'Bygone Days', pp. 332-333.

⁵⁹ Vera Figner was even a top graduate of an elite girl's boarding school and was well positioned to enter Kazan high society, but she alleged that she became disillusioned with that life upon her return to her home after her graduation: Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, pp. 31-32, 35-36.

⁶⁰ Engel, 'The Emergence of Women Revolutionaries in Russia', p. 93.

Rejection of marriage therefore appears prominent among Russian noblewomen. This is most likely due to their greater exposure to, and involvement with, social and political conflicts, combined with a very specific literary model in tune with the more rapidly and radically polarizing Russian context.

In both nations, however, elite women could remain unmarried for reasons that had little to do with a socially or politically charged rejection of circumstance. Eglantyne Jebb grew up admiring a spinster aunt, was introduced to liberal views at Oxford, suffered a broken heart and had an ageing mother to care for, any of which may have influenced her decision never to marry. Similarly, Lady Eastlake remained unmarried until the age of forty, while Anna Vyrubova became a nun after her divorce. Since neither reflected on this personal predicament, it may simply be that neither felt inclined to marry and were not required to as opportunities for women increased. This epitomizes the difficulty of comparing personal experiences and the necessarily suggestive nature of this study.

Discourses on marriage and family life, the developments that impacted this and the considerations that took precedence in arranging an elite marriage match are strikingly similar in Russia and Britain. With this similarity the Russian noblewomen can confidently be identified as part of a consciously European nobility. However, the differences apparent in the manifestations of this ideology at an individual level are indicative of the importance of the national context and its cultural heritage. From Lyons's and Lady Eastlake's observations and the reflections of Tatishchevna, Figner, and Pimenova a distinct "Russianness" can be discerned from their obvious awareness of and sensitivity to the specificity of this national context.

Education

Exploring elite women's secondary and higher education is the natural next step in this study, for it is a cultural episode of nineteenth-century female elite life at the juncture between the domestic ideology just examined, which education often perpetuated, and the course of noblewomen's later lives, which education could

inform. Changes within elite women's education are significant, as they both reflected and informed the formation of socio-cultural norms.

Girls' boarding schools had proliferated in Russia and Britain to the 1860s, but this must be understood in relative terms. Whilst Russia's first boarding school, the Smolny Institute for Noble Maidens, was established in 1764, by the end of the eighteenth century the country still had considerably fewer than Britain.⁶¹ Although more followed after 1800, when girls' education became a more significant government concern, they remained rare. Private home education was far more common but training for domesticity was the universal focus. Indeed, this was a Europe-wide theme.⁶² "Feminine" subjects including languages, music, drawing, sewing and Christian moral values formed the body of girls' curriculums with a view to training better wives and mothers.⁶³ There is one obvious difference, however, between British and Russian elite girls' education: while the development of the former was largely driven by like-minded individuals, particularly strong female teachers, the latter was state directed.⁶⁴ Emphasis on loyalty to Orthodoxy and the autocracy was pervasive in the Russian system, and censorship of the curriculum was extensive: current literature, debates and recent history were largely absent.⁶⁵ Furthermore, in order to prevent outside influences, the Russian girls lived in isolation at the Institutes for up to nine years of study. At the beginning of the period therefore, Russian and British elite girls received a similar instruction in domesticity reflective of their shared domestic ideologies. The structure of this education in Russia, however, lagged behind the more democratic and liberal British system.

⁶¹ C. De Bellaigue, *Educating Women: Schooling and Identity in England and France, 1800-1867* (Oxford, 2007), p. 11. While De Bellaigue examines middle-class education, she notes the elite nature of such establishments as only 4% of school age girls attended private school in Oxfordshire in 1821, and only 3% in Manchester (p. 14); E. T. Ewing, 'From an Exclusive Privilege to a Right and an Obligation: Modern Russia', in J. C. Albisetti, J. Goodman, and R. Rogers (eds.), *Girls' Secondary Education in the Western World* (New York, 2010), p. 168.

⁶² De Bellaigue, *Educating Women*, p. 23; Rahikainen, 'The Fading of the Ancien Régime Mentality', p. 32; J. C. Albisetti, J. Goodman and R. Rogers, 'Girls' Secondary Education in the Western World: A Historical Introduction', in J. C. Albisetti, J. Goodman, and R. Rogers (Eds.), *Girls' Secondary Education in the Western World* (New York, 2010), p. 3.

⁶³ Albisetti, Goodman and Rogers, 'Girls' Secondary Education in the Western World', p. 3; Ewing, 'From an Exclusive Privilege to a Right and an Obligation: Modern Russia', p. 168; see Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, pp. 23-25.

⁶⁴ De Bellaigue, *Educating Women*, p. 16; Ewing, 'From an Exclusive Privilege to a Right and an Obligation: Modern Russia', pp. 168, 171.

⁶⁵ Ewing, 'From an Exclusive Privilege to a Right and an Obligation: Modern Russia', p. 168; Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, p. 23.

After 1860 the “woman question” accelerated developments in elite girls’ education, particularly the expansion of curriculums and the provision of university courses. In Britain increasing criticism of the frivolity of girls’ education resulted in a shift in focus towards strengthening mental powers in traditional domestic training, so that educated wives may be of ‘material service.’⁶⁶ For example, John Ruskin taught pupils the theory and philosophy of painting, but such change was largely adopted on an individual pupil or school basis.⁶⁷ Similarly, women were able to study a limited range of university subjects, but could not earn a full degree. In Russia, however, the government adopted a new education policy from 1868, opening three-year *gymnasia* and six-year *progymnasia* institutions. While foreign languages, handiwork, dancing and religious history were still central, *progymnasia* also taught arithmetic, Russian language, world geography, history, physics, and some natural sciences.⁶⁸ Furthermore, after the government prohibited the practice of noblewomen studying abroad in the 1860s, midwifery and nursing courses were opened at home. In both nations developments were based on the nation-building desire to make better wives and mothers, but this resulted in some liberal victories.

The socio-political tensions these developments caused in nations confronted with emerging feminist movements demanding further concessions are not difficult to discern. This is especially so in the autocratic, patriarchal Russian context with its reactionary climate from 1881 and the predominance of students among revolutionary groups.⁶⁹ Natalia Grot wrote:

If girls run through the streets to school they will feel the need for activity outside the home. The modern woman needs a public arena, on

⁶⁶ De Bellaigue, *Educating Women*, p. 172.

⁶⁷ De Bellaigue, *Educating Women*, pp. 175, 177.

⁶⁸ ‘Petition to Establish a School, Anna Virt’, in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 176-179; ‘Statute of the School Established by the Women’s Patriotic Society, Approved 7 April 1827’, in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), p. 181; ‘Statute on Women’s Gymnasiums and Progymnasiums of the Ministry of Education, approved 24 May 1870’, in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), pp. 181-184.

⁶⁹ The assassination of the reform-minded Alexander II in 1881 cemented the reactionary mindset of his successor, Alexander III and then Nicholas II. See D. R. Brower, *Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia* (London, 1975) for a thorough study on radicalism among the student population.

a level with a man. Women's education should not instil knowledge but arouse good will to bring them closer to Christian perfection.⁷⁰

Emiliia Pimenova epitomised this "modern woman." She recorded a conversation with other female medical students in which one woman said, 'I am sure very few of us feel a true vocation for the medical profession.' Emiliia reflected, 'this was not a flattering statement, but I had to agree with her...I had not even given it a thought!'.⁷¹ For Pimenova higher education offered an escape from the domesticity that Grot revered. It is clear education became a subject at the forefront of political discourse for many and threw different visions about society into sharp relief. This raises an important consideration for questions of national identity, for a new polarity appeared in Russian noblewomen's group identification. On the one hand were those who engaged with established radicalism or nascent feminism to reject traditional Russian gender roles. On the other were those who held fast to these. Both kinds of noblewomen continued to broadly resemble their British counterparts, as their ideas and the development of these share key features. However, as new pathways emerged after 1860 there was no longer a broadly homogenous class of Russian noblewoman in which one culture could establish dominance. With the expansion of education, ideological specificity in the national context, rather than the national specificity of Russian noblewomen themselves, became the central feature of identity construction.

This does not inhibit drawing comparisons across the period or between nations. Russian and British views on the effectiveness of Russian educational methods can demonstrate the continued degree of similarity between women of the two elites. Russian comment is largely confined to institutes and criticism is rife, the most common denunciation being that girls left naïve of the world. Sofia Khvoshchinskaia remembered that there was no library at the Ekaterininsky Institute in Moscow, from which she graduated in the 1840s.⁷² She also denounced the conservative, domineering character of the Institute and the matrons:

⁷⁰ Grot, 'From a Family Chronicle', pp. 239, 240.

⁷¹ Pimenova, 'Bygone Days', p. 325.

⁷² Khvoshchinskaia, 'Reminisces of Institute Life', p. 91.

Decorum, silence, an appearance of propriety, and obedience at all costs- these were the qualities one could expect from girls subdued by power alone... I don't think that the institute founders meant to develop only those qualities in us. In part perhaps, but not in such monstrous proportions.⁷³

Similarly, Vera Figner wrote of the Rodionovskii Institute in Kazan, from which she graduated in 1869:

As for scientific knowledge, or still more, intellectual training, those years at the school not only gave me almost nothing, but even retarded my spiritual development, not to mention the harm caused by the unnatural isolation from life and people.⁷⁴

Furthermore reading was not encouraged. Figner's mother directed her through this process, giving her novels during vacations that stimulated her intellectually and provided more valuable knowledge than she believed the Institute, with its emphasis on French dictation, penmanship and manners, ever did.⁷⁵ Such criticisms attest to the static nature of institute-led education in the face of educational reform throughout the period and across Russia. Furthermore, that two so different noblewomen—Khvoshchinskaia a woman of moderate sympathies and Figner a revolutionary—shared such strong criticism is indicative of the faithfulness of these assessments. The Englishwoman, however, believed that the Catherine Institute was an 'excellent establishment,' providing a 'brilliant education' in languages, geography, religion, Russian history and physics, as well as traditional accomplishments.⁷⁶ This suggests the Englishwoman found the Russian system to provide a familiar education to a high standard. Nevertheless, she too criticised the Russian methods, believing there was far too much restraint and attention to 'exterior and showy accomplishments.'⁷⁷ Consequently, 'in Russia there are few, it must be confessed, whom we should call well-informed people, among either the ladies or gentlemen.'⁷⁸ Despite the familiarity of the subject matter, the Russian

⁷³ Khvoshchinskaia, 'Reminiscences of Institute Life', p. 99.

⁷⁴ Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, p. 23.

⁷⁵ Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, pp. 23-28.

⁷⁶ *The Englishwoman in Russia*, pp. 241-242.

⁷⁷ *The Englishwoman in Russia*, pp. 242, 244, 245.

⁷⁸ *The Englishwoman in Russia*, p. 245.

means and end result of education for girls appears to be significantly different from what the Englishwoman was accustomed to. There is a sense that this education and the Russian women who were made distinct by it fell far short of the English standard. However, her identification of the same flaws as Figner and Khvoshchinskaia noted suggests a cross-cultural disaffection with a system that transcends these women's native national contexts. There appears to have been some degree of engagement with broad transnational ideological developments that produced universal standards of knowledge that were not met in a Russian system emphasising "frivolous" pursuits. This suggests a similarity between Russian and British noblewomen in the values that they esteemed and their ideas of how these should be achieved through education.

Foreign languages undoubtedly constituted one such cultivated value. Their presence in Russian elite girls' education is central to an assessment of their cultural exceptionalism and national identity. Marrese's findings are seminal: interchange between native and foreign tongues was found to be a common feature of noble correspondence, indicating that Russian noblewomen's bilingualism existed comfortably as part of their bicultural behaviour. Adoption of foreign languages was a conscious choice in the construction of cultural identity but did not replace the use of Russian or eclipse feelings of patriotism.⁷⁹ Sofia Khvoshchinskaia attests to this beautifully. She recalled that at the Ekaterininsky Institute there was a stringent French-only rule, but demonstrated how this did not preclude expressions of national identity by recounting a conversation she claimed to have overheard and explaining its significance. Two girls were talking about an idol:

One of them had said: "*Elle est belle comme, je ne sais, a queen.*"

The other replied: "*Je l'aime comme, je ne sais, an angel.*"

The point is that the Russian words [queen, angel] described her qualities more fully, but to be able to use the Russian words they had to qualify them with the words "je ne sais," otherwise they would be punished for violating the French-only rule.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Marrese, 'The Poetics of Everyday Behaviour' Revisited', pp. 701-702, 705, 716, 718-731.

⁸⁰ Khvoshchinskaia, 'Reminiscences of Institute Life', p. 82.

The belief that Russian provided the best means of expression indicates that a sense of Russian identity persisted amid the adoption of foreign customs. This emphasis on foreign languages was not confined to institute education: Varvara Tatishcheva recorded it in her diary when she employed a French nanny, a French governess and when her son began music lessons under German tuition.⁸¹ That these events were recorded in her diary, which otherwise documents significant family events, is telling of the prestige attached to them. Indeed, both Amelia Lyons and the anonymous Englishwoman attested that it was not uncommon to find a French, a German and an English employee in noble households for the purpose of privately educating the children.⁸² However, such multiculturalism is not limited to the Russian noblewomen. The British commentators remain fixed in an observer mind-set, commenting on Russians' mastery of languages while demonstrating their own participation in similar practices: the use of French to provide more detail in their observations and as the language of conversation with their hosts shows that this it is not a specifically Russian trait, something Marrese does not elaborate upon.⁸³ This use of French, both in conversations with foreigners of similar status and in addresses to their countrymen, was in fact an integral part of elite identity construction across Europe, affirming membership to a transnational nobility while not obscuring national identity.

As with domestic ideology, and partly due to its close connection with education, Russian and British theories of girls' education and the developments that these underwent are remarkably alike, though their manifestation reflects national specificities. Unlike experiences of domestic ideology, which were highly personal and demonstrate that differences could be considerable, Russian and British experiences of the manifestations of educational theory, which was far more impersonal, are much more similar. In fact, Russian and British elite women of similarly inclined thought came to bear more resemblance than Russian noblewomen on either side of the "woman question" debate. The identification by

⁸¹ Tatishcheva, 'From 1797, A Journal', pp. 66-67.

⁸² Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry*, p. 9; *The Englishwoman in Russia*, p. 244.

⁸³ Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry*, pp. 9, 71; Eastlake, *Letters from the Shores of the Baltic, Vol. II*, pp. 220-244; *The Englishwoman in Russia*, p. 244. In the latter two narratives the use of French phrases occurs throughout on a variety of subjects, but the frequency of this noticeably increases when the Russian noble class forms the specific subject of the observations. For example, see Eastlake, *Letters from the Shores of the Baltic, Vol. II*, pp. 220-244 on St Petersburg society, the imperial family, balls and other elite customs.

Russian and British women of the same issues in the Russian institutes and the choice to incorporate foreign languages as a part of everyday noble behaviour are salient examples emphasising the ways in which Russian education broadly reflected transnational elite practices, and fostered a multicultural noble identity. However, national sentiment appears pervasive, and it is clear that both Russian and British women felt the former to be distinctive from the latter. The significant lack of cultural exceptionalism in Russian educational practices and values does not equate to cultural uniformity with the British.

Vocations

Adopting a vocation was the life experience in which noblewomen could exercise the most control thanks to expanding opportunities. This choice often represented the apex of an individual's experience of social, educational and religious discourses. How an individual interpreted these in relation to their own person, through their multiculturalism and amid a changeable national and international social, political and intellectual climate, determined whether they adhered to or subverted expectations. It must be remembered, however, that while opportunities for noblewomen expanded, they were still fairly finite.

These women's roles as writers of autobiographies and travel narratives have been examined. However, many wrote other genres, warranting further examination of writing as a vocation. The content, forms of and reasons for writing have been the subjects of academic study, but are not crucial considerations here.⁸⁴ The conditions of Russian and British literary and noble culture that permitted and encouraged women to write are more important, as nineteenth-century salon culture—the juncture between these two sets of factors—combined with the arguments of the “woman question,” resulting in a proliferation of female writers in both nations. The elite salon, originating in pre-revolutionary France, allowed prominent intellectuals and nobles to share knowledge and refine tastes. It became a fixture of elite life across Europe as Enlightenment ideals spread, but its late appearance in Russia

⁸⁴ See A. Rosenholm & I. Savkina, “How Women Should Write”: Russian Women's Writing in the Nineteenth Century, in W. Rosslyn and A. Tosi (Eds.), *Women in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Lives and Culture* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 161- 207; Ledkovsky, Rosenthal and Zirin, ‘Introduction’, pp. xxvii-xli.

(c.1820-c1840) means that historians rightly emphasise its similarity only to the first French salons, focused on literature and the acquirement of *urbanité* among women.⁸⁵ By the same period in Britain, salon culture and noblewomen's involvement were much more political.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, in both cases noblewomen acted as guests and hostesses, demonstrating that cultural sharing was a behavioural norm. After the 1860s Russian noblewomen gained increasing freedom as writers. Maria Korsini, Evgenia Tur, Natalia Grot, Sofia Khvoshchinskaia, Princess Elizaveta Lvova, Anastasiia Verbitskaia and Alexandra Kollontai were all authors of fiction, essays, journal articles, or political pieces between 1840 and 1920. Furthermore, Tur held her own salons and established a journal, while Verbitskaia had her own publishing house. Similarly, Lady Elizabeth Eastlake wrote regularly for the *Quarterly Review*, a literary and political publication. Russian noblewomen across the class were active in sharing European customs to the same extent as, albeit later than, British women.

Noblewomen's roles as wives and mothers have been investigated as well, but conformity to female and domestic ideology is also evident in philanthropic work, as it was believed domesticity allowed women to exercise a civilising influence on society.⁸⁷ Lindenmeyr has found that Russia followed European developments in philanthropy closely but retained distinctive Russian features, notably an indiscriminate attitude to the poor. The rich had a moral duty to assist these unfortunate victims of circumstance for the benefit of the general good in a pervasive culture of personal giving, heavily influenced by Orthodox teachings. In this way Russian philanthropy was integral to national identity.⁸⁸ This affirms themes evident in some of the Russian memoirs. Vera Figner spent a period as a physician in Voronezh with her sister. As well as their medical duties, they opened a school and gave readings in peasant households. Figner wrote:

⁸⁵ Engel, *Women in Russia, 1700-2000*, p. 37; Ledkovsky, Rosenthal and Zirin, 'Introduction', p. xxix; Rosenholm and Savkina, "How Women Should Write", p. 165.

⁸⁶ Richardson, "Well-neighboured Houses", pp. 62-65.

⁸⁷ W. Rosslyn, 'Benevolent Ladies and Their Exertions for the Good of Humankind: V. A. Reprina, S. S. Meshcherskaia, and the Origins of Female Philanthropy in Early Nineteenth-Century Russia', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 84/1 (2006), pp. 54-55.

⁸⁸ A. Lindenmeyr, *Poverty is Not a Vice: Charity, Society, and the State in Imperial Russia* (Princeton, NJ., 1996), pp. 5, 8, 10, 23.

This life of ours... possessed such a bewitching charm, that even now it is pleasant for me to recall it; every moment we felt that we were needed. It was this consciousness of one's usefulness that was the magnetic force which drew our Russian youth into the village.⁸⁹

Despite her refutation of women's domesticity and of religion, Figner was still drawn to philanthropic social work by her 'Russian youth'. That she was able to do this work is largely due to her gender and station: due to her and her sister's manners and appearances neither the villagers nor the authorities imagined them to be nihilists.⁹⁰ Not only is Figner's nationalistic philanthropic feeling evident, but the social discourse that extended women's roles to social and philanthropic work can be discerned in her provision of help through medical care and knowledge. This highlights a significant area that Lindenmeyr could have explored further: Russian noblewomen's philanthropy addressed a range of social issues besides pauperism. Anna Vyubova's memoir attests to this. During the First World War she joined the Empress and her daughters in nursing work.⁹¹ Furthermore, after she was severely injured in a railway accident in 1915, she used her compensation to establish a convalescent hospital for wounded soldiers:

This, it is needless to say, became a great source of happiness to me, since I knew as well as the soldiers what it meant to be crippled and helpless... [But] not this action of mine, patriotic though it must have appeared, [and] no amount of devotion of the Empress to the wounded, sufficed to check the rapidly growing [anti-imperial] propaganda.⁹²

There is an uncontested adherence to Russian and European ideas of femininity, as her roles as nurse and patroness reflected women's supposedly innate caring nature. Furthermore, she draws an explicit connection between her philanthropy and her patriotism. Both accounts therefore demonstrate the highly personal nature of philanthropic work, but also its centrality to the Russian national character. This latter theme is all the more glaring for its appearance in the memoirs of two radically different noblewomen. English observers confirm this. The Englishwoman wrote that,

⁸⁹ Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, p. 56.

⁹⁰ Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, p. 54.

⁹¹ *Alexander Palace: Anna Vyubova, Memories of the Russian Court, '1914 - The Great War'*.

⁹² *Alexander Palace: Anna Vyubova, Memories of the Russian Court, 'Railroad Accident, Tsar at Stavka'*.

`in a thousand instances I have remarked acts of benevolence and charity that would do honour to the name of Russian,'⁹³ while Amelia Lyons declared:

I but rarely knew a case of distress left unrelieved, and I have frequently been astonished at the considerable personal inconvenience the Russians will cheerfully bear to afford assistance to anyone in a difficulty...⁹⁴

Their observations were likely informed by the contrast between the prevailing English view of poverty and pauperism—that it was a social evil requiring state direction to tackle—and the Russian culture of giving.⁹⁵ This explains their tones of admiration, suggesting Russian charity was carried out to a degree and with a dedication with which the English women were unfamiliar. When engaging in philanthropy these Russian noblewomen adhered firmly to a Russian cultural framework, which they and their observers equated with Russian national identity.

Finally, women as activists must be examined in the charged atmosphere of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, for activism was influenced more than any other vocation by an individual's character and experiences, shaped by their engagement with the national and international contexts. Vera Figner had a conventional noble upbringing and institute education. She became disillusioned with that life as she read socially and politically charged Russian literature outside of her domestically oriented schooling and took up radical socialism while studying in Zurich. She was active in the 1881 assassination of Alexander II, confessing her part with pride while incarcerated. She believed she had carried out her duty to her native land and was horrified at her mother's procurement of a commutation of her death sentence: she wanted 'to drain the cup to the end together with [her] comrades.'⁹⁶ Sofia Panina, in contrast, passionately pursued self-proclaimed apolitical social and philanthropic work, which she believed was the best means of forming a solid basis for a better Russian society. After the February Revolution she joined the Kadet party to disassociate herself from the socialists and became the only female

⁹³ *The Englishwoman in Russia*, p. 43.

⁹⁴ Lyons, *At Home with the Gentry*, p. 9.

⁹⁵ Lindenmeyr, *Poverty is Not a Vice*, pp. 9-12, 17; M. E. Rose, 'The Disappearing Pauper: Victorian Attitudes to the Relief of the Poor', in E. M. Sigsworth (Ed.), *In Search of Victorian Values: Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Thought and Society* (Manchester, 1988), pp. 56-58, 64.

⁹⁶ Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, pp. 16-17, 19, 23-31, 39, 75, 77, 156, 166, 186, 290.

assistant minister in the Provisional Government, first as Deputy Minister of State Welfare and later as an assistant Minister of Education. She did, however, take up activism against the Bolsheviks, who she believed were devastating her country.⁹⁷ Despite the different contexts, these two types of activism demonstrate the significance of Russian women's engagement with national and international developments. For Figner, this was facilitated by the freedom she acquired abroad to adopt new ideas about Russia and her role in it. For Panina, this occurred through her engagement with traditional philanthropy and social work, and her translation of this acceptable female role into an official government capacity. The English observers writing before 1860 unfortunately do not provide comment. A comparison of national and international influences on Russian and British women's activism may therefore be an area for further study with an amended source base. What can be tentatively concluded here is that Russian noblewomen did engage with pervasive international and national developments frequently in a variety of ways, but the production of the same end result—a strong national feeling—suggests international influences could not eclipse their sense of Russianness.

The adoption of adult vocations among noblewomen in the changeable Russian context provides insight into their engagement with the world around them on multiple levels, and the impact of this on a multicultural class that bore broad similarities to its British counterpart. The rise of the elite female writer and of the elite female revolutionary demonstrates that noblewomen's engagement with international cultures and developments impacted their life in their homeland. Interpretations of the national context and culture, seen in the specifically Russian traditions adhered to in philanthropy and alternative activism, had a similar influence. The production by both, however, of a class of Russian noblewomen discernably different from their British counterparts, with an obviously strong sense of national belonging, suggests that multiculturalism could not remove nationally constructed boundaries of cultural belonging. As a result of the multiculturalism that impacted Russian noblewomen at some juncture in their lives, they were extremely culturally flexible.

⁹⁷ Sofia Panina, 'On the Outskirts of St. Petersburg: Memoirs', in R. Bisha, J. M. Gheith, C. Holden and W. G. Wagner (Eds.), *Russian Women, 1698-1917: Experience and Expression, An Anthology of Sources* (Bloomington, IN., 2002), p. 366, 370-371; A. Lindemneyr, '“The First Woman in Russia”: Countess Sofia Panina and Women's Political Participation in the Revolutions of 1917', *Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography*, 9 (2016), p. 167.

Conclusion

This study has been limited to English language translations of Russian sources and has attempted to strike a balance between a breadth and depth of topics to examine the broad issue of Russian noblewomen's cultural exceptionalism. Mother-daughter relationships, noble girls' home and school education, and Russian noblewomen's activism could benefit from an in-depth study of Russian noblewomen's writings, especially the more numerous Russian language originals. They are a substantial, fruitful and underused resource. This article has demonstrated their potential. Firstly, such accounts have offered highly significant insights into the cultural norms of Russian noblewomen. Secondly, they have demonstrated the impact of both the rigid and flexible aspects of contemporary gender ideology at an individual level. Finally, they have indicated the ways in which cross-cultural contact informed noblewomen's culture and national identity, both collectively and individually.

The extent of cultural exceptionalism among Russian noblewomen must be assessed by degree. The adoption of similar ideologies as the British elite on marriage and family life, education and the "woman question," translating into remarkably similar experiences of arranging marriages, domesticity in marriage, expectations of education, the use of languages, and the rise of the elite female writer, suggests that Russian noblewomen were not culturally exceptional. Resemblance to their British sisters occurs at too great a degree throughout their lives and across the period to reasonably allow for this. However, the variations among women of the two elites in the different manifestations of similar ideologies, seen in responsibilities in marriage, trends in the rejection of marriage, Russia's fledgling secondary education prior to the 1860s, differences in philanthropic ideology and practice, and the nationalistic character of elite activists, indicate the significance of the national context. This influenced elite women's culture as much as, if not more than, their exposure to and engagement with European customs throughout the period.

Russian noblewomen were therefore highly active in the sharing of cultural ideologies and motifs, as Marrese argues. Their engagement with national and

international developments caused their group identification to splinter along several fault lines, making it difficult to delineate a single class of Russian noblewomen among which a single culture could exist. What is clear throughout, however, is that whatever path each woman took, Russian and European customs coexisted within individual, group and national identities.

Russian noblewomen were a part of a transnational European elite which did not preclude their identification as Russian. The sources have consistently demonstrated this, from Tatishcheva's diary highlighting married Russian noblewomen's unique responsibilities, to Figner's and Vyrubova's patriotism in philanthropy despite their radically different sympathies. The Russian noblewomen demonstrate an implicit sensitivity to, if not an explicit identification with, their Russian context that places national sentiment at the centre of their identities. The English observers have affirmed this throughout. Despite identifying points of comparison between the Russian women and themselves, they clearly perceived the Russian noblewomen as different. Therefore, there was not a *culturally exceptional* Russian noblewoman, but various *distinctively Russian* noblewomen, who were neither as culturally rigid as Grot believed nor as culturally fluid as Tur proposed.

Book Reviews

***Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe.* John H. Arnold. Joe Peake**

‘Since it is the task of the historian to look upon a particular fact as merely a link in a chain, to regard it in relation to some greater whole... the writer of history who desires to be more than a mere antiquarian must have a thorough theoretical training in those fields of inquiry with which his work is concerned... No theory, no history!’¹

The economist Werner Sombart wrote these words in 1929, and they are no less true for the present-day historian of the medieval period. The influence of long-dead economists and social scientists upon our field can be seen in the intellectual inheritance of its most renowned practitioners; Michael Postan drew heavily from the theories of Thomas Malthus when outlining his population-resources model of English demographics; Maurice Dobb, Rodney Hilton and Robert Brenner developed distinct Marxist approaches to the study of class, feudalism and popular revolt; and D. L. D’Avray and Jean-Claude Schmitt are just two prominent examples of how the social histories of lay religion and the medieval church continue to be informed by Durkheim and Weber. However, historians of the Middle Ages have traditionally maintained a distance between their discipline and the kind of ‘theory’ popular among social scientists and modernists. Since the late 1990s, Michel Foucault has been one of the most cited theorists in the humanities and yet medieval history has scarcely begun to engage with his theoretical frameworks as they have with those of Marx and Malthus.² Applications of Foucauldian approaches in medieval history tend to be found in the study of sexuality, and there remains considerable division among these scholars as to whether Foucault’s theories are useful tools for avoiding anachronistic readings or whether they themselves lend themselves to anachronistic readings.³ Furthermore, Foucault’s own work on the Middle Ages are sub-par

¹ W. Sombart, ‘Economic Theory and Economic History’, *The Economic History Review*, 2/1 (1929), p. 3.

² J. T. Nealon, *Foucault beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications since 1984* (Stanford, 2007), p. 1.

³ K. Phillips & B. Reay, *Sex before Sexuality: A Premodern History* (London, 2011), pp. 12-3.

compared to that which is concerned with the early-modern and modern periods, leading the majority of medievalists to dismiss them for their 'superficiality, lack of detail, and indifference to documents and their nuances.'⁴

The scholarship of John Arnold is therefore something of a rare breed in its reconciliation of Foucauldian theory and rigorous analysis of historical evidence. Arnold has throughout his career made a conscious effort to connect the study of medieval religion with wider meta-historical questions pertaining to the origins and nature of religious belief, its expression in religious activities, and its role in the formation of the in-group set apart from the out-group. To this end, Arnold's *Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe* draws on an area of Foucault's body of work that has received surprisingly little attention from medievalists; namely, Foucault's general theory of power. Foucault characterised power as both a positive and negative force, a horizontal 'grid of disciplinary coercions' that shape and maintain social cohesion.⁵ According to Foucault, this kind of disciplinary power became the primary means of governance in modern Europe, with earlier forms of governance relying on the power of sovereignty, state repression, and coercion.

Belief and Unbelief can be regarded as the culmination of a dialogue, traceable throughout Arnold's research, between this theory of power and the experiences of medieval Christians as they appear to us in the surviving record. In *Inquisition and Power* (2001), Arnold drew upon Foucauldian ideas of power in his evaluation of inquisition records from medieval Languedoc.⁶ He concluded that the inquisitorial discourse gave the 'confessing subject' a sense of empowerment, one which allowed them to take pleasure in voicing and unburdening themselves of their transgressive views and behaviours.⁷ This ambitious reading was criticised in several publications for paying insufficient attention to the fact that these confessions are mediated by the act of their recording by an inquisitor, rendering any conclusions regarding the

⁴ A. J. Frantzen, *Before the Closet: Same-Sex Love from "Beowulf" to "Angels in America"* (Chicago & London, 1998), pp. 7-11; For a less condemnatory assessment of Foucault's medieval studies, see A. C. Bartlett, 'Foucault's "Medievalism"', *Mystics Quarterly*, 20/1 (1994), pp. 11-4.

⁵ M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. and trans. C. Gordon (London, 1980), pp. 95-106.

⁶ J. H. Arnold, *Inquisition and Power: Catharism and the Confessing Subject in Medieval Languedoc* (Philadelphia, 2001), pp. 10-1.

⁷ Arnold, *Inquisition and Power*, pp. 10-1, 92-102

subject's general state of mind during confession highly suspect.⁸ *Belief and Unbelief* (2005) shows a development in methodology from a bold, sometimes ill-considered application of Foucauldian theory to one that is well-supported by the evidence and comprehensive in its analysis of how dissent manifested within a wider culture of religious orthodoxy. At no point in this volume do we get the impression of the integrity of the evidence being subordinated by a need to prove one theory or another – Foucault himself is cited only twice in the entire monograph. Instead, Arnold takes from theory that which can provide a useful interpretive model for contextualising his findings.

The structure of *Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe* may come across as unusual or haphazard to regular readers of medieval religious history. The book is divided into chapters with no regard for chronology or geography, and readers should not expect anything more than a cursory overview of the development of the medieval Catholic Church as an institution. Nor does Arnold rely on the standard formula of having an introduction and conclusion to frame his arguments; instead, his central argument is articulated through the organisation of the chapters themselves. The first chapter, *Belief*, serves as an introduction of sorts while establishing that individual belief was inseparable from religious practice, both individual and communal. The second chapter, *Acculturation*, follows this by discussing how the church was able to socialise medieval Christians to a specific set of beliefs through the promotion of certain practices. The third and fourth chapters take shift the focus away from the relationship of communal activity to individual belief and toward the communities themselves, namely the rituals, celebrations, devotions to saints, and other such activities that aided in their formation and consolidation. The fifth chapter *Selfhood* however takes the focus back to the individual and how he or she defined themselves in relation to church and community. Here Arnold draws our attention to the question of why some people chose to define themselves in opposition to those norms, and how these processes of acculturation and community-building could isolate and exclude individuals as well as integrate and acclimatise them. This leads us into the longest chapter and the cornerstone of this

⁸ B. Hamilton, 'Review: Inquisition and Power. Catharism and the Confessing Subject in Medieval Languedoc, by John H. Arnold', *The Catholic Historical Review*, 89/3 (2003), pp. 548-9; M. G. Pegg, 'Review: Inquisition and Power. Catharism and the Confessing Subject in Medieval Languedoc, by John H. Arnold', *Speculum*, 79/1 (2004), pp. 123-5.

volume, *Dissent*, which at its core asks the question: when an individual failed to be acculturated into the religious community, how did that community punish or reform that person?

Rather than being a purely modern phenomenon, Arnold has shown that the horizontal, disciplinary power of the social norm could be used by a medieval religious community to police the beliefs and behaviour of its members, rather than relying on the centralised power of the state or the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Whenever these authorities resorted to using force to punish dissent it did not demonstrate their power as much as signify its failure; public displays of penance were always preferred over violence or execution, as these displays reinforced 'the boundaries of transgression' as well as the church's capacity for mercy and forgiveness.⁹ Furthermore, these boundaries were produced and policed as much by lay believers as church authorities. Arnold uses the examples of Jews, lepers, prostitutes and heretics to discuss the precise ways in which 'the *process* of exclusion' could serve a positive social function for the excluders: 'the 'centre' was *produced* by positioning these groups at the social margins'.¹⁰ The discourse of orthodoxy thereby not only served a social function but enabled medieval people to make sense of themselves and the world they lived in. Arnold grounds this thesis in a close reading of inquisitorial records in which members of the community used their intimate knowledge of one another's transgressions to settle grudges, deflect inquisitorial attention, and define themselves in relation to the boundaries of heterodox and orthodox thought.¹¹

Where Foucault was prone to generalisation across time periods in developing his theory of power, Arnold historicises by incorporating those forms of power unique to a society where the supernatural was normalised and omnipresent. This is most evident in the fourth chapter, in which he discusses the means by which supernatural sources of power could be drawn upon by medieval lay people in order to navigate societal, ostensibly 'secular' power relations. Arnold uses cases of prosecution for the practice of magic to show how ordinary and marginalised lay people (such as

⁹ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 14-5.

¹⁰ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 118-23.

¹¹ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 201-7.

women and Muslims) could instrumentalise the supernatural in order to wield power in their communities, and the means by which ecclesiastical authorities sought to police and regulate this behaviour.¹² The line between sacred and secular power was similarly blurred in the cases of saints and holy men. Over the course of the Middle Ages, the path to sainthood became less the preserve of ‘powerful protector’ to those who embodied holiness in their ‘mode of life’, providing an ascetic counter or mitigation to the trappings of contemporary urban society ‘for the benefit of the wider community.’¹³ This development was prompted by the growth of urbanisation, literacy, and commerce. Penitential suffering provided comfort to the poor and alleviated the guilt of the rich. Mysticism and mendicant poverty, though heavily policed, provided exemplars. Hermit or reclusive communities, such as the beguines, offered women a path to holiness they would have difficulty achieving on their own. The activities of these holy men and women provided ‘models and patterns’ for others to follow in ‘apostolic imitation’, and Arnold grounds these patterns and groupings of holy people in terms of ‘factional power’ within communities.¹⁴

In his fifth chapter on selfhood Arnold challenges Foucault’s own separation between modern and medieval mentalities with respect to power and governance. The confessional and heretical discourses informed not only the way medieval people policed one another but also their own behaviours and thought processes, enabling the formation of individual Christian identities. Arnold identifies in medieval European society a form of ‘self-discipline’ promoted by a growing literature encouraging self-examination and reflection. Texts such as the Goodman of Paris’ instructions, as well as confessional literature, exerted a power over people that was ‘gentle, encouraging and caring... through being cared for, encouraged to improve ourselves, we are shaped.’¹⁵ In this argument Arnold goes beyond and even challenges Foucault’s assessment of the Middle Ages as ‘a cultural space free of the routine and disabling surveillance that, for Foucault, characterizes modern society.’¹⁶ In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault draws a very sharp divide between the spectacular and coercive methods by which medieval power was wielded and the ‘disciplinary power’ and

¹² Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 97-9.

¹³ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, p. 74.

¹⁴ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 71-83.

¹⁵ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 184-7.

¹⁶ Bartlett, ‘Foucault’s “Medievalism”’, p. 15.

'control through normalisation' which he believed was unique to modern industrialised societies.¹⁷ He furthermore characterised modern disciplinary power as one that was enacted 'upon bodies' and classical/medieval sovereign power as one that derived from material forces.¹⁸ Yet as Arnold points out, medieval ideas of selfhood and spirituality 'were often entwined with ideas about the body.' While it took a very different form in the Middle Ages to that of modern Europe, regulation of the body was as central to medieval Catholic Christianity as it was to the modern industrial state. Sin and temptation could enter through bodies, and so they required regulation through fasting, abstinence, and even whippings or beatings of one's own flesh as a means of self-discipline.¹⁹

This raises an important question for historians as to how far one can identify common cultural practices across time periods using theory that is in itself very much a product of a particular culture at a particular time. It would be anachronistic to argue in favour of 'bio-politics,' in the modern Foucauldian sense of the word, existing in medieval England; Arnold himself only narrowly avoids falling into this trap. Yet the question of whether terms such as 'identity' and 'discourse' can find a proper place in medieval history contains within it a greater problem: does the search for individual Christian identities within medieval discourses inevitably place too much emphasis on how individuals identified what they were not (heretic, Jew, Saracen), rather than what they actually were? Does a focus on the margins and the extraordinary obscure the everyday lived experience of the majority (a thesis that underpins the work of Eamon Duffy), or does the study of the centre and ordinary obscure the real, heterogeneous nature of medieval attitudes and identities?²⁰ Scholars such as Arnold take a view that studying the margins can tell us a great deal about the centre, that not doing so leads to a falsely homogenised view of the past, and that obedience and dissent exist on a spectrum rather than in bipolar opposition. It is only with regard to outright *Unbelief* that Arnold over-states his case, the word itself having connotations with modern atheism. Though Arnold is eager to distinguish between 'a complete rejection of God and the supernatural' and

¹⁷ M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, Trans. A. Sheridan (New York, 2nd Ed., 1995) p. 184

¹⁸ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 104.

¹⁹ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 187-8.

²⁰ E. Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580* (New Haven, CT., 2nd Ed., 2005)

disbelief of Catholic teachings as to the nature of God, his suggestion that cases of blasphemy and disbelief were under-reported implies that the examples that occur in inquisitorial records are merely the tip of the heretical iceberg.²¹ Readers should therefore exercise caution with this final section of the book not to come away with an exaggerated impression of the amount of unbelief – both in terms of the number of cases and their severity – present in medieval societies. For the sake of balance, reading this volume in conjunction with Duffy's highly partisan *The Stripping of the Altars* or Robert Swanson's *Church and Society in Late Medieval England*, which provides a much more cautious assessment of what constituted 'normal' belief and practice than that of Duffy and Arnold.

Arnold furthermore pays scant attention to the regular, everyday occurrences in which medieval people expressed their 'belief' or 'unbelief' in ways that did not involve explicit self-identification or overt expression of views in speech or writing. For instance, the interaction of economic activity and pious activity was central to how the majority of laywomen saw their role in their church and community; piecemeal work and 'church-keeping', charitable initiatives based around donations of moveable material goods, active leadership of 'life-cycle liturgies', and other self-directed endeavours of labour and performance, were common to women of multiple social strata.²² Where Arnold does briefly discuss the role of charity and communal organisation in fostering a church community with relation to guilds and festivals, women are surprisingly absent, and throughout the rest of *Belief and Unbelief* are discussed only in relation to how their gender was constructed and policed through discourse, such as through religious instruction or imitation of female saints. Furthermore, there is no sense here of how lay men or women expressed their piety 'through their pockets,' or of how lay people were increasingly empowered by their growing involvement in the day-to-day economic routines and structures of the parish church – developments which reached their apex during the time period covered by *Belief and Unbelief*.²³ It would be unfair to expect Arnold to provide as systematic and comprehensive overview of the economic aspect of medieval

²¹ Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief*, pp. 220-29

²² See: K. L. French, *Good Women of the Parish: Gender and Religion After the Black Death* (Philadelphia, 2008); C. Hill, *Women and Religion in Late Medieval Norwich* (Woodbridge, 2010)

²³ R. N. Swanson, *Church and Society in Late Medieval England* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 217-27, 253-308.

European religion in addition to his analysis of power and culture, and yet its omission entirely gives *Belief and Unbelief* a sense of incompleteness.

Overall, *Belief and Unbelief* is a lively and important study of how medieval religious believers exercised power and autonomy within the discourses of heresy/orthodoxy, belief/unbelief, and virtuous or sinful behaviour. Both historians and non-specialists will be pleased to find Arnold's writing is refreshingly free of the jargon and anachronism that pervades much of Foucauldian-influenced historical scholarship. Most significantly, it has demonstrated the value that historians of pre-modern societies may find in drawing upon approaches and methodologies from other disciplines.

The Colonial American Stage, 1665-1774: A Documentary Calendar.
William Burling and Odai Johnson.
Gary Fisher

There are perhaps fewer pleasanter discoveries in scholarship than when one finds that a particularly arduous task that is fundamental to one's own research has already been completed. Especially when said task has been completed with a greater degree of meticulousness and proficiency than would have been possible under one's own efforts. This is exactly the breed of revelation that Johnson and Burling offer in the form of *The Colonial American Stage, 1665 – 1774: A Documentary Calendar*.

Johnson and Burling frame their work as a response to the failings of contemporary scholarship on the subject of the colonial American stage, which they criticise as relying too heavily on individual anecdotes for evidence and allowing 'the assumptions of one historian [to become] the facts of another.'¹ Their text seeks to produce a single sourcebook of all extant materials relating to theatrical culture in the American colonies, re-examine previously published evidence and claims, and provide information from sources that were previously unavailable or unknown to researchers.² A set of objectives which, in this author's judgement, they complete with distinction. This is a text to which those writing henceforth on the subject of colonial American theatre will be indebted and those writing heretofore will be covetous.

The text is divided into two main sections. After a brief preface explaining the purpose and academic context of this work and a series of maps that ensure the reader is familiar with the geography of the American colonies, the first seventy pages are composed of a discussion of what the sources compiled within their calendar reveal about the theatrical culture of the American colonies. The remaining four hundred or so pages contain the actual documentary calendar of theatrical activity.

¹O. Johnson & W.J. Burling, *The Colonial American Stage, 1665 – 1774: A Documentary Calendar* (Madison, NJ., 2002), p. 11.

² Johnson & Burling, *The Colonial American Stage*, p. 9.

The first section begins by outlining the theatrical companies that were active in North America during this period and the professional training and lifestyles that travelling actors of differing degrees of professionalism might possess. Secondly, the nature of the presentation of plays is discussed. Johnson and Burling use the advertisements, reviews, and private records of companies to deduce what form the scenery, costumes, and music that were used in productions regularly took. They also examine the size of the lots upon which theatres were placed, financial records concerning the number of tickets sold, and the varieties of seating that were advertised in order to calculate the size and seating structure of various theatres concerning which no other evidence survives. Finally, they present the repertoires of plays different companies performed.

Following this discussion Johnson and Burling examine the opposition that early theatrical troupes faced whilst attempting to ply their trade in the Americas. They dissect this resistance into three broad categories: moral (religious opposition to the perceived immorality of the theatre), legislative (legal sanctions taken to prevent or limit theatrical activity), and economic (to prevent financial capital being removed from local communities). After which they discuss the steps that theatre companies took to either placate or avoid this opposition. Throughout this section examples from printed sermons, colonial legislation, and newspaper articles are presented to illustrate the precise nature of this opposition. They also closely examine the advertising materials of theatre troupes to show how companies were inventively adapting how they presented their shows (such as emphasising the noble moral sentiments espoused in the plays being performed or advertising that a portion of their profits will be donated to local charities) so as to attempt to assuage these fears.

Following this the economics of colonial theatre are discussed. Johnson and Burling use what few financial records that survive to demonstrate the costs and profitability of professional colonial theatre. They also discuss the alternative methods by which theatre companies attempted to supplement their income, such as offering musical or dance classes. Finally, the authors examine the nature of the audiences who attended such theatrical performances and the cross-section of society that they constituted. After briefly explaining the socio-economic composition of American audiences that attended these performances they move on to discuss the frequency

with which violent disturbances broke out amongst American audiences. They argue that, despite a few examples of outbreaks of violence during performances over the course of this period, American audiences were less violent than their contemporary British counterparts and 'were generally docile and predictable.'³ Johnson and Burling illustrate their discussion with quotations from contemporary newspaper articles reporting on such violent outbreaks and discuss the extent to which the propensity for audience violence varied according to region and audience makeup. This topic serves as a colourful and engaging conclusion to Johnson and Burling's discussion of the findings of their calendar.

Throughout the entirety of this first section the authors largely manage to avoid the temptation to enter into a potentially partisan discussion of this calendar's implications for broader questions concerning colonial theatrical culture. Instead they, for the most part, present a clinical discussion of the practices and trends revealed by their calendar.

There are however some exceptions to this. For example, in their discussion of the opposition that theatre troupes faced they claim that the economic criticisms that were voiced throughout this period were 'moral objections masquerading as financial objections' and that economic objection was simply 'a new approach for old enemies; having failed in their appeal on moral grounds, they resorted to economic objections.'⁴ While this claim is not necessarily incorrect, it risks straying into the potential minefield of debate concerning the motivations of colonial opponents of the theatre within which figures such as Peter Davis ply their trade and would no doubt take serious umbrage with such assertions.⁵ This subject is one which would perhaps require an entire monograph in of itself to adequately examine and, by writing off as they do the sincerity of economic objections to theatre within just over half a page, Johnson and Burling gloss over a topic that has been the subject of fierce academic debate.

Yet this example is an isolated one. For the most part the discussion of their calendar that is presented in this section avoids applying these results to broader

³ Johnson & Burling, *The Colonial American Stage*, p. 91.

⁴ Johnson & Burling, *The Colonial American Stage*, p. 78.

⁵ For further discussion of this subject see: P.A. Davis, 'Puritan Mercantilism and the Politics of Anti-Theatrical Legislation in Colonial America' in R. Engle & T.L. Miller, (Eds.) *The American Stage* (New York, 2006), pp. 18 – 29.

partisan debates that surround colonial theatrical culture. Instead it is largely an objective discussion of theatrical trends and practices that are identifiable within the calendar. A fact that ensures its utility to all scholars of colonial theatre.

The discussion of their calendar that Johnson and Burling present in their first section is tremendously valuable in of itself. That they compound this discussion by presenting alongside it the documentary calendar from which this information was drawn substantially increases the value of this text as it allows other researchers of colonial theatre to use their findings as an evidential basis for their own research.

The calendar provides a year by year account of theatrical activity not just in the thirteen colonies but throughout all of the northern Americas, including Nova Scotia and the Caribbean Islands. In addition to recording performances of plays they also record information concerning legislation enacted against the theatre, newspaper articles and personal diaries discussing various aspects of the theatre, and reviews of performances, and is no doubt the product of dedicated and rigorous processing of the extant corpus of evidence.

When detailing performances Johnson and Burling record information concerning the date, location, and venue of the performance in addition to, where available, the play(s) being performed, the company that were performing, the cast list, the ticket prices, and the original source whence the information is derived. These fields are presented in a consistent structure that renders this potentially irregular and unwieldy information easy to understand and process. The calendar of activity for each year is preceded by a brief prose description of the activity that occurred in that year. These annual descriptors make the calendars of activity immediately more engaging and serve to effectively and understandably contextualise the following data.

The accessibility of the calendar is further augmented by the sophisticated system of indexes the Johnson and Burling provide. Rather than simply providing one possibly unwieldy index recording all possible topics relating to colonial theatre that one might wish to search they instead offer three: a Person index that allows one to identify information pertaining to individuals active in the colonial theatrical scene, a Subject and Place index that allows one to identify information pertaining to activity that occurred in a particular location or related to a particular subject, and a Title and Author index that allows one to identify activity relating to specific plays or

playwrights. This is arguably the best way in which this information could have been presented within the format of a printed text to make this information as easily identifiable and accessible as possible.

Yet this leads on to what could possibly be considered the only significant criticism of the overall value of this work. Namely that a printed text is perhaps not the optimal format in which to present this information, especially for individuals hoping to use the information contained within the documentary calendar as part of their own research. The utility of this information would have been greatly enhanced had it been presented in some form of remotely accessible and searchable database. This would allow users to directly search for information relevant to their own investigations and compile their own data concerning performance frequencies and long term trends in theatrical culture.

It would be a mistake however to allow this criticism to draw attention away from the immense academic possibilities that this text provides. In spite of the limitations of their format Johnson and Burling have done an admirable job in compiling and presenting this information. As a direct result of their efforts future scholarship on the subject of colonial American theatre will no longer have to rely on using individual case studies to make assumptions about American theatrical culture at large but will instead be informed by a solid grounding in reliable evidence concerning theatrical activity. One can only hope that they take it upon themselves to produce further documentary calendars of a similar calibre that detail later periods of American theatrical history.

***Orientalism: Saïd and the Unsaid.* Daniel Martin Varisco.
David Robinson**

Edward Said's *Orientalism* is the seminal work proposing a ubiquitous 'othering' of the Orient by Europe, evident in canonical European literature from Aeschylus onwards, a process Said called 'orientalising'. Said claimed that the Orient was 'almost invented' by the West, as a feminised, exoticised, and eroticised space; an unchanging and unchangeable mirror-image of the rational, morally and culturally superior Occident.¹ 'Orientalising', claimed Said, was largely responsible for two centuries of European imperialism.² Attracting adoration and vitriol equally, Said was an American scholar with a Palestinian heritage, politically active in the cause of his cultural homeland.³ *Orientalism* has, consequently, a significant political edge, polarising opinion as either a brilliant expose of Western prejudice, or a polemical rant which 'invents' the West as equally as Said accuses the West of inventing the East. Regardless, *Orientalism* has remained in print since 1978 and 'its influence can hardly be disputed.'⁴ Credited by many as the founding text of post-colonialism, *Orientalism* remains one of the most cited academic works of modern times.⁵

Varisco's critique of Said brings together an enormous quantity of material published on Said, in a 'critical engagement with this powerful text and the ongoing debate over it'.⁶ The question is, why? As Varisco correctly identifies, *Orientalism* has elicited a veritable avalanche of responses, both supporting and attacking Said's thesis.⁷ In 1986, the scholar Bernard Lewis clashed with Said at the Middle East Studies Association convention, resulting largely in mutual abhorrence of each other's positions, and offering an example of the polarisation which Said's work has often

¹ E. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978), p. 1.

² Said, *Orientalism*, pp. 4-9.

³ Biography of Edward Said', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Said> (Accessed 2/3/16).

⁴ R. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford, 2001), p. 384.

⁵ D. Varisco, *Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid* (Seattle, WA., 2007), p. 313, note 41.

For citations, see 'cited references', Web of

Science http://apps.webofknowledge.com/Search.do?product=UA&SID=Y1PdZfOi2uAwmSwCOXc&search_mode=CitedReferenceSearch&prID=dc7c3175-895b-46a0-bdf0-d72377cf9522(Accessed 4/3/16).

⁶ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. xi.

⁷ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 17-20.

created.⁸ The impasse has barely been broken since, with Said's detractors perhaps best represented, in a wide field, by Ibn Warraq and Martin Kramer in lengthy refutations of Said's thesis.⁹ Said's supporters have long accepted the polemical nature of Said's work, although agreeing with much of his general thrust. An uneasy 'middle way' has been proposed, perhaps best represented by Fred Halliday and Aijaz Ahmad, who sympathise with Said's anger and political position but accept the flaws in a book they consider important and influential.¹⁰

Daniel Varisco calls his 501-page critique, 'two books about one book, the one book being Edward Said's 1978 work, *Orientalism*.'¹¹ Varisco's 'two books' are his critique of Said's thesis, and a further 200 pages of copious footnotes (over 1,700), bibliography and index. The book is prefaced with a note to the reader, an introduction, and then divided into three chapters, further sub-divided into numerous titled sections. Varisco writes clearly, notwithstanding my comments below, effectively exposing Said's polemic. Chapter one discusses the phenomenon of *Orientalism*, its impact on many fields of academic study, and how Said's thesis has been received, interpreted, and applied. Chapter two deconstructs Said's many historical errors, his critical omissions, and his representation of Orientals as unable to represent themselves. Chapter three focuses on the attractions of the orientalisating thesis and attempts to go beyond the polarised debate that has characterised the book since publication.

Varisco's aim is bold: to break the impasse and 'move beyond a referendum on Edward Said...to think outside the binary that binds us to us-versus-them-ism.'¹² He also claims to want to 'strengthen rather than jettison what Said has done', although Varisco's critique is fairly devastating.¹³ The author quotes Mahmoud Manzalaoui's comment that within Said's book, *Orientalism*, 'is a slimmer and genuinely excellent

⁸ The MESA Debate: The Scholars, the Media, and the Middle East', *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 16 (1987), pp. 85-104.

⁹ I. Warraq, *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism* (Amherst, MA., 2007); M. Kramer, *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America* (Seattle, WA., 2001).

¹⁰ F. Halliday, 'Orientalism and its Critics', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 20/2 (1993), pp. 145-63; A. Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (London, 1992), Chap. 5.

¹¹ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. xi.

¹² Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. xv-xvi.

¹³ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. xiii.

one trying to get out.’¹⁴ I suggest the same is true of Varisco’s genuinely comprehensive study of Said’s canonical work. I agree that Varisco has written ‘two books’ here, but in the sense of one book which attempts to go beyond what has been already said, and another that is a reference-work on Said. The former disappoints, whereas the latter is of great value to scholars of Said, those interested in representations of the East, and to historians, as an object lesson in how inaccurate history can be constructed very plausibly, as Varisco ably demonstrates Said has done.

The disappointment is that Varisco ultimately fails to move beyond the binaries he correctly identifies. At times, Varisco appears as polarised as those he criticises, attacking Kramer’s *Ivory Towers on Sand* as ‘an unseemly screed’ favoured by ‘the neocon clique’ responsible for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁵ With such a one-eyed attack on a pillar of the anti-Saidian response, Varisco inadvertently reproduces the binaries he claims to avoid.

One of Varisco’s reviewers commented that ‘Varisco seems convinced that he has written a very important book’, and this is indeed the case.¹⁶ For example, his opening note ‘To the Reader’, headed with a quote from Maria Rosa Menocal, asks ‘and is it not further tribute to his triumph to see more clearly what he was battling?’¹⁷ Turning to the notes, Varisco states that this quote actually refers to Dante, but that it equally applies to Said.¹⁸ Yet positioned at the start of the author’s explanation for writing the book, Varisco also implies tribute to his own triumph. Similarly, Varisco states that, although a must-read book for generations of scholars, *Orientalism* ‘is also a book with manifest flaws’ which require acknowledgment, ‘to prevent it becoming the kind of sacred text Said defined as problematically Orientalist. Were this not so, I would not have written this critique.’¹⁹ Of course, for many, *Orientalism* is *already* a sacred text, and Varisco’s critique is mostly not original, but predominantly a compilation of criticisms already

¹⁴ M. Manzalaoui, ‘Review of *Orientalism*’, *Modern Language Review*, 75 (1980), pp. 837-839, 837 in Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 13.

¹⁵ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. xiv-xv.

¹⁶ A. J. Caschetta, ‘Review of *Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid*’, *The Middle East Quarterly* (Winter, 2010), pp. 78-80, 78. <http://www.meforum.org/2607/reading-orientalism-said-and-the-unsaid> (Accessed 1/3/16).

¹⁷ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. xi.

¹⁸ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 307, note 2.

¹⁹ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 39.

made, as he readily admits.²⁰ Such self-importance, the impression that Varisco feels he was required to step into the breach to help us resolve that debate, somewhat distracts the reader from what is, as I will shortly discuss, a comprehensive and excellent summary of the same discussion. Varisco's real motive is perhaps revealed in his acknowledgements: to be Said's *bete noir*, the same role that Varisco's friend, Jacques Berlinerblau, played in his own deconstruction of Bernal's '*Black Athena*'.²¹

Similarly, Varisco's note prior to his introduction is unnecessary, given that the introduction is an expanded version of what he has just said. In fact, there is a lot of repetition of themes throughout the book: the polemical nature of Said's work; the polarised nature of the subsequent debate; summaries of protagonists on each side; the need to move beyond. Ironically, by continually stating how we must get past the vitriolic debate between supporters of Said and his detractors, Varisco tends to reproduce and reignite the very argument which he claims to navigate through. The number of examples Varisco gives to support his points throughout is impressive, but the constant repetition of *La problématique* slightly patronises the reader by suggesting they might not have understood previously what are perfectly clear points.

Varisco claims to use 'judicious satirical criticism' to interrogate Said.²² This amounts to the copious use of synthesised words and puns, starting with the title, *Said and the Unsaid*, and continuing with sentences such as 'he grew up in the literal Orient, at least the littoral Mediterranean portion.'²³ By the time we encounter 'a-meta-theoretical' and the 'dainty inferno-ization...of Dante', it becomes irritating, almost trivialising.²⁴ 'Satire' is a dangerous weapon to wield, indeed a two-edged sword, when it is not particularly funny. Other expressions are simply incomprehensible, such as 'antimetaphysical literary archaeology'.²⁵

²⁰ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. xi.

²¹ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. x.

²² Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. xi.

²³ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 37.

²⁴ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 255.

²⁵ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 253.

If all of this suggests a book which is not very good, that is not the case, indeed Varisco's is the first book to bring together such a wealth of material.²⁶ Varisco starts with an interesting analysis of Said's personal choice of cover-picture, Gerome's *Le charmeur des serpents*, which shows a naked boy snake-charming for an assembled audience of elderly eastern men. Varisco points out the polemical use of this picture, the typical portrayal of Orientals as lascivious sexual deviants, demonstrating that Said is rhetoricising before a page has been turned. Varisco contrasts this with his own choice of cover-picture, Dinet's *Le charmeur de vipères*, a snake-charming picture which offers an alternative view of Orientals.²⁷ Of course, Said would say that Varisco's choice is also a stereotype of the mystical and exotic East.

Analysing Said's polemical style, Varisco makes the powerful point that Said uses vague language such as 'almost', 'more or less', 'mainly, or 'nearly' very regularly as rhetorical devices to avoid the need for precision and accuracy, and in doing so, appears to have proved points which, in fact, he has not.²⁸ Varisco's point about Said's use of language is also another example of his repetition, given that he makes the same, albeit very good, point on the previous page, and nearly fifty pages previously when he first describes Said's 'trope of the adverbial caveat.'²⁹

Said's three definitions of 'orientalising' are very effectively taken to task, showing how Said ensnares anyone commenting on the Orient as responsible for a discourse of domination used to justify imperialism.³⁰ Varisco uses a vast array of historiography to demonstrate this point, before bringing the argument together in his own summary to show how Said performs 'a post hoc sleight of hand' by assuming that the extent of rapacious western colonisation means 'orientalism as a specific and absolute discourse must exist', and therefore scholars of the East must be responsible for such discourse.³¹ As Varisco points out, Said avoids mentioning the long list of Orientalist academics who have long declared their antipathy to biased interpretations of the Orient.³² This is an example of one of Varisco's strengths,

²⁶ D. Cannadine, 'Review', *Common Knowledge*, 15 (2009), p. 510. In University of Washington Press <https://www.washington.edu/uwpress/search/books/VARREC.html> (Accessed 5/3/16).

²⁷ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 24-7.

²⁸ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 100.

²⁹ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 56.

³⁰ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 41-56

³¹ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 54.

³² Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 41-44.

discussing what Said fails to say in his selective use of evidence;³³ another is his point that the very word 'Western' is related to the Arabic for 'strange', in one of many cases of 'reverse orientalism' which Said ignores.³⁴

Scattered throughout this analysis are examples of Said's lack of historical method. Varisco argues effectively that ancient Greece had no sense of themselves as 'Europeans', and that Persia did not represent an 'Orient', therefore accusations of the former 'othering' the latter cannot represent Western 'orientalising' and are anachronistic.³⁵ Varisco could have gone further and shown the extent to which Greek statuary was influenced by Egyptian art.³⁶ Such examples are a prelude to perhaps the best part of the book, where Varisco highlights Said's manifest historical errors across every period, referencing figures as diverse as Bernard of Clairvaux, to Elizabeth I and Napoleon.³⁷ Discussing the latter's campaign in Egypt, and the 'imagined' Orient that Said's literary analysis claims Napoleon's mind invented, an idea which Said derived from the 'relatively minor historical study' by Jean Thiry, Varisco demonstrates how Said is more interested in a constructed Orient than he is with the real historical interplay between the French, English, and Ottoman presences in Egypt.³⁸ Varisco's grasp of the broad historiography here is seen in the footnotes, where he offers us three alternative studies of Napoleon's expedition from different points in the twentieth century.³⁹

Surprisingly, given his stated aim of 'strengthening' Said's work, Varisco's coverage of orientalising within the travel-literature genre is thin, particularly as post-colonialists have used this genre to show exactly the kind of orientalising Said proposes, as justification for imperialism, and for epistemological and territorial appropriation.⁴⁰ Although included in the bibliography, the index shows no entries for Nigel Leask, Ann Stoler, or Mary Pratt, all of whom have made significant

³³ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 73-78.

³⁴ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 67.

³⁵ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 63-6.

³⁶ Metropolitan Museum of Art <https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/32.11.1/> (Accessed 4/3/16).

³⁷ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 83-125.

³⁸ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 123-5.

³⁹ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 359, note 176.

⁴⁰ Varisco, *Unsaid*, pp. 224-30.

contributions built on Said's work.⁴¹ Varisco's ambivalence towards Said is never really resolved, as demonstrated by his reviewers. Whereas one claims that Varisco 'attempts mightily to buoy up Said's sinking reputation',⁴² another, reproduced by the publisher, claims that 'this book will enrage Said's many admirers and win the applause of his many detractors'.⁴³

Unfortunately, the end is disappointing. 'Beyond the Binary', which should have offered the reader the much-heralded passage through the polarised response to Said, in fact simply repeats the problem. Varisco's conclusion is that 'the best way to battle misleading binary thinking is to get on with sound academic scholarship and spend less time rhetorically damming the binary itself'.⁴⁴ Yet condemning the binary is exactly what Varisco spends three hundred pages doing, and, as he states himself, academic scholarship has already moved on, has already accepted Varisco's self-evident conclusion.⁴⁵ Ultimately, Varisco fails in his ambitious objective of moving the debate 'beyond the binary', and perhaps actually reproduces it. This may explain the luke-warm reception from his reviewers and the relatively few citations the book has generated.⁴⁶ This is a pity because, as a reference-work on Said's *Orientalism*, this is the most complete book in its field.

⁴¹ For example: M.L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes* (London, 1992); A.L. Stoler & F. Cooper., *Tensions of Empire* (Berkeley, CA., 1997), N., Leask, *Curiosity and the Aesthetics of Travel Writing, 1770-1840: From an Antique Land* (Oxford, 2002).

⁴² Caschetta, 'Review', p. 78.

⁴³ Cannadine, 'Review', p. 510.

⁴⁴ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 303.

⁴⁵ Varisco, *Unsaid*, p. 301.

⁴⁶ Web of Science, 'cited

references' http://apps.webofknowledge.com/Search.do?product=UA&SID=Z15nyCFJaIGG5E8AARN&search_mode=CitedReferenceSearch&prID=60289532-3654-41ec-9d4c-fbcada1eb8ee (Accessed 5/3/16).

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